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THE BOUNDARY AWARD IN THE PUNJAB

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It is with c onsiderable diffidence that I address an audience which undoubtedly contains many whose knowledge of the Punjab and its problems is far greater than my own; all that I dare to claim is that by training I should not be altogether unfitted to give a straightforward account of the process of partition, which may serve to put the present troubles in perspective. It will be apparent that, while I hope to maintain the strictest adherence to fact and to be impartial in that sense, in matters of opinion I am in general sup ort of the Muslim case. I was not a detached observer nor in any way officially attached to the Boundary Commission; my position, in fact, was that of an expert witness, bound absolutely to adhere to fact, but also bound to consider the interpretations more favourable to the side he is serving. The latter obligation no longer holds, but I still feel the Muslim case on merits the better of the two: that the official Muslim claim was less than that which I suggested in 1943, when of my many Indian friends just one was a Muslim, is I think evidence of good faith.

This support of the Muslim claim does not mean that I was or am in favour of Pakistan as a thing in itself. I recognize but regret its inevitability, and in published and unpublished studies of the problem my general conclusions were unfavourable to Pakistan in most aspects. But, once

given Pakistan, it seems to me essential statesmanship that it should have good working frontiers, an adequate territory, and if possible no sense of grievance to imperil the future relations of two countries in which, despite all that has happened, the prosperity of the one is inextricably bound up with that of the other.

My criticism of parties or persons must therefore be taken as referring to this concrete case only; in Bengal, for instance, I think the merits and demirits of the rival claims about equal, moderation if any being on the Hindu side; and, though I have not yet been able to examine the award in detail, I think that perhaps it leans a little to the Muslim side. Over the whole period since 1937, when I was first able to take a close interest in Indian affairs, my views and sympathies would be by no means so antipathetic to the Congress cause as this paper in isolation would suggest.

I hope it is superfluous to say that none of my criticisms are personally motivated. One expression of personal feeling, however, I must make, and that is to express my gratitude to the Ahmdiyya Muslim community, whose headquarters is at Qadian in Gurdaspur district, and at whose instance I went out as a geographer with some knowledge of boundary problems. The professional experience thus gained was invaluable, and I received the most perfect hospitality and amazingly efficient technical service; the organization and spirit of the Ahmadiyya are indeed most remarkable.

The Area in Dispute

The Punjab may be considered as consisting of two wings, a western along the Indus and an eastern between Sutlej and Jumna; and a central block consisting of the doabs or areas between the five rivers Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The western wing and all but a fringe of the eastern along Sutlej were not in dispute; the battle ranged over the central doabs and especially over the easternmost,

the Upper Bari Doab between Beas and Ravi. This contains three of the richest and most densely populated Districts: Lahore, with the capital of the Province, the fifth largest and one of the finest cities of India; Amritsar, with a 53.5 per cent non-Muslim majority and the most famous centre of Sikh devotion; and Gurdaspur, a very marginal district, culturally very strongly Muslim but with a Muslim majority of only 51.14 per cent. After the acceptance of partition by all parties in June, 1947, interim governments were set up in East and West Punjab, their areas being defined by a "national" division based on simple district majorities; the division ran along the Beas and Sutlej, except where Amritsar brought a broad salient of East Punjab territory into the Bari Doab. The final limits were to be decided by a Bounday Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was also chairman of the Bengal Boundary Commission. Although this arrangement has the obvious advantage of uniformity, it is no reflection on Sir Cyril to suggest that the imposition of this tremendous double burden on one man may have been in itself unwise.

The Commission Procedure

The procedure of the Commission was itself perhaps unfortunate. The Commission consisted of four judges, two Muslims, a Hindu, and a Sikh, before whom the cases were legally argued, Congress opening and closing the debate. The arguments were conducted with courtesy and at times with humour; but the protagonists were simple advocates, bound to present extreme cases, and with no powers to seek an agreed compromise by bargaining. It may have been thought that this would be the function of the judges; but they had no mandate from anybody, and it is not perhaps surprising that they declined so invidious a role, and on essentials divided two and two. In the upshot Sir Cyril has thus to take all decisions on his sole responsibility. It

would certainly seem that this quasi-judicial procedure (perhaps adopted to avoid long-drawn bargaining) was not that best suited to the situation, and that negotiations between plenipotentiaries at the highest possible level might have been preferable. Here, however, as in so many aspects of the affair, the presence of the Sikhs as a vitally interested third party greatly complicated matters. Sir Cyril did not attend the sittings, and this I think was wise. The final deliberations of the judges with each other and with the chairman took place in the cooler atmosphere of Simla.

Terms of Reference

The code of the terms of reference was as follows: "To demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab, on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslim and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors." The very general rider in the latter sentence gave rise to much subtle disputation, Congress and Sikhs quite naturally seeking to elevate "other factors" to practical primacy. Congress and Sikh claims were to all intent identical and will be treated as one, although Congress was a little less explicit than the Sikhs in the extreme south-west. The boundary claimed ran along the Chenab for about 100 miles in the north, and then trended south-west to a point about 20 miles from Multan. It may be said straight away that this was a fantastic claim, and as far as Congress at least was concerned obviously a bargaining one which they would have been shocked to get, though the Sikhs were probably in earnest. Four main lines of argument were adduced: economic, strategic, population, and the location of Sikh holy places.

The Economic Issue

The strongest arguments were certainly economic. It was not disputable that in many districts the largest landowners were Sikhs, though this was to some extent offset by double-counting in the original statistics, since the same man might be returned as a holder in several villages. In ten villages only this double-count amounted to nearly 1,000 and clearly this affects large holders rather than the small Muslim peasantry. The Sikh case on its economic side in fact rested very largely on a confusion, very appropriate to feudal conditions, between private property in land (which no one was proposing to expropriate) and territorial sovereignty. The admitted Muslim majorities were dismissed as consisting mainly of menials, village artisans, urban floaters, at best very small peasants, of little account in rural economy. Yet, as Sir Zafrullah Khan remarked, it is the village carpenters and blacksmiths who make the Persian wheels go round.

On the Congress side emphasis was naturally placed on the preponderant share of non-Muslims in trade and industry, and the figures were certainly very striking. Thus in Lahore, Montgomery, and Lyallpur Districts only 101 of 270 registered factories were Muslim-owned; in Lahore City only seven of ninety-seven banks and two of fifteen insurance offices were Muslim, and non-Muslim traders paid nearly 5¼ lacs sales tax against two-thirds of a lac Muslims. These are certainly facts which deserve serious considerations, though one may feel that they are hardly such as should be adduced by a free India, being suspiciously like some of those formerly advanced in justification of British rule; it is generally conceded that both non-Muslims in the Punjab and British in India got a few pice return on their crores of outlay. On a different level this admitted economic domination formed much of the raison d'etre of the claim for Pakistan itself;

for well-known historical and geographical reasons non-Muslims has far more than a numerically proportionate share of economic power, and the deman for separation has been in large part the reaction of a rising Muslim bourgeoisie (I use the term technically, not morally), who find the best places pre-empted. Weight must clearly be given to these economic considerations, but to give them decisive importance would be to negate the principle of self-determination which, rightly or wrongly, was the primary factor on any reasonable interpretation of the terms of reference. Perhaps the weight attached to the economic factor depends on the relative significance one attaches to the rights of man and the rights of property; a difficult problem, as they are incommensurates.

The Strategic Issue

If the economic claim was strongest, the strategic was weakest. Some play was made with the statement that the Chenab line would be a good defensive frontier to both sides. This is sheer absurdity. Pakistan, with no heavy industry, would be dependent on war supplies through Karachi, and an advance of less than 40 miles from the Congress-Sikh line would break the 520-mile double track railway from Karachi and the two single lines to the north (one actually on or inside the Congress-Sikh line), which are all the communications Pakistan has. In effect, Pakistan would be cut in two and defence would be hopeless. On the Muslim line a 40-mile advance would not compromise beyond retrieving the defence even of East Punjab, much better supplied with railways, let alone the immense depth of India behind it.

Distribution of Communities

The population aspect is enormously complicated by the unfortunate distribution of the Sikhs. They number over 10 per cent. of the population in eleven Districts, but in none have they an absolute majority, and in only one, Ludhiana, are they even the largest community. In the Amritsar District itself they are only 36 per cent. and in the city 20 per cent. On the other h

On the other hand, in six of the eight Districts west of the Beas-Sutlej line, where Sikhs are over 10 per cent., Muslims are over 60 per cent. I do not think that further argument is needed to show the impracticability of meeting their claims; the disparities are too great to be outweighed by "other factors". It is true that the whole area claimed by Congress and Sikhs was called a contiguous non-Muslim majority area; but this is true only if the undisputed east is included. It is surely fair to take the disputed area only, and here, without calling the undisputed west to their aid, the Muslims have a clear majority. Village figures for the 1941 Census are not available in England (they are not always intelligible when available), but of a total of some 13, 600, 000 people in the disputed are at least 7,840,000 or over 57 per cent were Muslims; and the method I have used certainly understates the number of Muslims, who are probably nearer 8,000,000. Moreover, by parity of reasoning, the Muslims might well claim the entire Punjab as a "contiguous Muslim majority area".

The general reliability of the 1941 Census was strongly impugned by Congress on the grounds of under-representation of non-Muslims. In 1941, however, all parties were keenly aware of the issues, and while over-representation probably took place there are no grounds for supposing that it did not take place pretty equally all round; in any case, it was simply not possible to get behind the 1941 figures. The only definite cases cited were a few of intimidation of Scheduled Castes to return themselves as Sikhs; this was defended on the remarkable ground that this was not cheating between and non-Muslims and Muslims, only between friends. In any case, the Census was implicitly relied on for the construction of the

Congress "Red Map". This showed two long irregular bands between Sutlej and Ravi, and Ravi and Chenab, as non-Muslim majority areas, rather miraculously joined up in the north, with no non-Muslim but plenty of Muslim detached islands.

This, on the face of it, is a somewhat remarkable distribution of population, and one's suspicions were not dispelled by the statement of the basis of construction: "Anything from a district to a village"! This was, of course, gerrymandering in the original American sense of the term; how it worked can be seen from Chunian tahsil, where the areas of each side were about equal. On examination the Muslim majority in their half turned out to be 85,706, the non-Muslim in theirs exactly 1,100. In Lahore City, where the 1941 Census really was inaccurate, there was some Muslim majority on any reckoning, and it can be shown conclusively from the age and sex structure that the stable non-floating element of the population is predominantly Muslim. On a population basis, therefore, I think the non-Muslim had no case; especially as the calculations in nearly all instances were on a simple Muslim or non-Muslim basis, whereas it is very highly probable that a good majority of the Scheduled Castes and Indian Christians would opt for Pakistan.

The Holy Places

There remains the difficult question of the Sikh holy places. I do not think that when Mr. Butler and Mr. Henderson discussed the matte r they can have been aware that, according to the Sikh leader Ganga Singh, there were no fewer than 700 Sikh shrines scattered all over the Punjab, With all due respect to deeply held religious feelings, it is difficult to think that many of them were of such importance that responsible leaders of a community of 5,000,000 should found a claim to territorial domination on them and thereby imperil the peaceful relations of the remaining 400,000,000 of the sub-continent; yet this is in effect what has happened. Here we are in a realm of subjectivism.

where argument is in vain.

Summing up, it is hardly too much to say that the extreme Congress-Sikh claim amounted to accepting Pakistan in words to deny it in deeds; since it is hardly contestable that the Punjab will have to be the economic and fiscal mainstay of Pakistan, and the Chenab frontier would leave little of the Punjab worth having. Again, it must in fairness be remembered that this was in all probability regarded as a bargaining case, at least by Congress.

The Muslim Claim

Turning to the Muslim claim, this was slightly amended after Congress had introduced the strategic argument, and in its final form ran along the latter and just beyond the Ludhiana-Ferozepore railway and the Bikaner Canal. This line is little beyond the limit of absolutely contiguous Muslim majorities, except in the east of the Bist Doab, the angle between Beas and Sutlej. Here the Siwalik crest was claimed to give a strategic frontier, though I myself think that a better argument is the economic one that control over deforestation and soil erosion in the hills is vital to the agriculture of the plains below; nor is there any strong reason why a boundary should not run down from the crest splitting the doab, except that it would hamper the execution of the projected Bist Doab canal.

However, considered simply as a boundary, this line is probably technically better than any other suggested, including the actual award and my own favourite the Beas-Sutlej line, although from a strategic point of view it should have been advanced a few miles between Luchiana and Ferozpore to give some tactical cover to the railway.

The line is well defined almost throughout, not by shifting rivers, but by a marked mountain crest or by visible artificial objects subject in any case to

administrative surveillance, such as canals and railways; it causes the minimum splitting of canal systems (except in so far as they are already cut up by Patiala and other States), and is crossed by few railways. The original line was criticized by Congress because it was cut by six railways; but their own line simply took over existing local boundaries without any examination of how far these suitable for international boundaries, with the ludicrous result that in the 35 miles or so between Shorkot Road and Khanewal there were six crossings by the same railway, and for 10 miles the boundary would actually run down the middle of a single-track railway. There are other factors more important than technical simplicity, however, and though I think the Muslim line quite a legitimate claim, as these things go, it does not of course follow that it would have been a fair award.

The Award

Sir Cyril's Award - it is its one great merit - does reduce the minorities on either side to what is probably the minimum possible: some 27 per cent. of the former Muslim population of the Punjab was left to the east and 32.5 per cent. of the non-Muslims to the west, in each case about 4,000,000 people. It fails, inevitably, to avoid splitting the Sikhs or the canals; but it is difficult to feel that it is in fact drawn on the principle of contiguous majority areas which Sir Cyril's report accepts as the fundamental basis. Literal adherence to this principle would, of course, be absurd, but I feel that a closer approximation could be made without undue violence to "other factors". Clearly, too, tahsil boundaries are not sacrosanct, since Kasur tahsil is split for no very clear reason. This being so, it is difficult to see why Gurdaspur district should not have been allotted to West Punjab, with the boundaries modified in the north and south to give contiguous non-Muslim majority areas beyond the Madhupur headworks and adjoining Amritsar tahsil to East Punjab.

It is true that communally Gurdaspur has a bare Muslim majority, but culturally it was overwhelmingly Muslim, and it was, perhaps, the only area in the Bari Doab where Muslims were in the lead industrially.

Ita allocation to East Punjab secures the flank of the Amritsar salient, which reaches to within 17 miles of Lahore, while if allotted to Pakistan it would in no way endanger the defence of India. If East Punjab had to come west to the Beas-Sutlej line - and given the special attachment of the Sikhs to Amritsar this may well seem inevitable -- there seems no very good case for extending it beyond the two tahsils of Amritsar and Tarn Taran, especially as there is no corresponding concessionas regards the Muslim areas below the Beas-Sutlej confluence. The difficulties are, of course, tremendous, and it is true that it is not possible to draw an entirely just line, still less one which could satisfy more than one side; but with a full appreciation of all this, I do not feel that the award is the best approximation that could have been made.

The fundamental difficulty, once again, is the scattered distribution of the Sikhs. There is much in the argument that they would be better off en bloc in Pakistan; if only Ambala division were dtached, and excluding States, they would form nearly 15 per cent. of the population of the Punjab, the key Province of Pakistan - a minority too big and too tough to be treated without due considération. But this is an outsider's view, and it has not commended itself to the community, although at various times some of their leaders have seemed to glimpse this apparently obvious point. In the event, one cannot resist the conclusion that their leadership lacked longer vision, and that the vehemence with which they pressed their claims has led to an attempt at securing peace for a month or two at the possible price of lasting bitterness between Pakistan and India -- and

Pakistan and Britain - and has not even attained its limited objective. It must also be said that boundary disputes not terminated by war are normally solved by compromise; and a map of the disputed area with a boundaryd drawn, say, along the Beas-Sutlej would certainly look superficially very lop-sided; the Muslim claim was so near their communal limits as to leave room for manoeuvre. It is possible that this may have weighed subconsciously with Sir Cyril, and he certainly could not reasonably be blamed if it did.

The Status Quo

But whatever boundary one might wish to see, whatever one may think of the Award, I think one point is certain beyond dispute, and that is the folly of any revisionist movement. To reopen the question of the frontiers now, while the Punjab is still in a state of indescribable ferment, would surely be fatal to the chances of restoring peace and order; and an "other factor" of a different order from those argued before the Commission is at the head of the agenda. The rains have been late and little over very much of the sub-continent, but have now produced disasterous floods; it is no exaggeration to say that famine and actual starvation will be the lot of millions of peaceful Hindus and Muslims in food-deficit areas if the fields of the Punjab are long abandoned, its food stocks and standing crops ravaged, its towns anarchic or half-dead, and its transport utterly disrupted, as they now are. There has been effected, in the most dreadful manner it is true, a mass migration, with numbers probably running into millions, which will pretty certainly leave no considerable areas with Muslim majorities in the east or Hindu-Sikh majorities in the west. Some measures for the rehabilitation of the dispossessed in their new homes have apparently already been taken, but one wonders how much of the winter wheat crop will be planted.

When more settled conditions return, as I am confident they will, it will, then be pointless to press for revision other, perhaps, than minor adjustments. Pakistan's grain and India's manufactures are needed each to each; but the first and most pressing needs, without which the others cannot be satisfied, are peace and order. The atmosphere in the two Dominions before August 15 seemed far more hopeful than it had been durning the war or in the early months of this year. The Punjab disaster - it is no less - has been an infinitely distressing blow to the hopes of those who would wish to be friends to both countries. But it is far too early to take a pessimistic general view, and I feel sure that there exist sufficient reserves of statemanship to set the two Dominions on the road of co-operation so vital to the abiding interests of them both.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A Joint meeting of the East India Association and the Overseas League was held at Overseas House, St. James's, S.W.I., on Tuesday, October 7, 1947, to hear the foregoing paper by Dr. Oskar Spate, M.A., Ph.D.

Sir Henry Craik, Bart, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., presided, and said that it was his pleasant duty on behalf of the Council of the Overseas League to extend a cordial welcome to the East India Association and its members. He was glad to see that the Association had formed what he hoped would become a regular habit of having its meetings in Overseas House. They of the Overseas League were always delighted to seem them.

Passing to the subject of the paper, he said that most people were interested not so much in the actual working of the Boundary Commission as in the consequences which flowed from it, and they all had some idea of how deplorable and tragic those consequences were. He would only say this, that he was certain that their sympathies as members of an Association

deeply interested in India would go out to the unfortunate inhabitants of the Punjab who were now suffering under this terrible, almost unspeakable, tragedy. But today it was not so much the consequences which concerned them as the actual working of the Boundary Commission itself, and he thought it would be as well if, before he called upon Dr. Spate to read his paper, he gave a sort of time-table which would furnish an idea of the background against which the Commission was formed and operated.

The story might be said to begin with the statement of His Majesty's Government on June 3rd last that power would completely transferred by the middle of August. That statement was accepted with a varying degree of reluctance by the different parties in India, and a few days later a statement announced the procedure that was to be used for ascertaining the views of the people of the Punjab and Bengal as regards the partition of these two Provinces. Immediately after that statement was made, by the middle of June, "interim" Governments were set up in the two parts of the Punjab - that is, the two parts into which it was known or thought likely to be divided. It was also announced that Boundary Commissions would be set up for the Punjab and Bengal to "demarcate" the actual boundaries, and about this time the leaders of the various political parties promised on behalf of their followers to accept and abide by the findings of those Commissions. It is now known what those guarantees were worth. Those of them who knew the country knew at the time what they were worth, and now the whole world knew. On June 23 the Punjab Legislative Assembly met in two parts, and, as expected by everyone, the representatives of the Western Punjab decided for Pakistan and those of the Eastern Punjab decided to be in India. A few days later the terms of reference and the composition of the Boundary Commission were announced. Dr. Spate would deal with the terms of reference.

As regards the composition of the Commission, it consisted of four High Court judges, two of whom were Muslims, one was a Hindu, and one a Sikh, and it was provided that in the event of disagreement an eminent English lawyer, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who was appointed chairman of both Commissions, was to come to a decision. It was clear, of course, that with a Commission of that composition there would be no agreement, and they all knew there was not. Then the Commission began its work. It sat to hear evidence and arguments from July 21 to 31. On August 15 the official transfer of power was formally carried out. Actually the administration had practically completely broken down before that, and though power was formally handed over it was very difficult to say to whom it was transferred. On August 17, the Commission having failed to agree, as was to be expected, and having referred the very brief document, merely stating that after the close of the public sittings the Commission adjourned to Simla and discussion were entered upon in the hope of presenting an agreed. decision. It soon became evident that the difergence of opinion was so wide that an agreed solution was not to be obtained. In these circumstances Sir Cyril's colleagues assented to the conclusion that he must proceed to give his own decision, and he gave it in one page of foolscap with a long appendix describing in detail the actual boundary. He concluded by saying that he was conscious that the award could not go far towards satisfying the sentiments and aspirations, deeply held on either side but directly in conflict, as to the placing of the boundary. If means were to be found for satisfying them in full they must be found in political arrangements with which he (Sir Cyril Radcliffe) was not concerned.

He would now say a word about Dr. Oskar Spate. Dr. Spate was a Lecturer in Geography in the London School of Economics and an expert in boundary questions. He was asked

to go out and help the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims, whose headquarters at Qadian were very near the disputed boundary, to present their case before the Boundary Commission, their case being that Qadian should be included in Pakistan. The finding of the Commission was against them and Qadian was included in India. Dr. Spate went out as an expert in geographical matters. After Dr. Spate had read his paper,

The Chairman said that they were much indebted to Dr. Spate for his clear, interesting, and objective description of the work of the Commission. An invitation had been sent to Sir Cyril Radcliffe to come to that meetings, but, in declining it, he said that he had read with admiration Dr. Spate's paper and was grateful to him for the clarity and moderation with which he had dealt with the subject, but he did not hink that it would be suitable for him to take part in any public discussion on the award. Now that he had given the award and had said as much as he thought it helpful to say in the body of the award, he felt that he must keep silence - doubtless a wise decision.

A few things had occurred to him while Dr. Spate was describing the work of the Commission. The first was the extremely vague character of the terms of reference. The Commission was instructed "to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab, on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it would also take into account other factors". There were two words in those terms which were about as ambiguous as words could be. One was the word "areas" and the other word "factors". Many of those present at that meeting were people who had held great administrative appointments, and they would agree with him that there was no more fatal mistake that an administrator could make than to be ambiguous in his language.

Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a very eminent leader of the Bar, was chosen as chairman not only of this Commission but of the Bengal Commission as well, and in effect that meant that he could not be present at either Commission; he was not in fact at any of the sittings certainly of this Commission, and he did not think of the Bengal Commission either. That was not his fault, it was in the nature of things. It was also in the nature of the composition of the Commission that the whole onus of making the decision was on his shoulders alone. He was no doubt a very able man, entirely judicial in his outlook and impartial, but he had had put upon his shoulders a burden impossible to discharge. He did not think that Sir Cyril Radcliffe could be blamed for the consequences of the award of the Commission. His award was probaboy as fair and impartial as any award could be, but he was faced with an impossible task.

In the proceedings of the Commission nobody had the power to nogotiate an agreed decision. But, of course, the greatest difficulty in the whole business, in his judgment, was the inordinate desire for a speedy decision at any cost. He had already given to the meeting the salient dates, starting from the announcement of June 3 and finishing up on August 15. Thus an attempt was made in little more than two months to settle a problem which had engaged the attention of the greatest brains in this country and in India for thirty years. Grave constitutional issues could not be settled in that way. The result was that when power was handed over and when that day came which everybody had eagerly awaited, the day of "the gift of freedom to India," what it really amounted to was a hasty, ill-considered, and disorderly liquidation of all our interests there. India was handed over, and we did not care to whom it was handed over as long as we got out of it. The result was that we handed it over to chaos. The Punjab was now in a state where, in the disputed area, the great towns

had been largely destroyed and almost every village obliterated. What had been a year or two ago a prosperous, happy, and peaceful countryside had been reduced to something like the state of Poland when the Nazi hordes had overrun it. There were many of those present who knew and had worked in that Province and who could not regard all this from a cold, detached point of view.

He thought perhaps the most pithy comment on the results of partition of the Punjab occurred in something he read the other day which had not yet been published in this country. When Pandit Nehru and the Prime Minister of Pakistan were recently on tour together in the Montgomery district of the Punjab a joint statement was issued every day be four Hindu journalists accompanying Mr. Nehru. They stated that on one occasion the party passed many Muslim refugees moving wewtwards and presently found the road blocked by a vast procession of refugees, mostly Sikhs, marching eastwards. Mr Nehru was greatly impressed by this mass movement, and he asked a group of people where they had come from. A typical rustic woman, without knowing to whom she was talking, said: "If you wanted partition of the country, why did you not at first make arrangements?" She had hit the bull's-eye, and it was not recorded that the Prime Minister of India was able to find a reply.

Brigadier J.G. Smyth, V.C., said that he felt rather strongly on this question, having been intimately connected with Sikhs during the whole of his service, and that he was in very great sympathy with what they had been suffering during the last two or three months. He knew the Sikh for/a rather truclent person when his blood was up. He could only bear out what the Chairman had said, that the transfer of power to India was due to take place in June of next year and then suddenly the Government

of India found or were advised that the organization was breqking down and decided that this transfer should take place on August 15. In making that decision the British were tremendously lacking in courage. They would not take the slighest risk themselves of things going wrong. The one idea of the Government at home was to offload this nasty problem before it "blew up" on them.

The Sikh trouble should have been realized and adequate steps should have been taken beforehand to see that as soon as the trouble started it was dealt with vigorously. In India conflagrations started suddenly and if tackled at once they probably went out. He remembered taking a Sikh battalion to a Muslim country (Chitral), and the authorities in India were considerably alarmed at what was going to happen. He said, however, "Don't worry, the men are going to be so tired in the evening that all they will want to do is to go to sleep, and provided you allow them leave all will be well". It turned out that all was well and there was not a single incident during their two years in Chitral. If they had taken the precaution of stationing all the available troops at the trouble centre before the award was announced, the minute the troubles took place there would have been some chance of putting them down with a firm hand. It was no good blaming the military authorities. They had an utterly impossible task. They had to divide the Indian Army and to decide what was to happen to the Gurkhas and the British officers. A little Boundary Force of four brigades was alloted to look after that enormous area.

The thing we ought to be thinking about now was what we could do about it in this country. The thing that infuriated him in London was the attitude of the Government here. Their attitude seemed to be, "We have been very clever. We have done this just in time, and now it is none of our business". He thought that attitude utterly unworthy, and

he urged that although it was impo-sible to send back British troops into India, the British Government, who after all were responsible for these people, should do all it could by way of consultation and by means of funds for relief of famine.

Lord Mountbatten had made a mistake when he accepted the Governor-Generalship of one Dominion. He had been Viceroy of the whole of India and the original idea was that he should be Governor-General of both Dominions. When that was not agreed to it was a mistake that he should be Governor-General of one of them.

Sir Blyth Wace said that he did not wish in this connection to make any criticism of the general idea of partitioning at short notice, but to speak very briefly about the way in which the actual partitioning struck an officer who had not only spent all his own service in the Province but had family connections with it going back to the Mutiny. It was, naturally, difficult to speak of this subject without emotion. Two points, however, he did want to mention in connection with what Dr. Spate had said. These concerned the Punjab canal colonies and the Sikhs. It seemed obvious that partition of the Punjab would present the greatest difficulty because of the canal colonies. These colonies were the economic heart of the Province in almost every conceivable way. They fed the Province and there was a constant link between the old settled districts and the canal colonies. It was the Sikhs who founded the prosperity of the first Punjab colonies. When that great experiment was introduced there was difficulty in finding peasants to cultivate these previously desert areas, and it was the Sikhs who provided the most enterprising element.

If one toured in any of the colonies or, again, in any of the closely settled districts of the Punjab it

would be realized that the two were really intimately linked together. To split them up was almost impossible. Any solution which proposed to split up the whole Punjab cut at the economic life of the Province, and this would have its effect not only on the Province but on the whole of India. During the last war years he was responsible for the Food Department of the Punjab, including the collection and distribution of food and rationing, and it was more and more clear that if the Punjab colonies were in any way disrupted or disorganized the feeding of the India became enormously more difficult. He could see very little hope of early alleviation. It would be a long time before cultivation could get back to its previous standards, and marketing and transport had also been disrupted.

There was the further question whether it was possible to re-establish confidence and peace in the Punjab colonies.

The Sikh case deserved a great deal of sympathy, although he thought Sikh leadership was at fault in not trying to concentrate earlier on arriving at an agreement with the Muslims.

Mr. William Kirkpatrick said that he had seen the appaling atrocities which Hindus and Muslims could commit each upon the other, but it must be remembered that there were thousands of Unscheduled Classes who were overlooked by both Muslim and Indian leaders. Unless little details of that sort were considered there would be such trouble in India for the next twenty years as had been seen for the last quarter of a century in China.

Sir Lionel Haworth asked whether they were going to leave the Punjab question alone or to take its lesson

for the rest of India. The Government in making this hasty decision were quite convinced that in doing so they were advising the two parties to come together. Could anything illustrate better the ignorance of the people in England? Every one of those who had had experience in India knew what was going to happen. Those who had served in that country had had the experience of arranging that, for example, a Hindu and a Muslim procession to be held on the same day should never be allowed to meet. How could the British Parliament composed of men who had never been in the East make wise decisions about an Oriental Empire ?

Mr. M.A. Bajwa, the Imam of the London Mosque, gave figures of population of Gurdaspur district, and pointed out that in two of the three tahsils that had gone over to the East Punjab Muslims were far more than a mere marginal majority, for there were 55.07 per cent. in Batala tahsil, 52.15 percent. in Gurdaspur tahsil. Christians desired to be in Pakistan, so they should also be counted on the side of the Muslims. This meant that in Batala tahsil 60.53 per cent. desired to go over to Pakistan and 39.47 per cent. to India, and in Gurdaspur tahsil 59.24 per cent. whished to go over to Pakistan and 40.76 per cent. to India. If this contiguous majority Muslim area had not been excluded from Pakistan it would have remained safe from the orgy of murder, bloodshed, and arson perpetrated by lawless bands with the connivance and, in some cases, active co-operation of the Hindu and Sikh police and military.

The world-centre of the law-abiding and peaceful Ahmadiyya community was situated in Batala tahsil. Not-withstanding our remaining peaceful and despite assurances of the Prime Minister of Indian Union, this holy centre of the movement seems to be receiving more than its share of death and destruction. It was said that bigger forces in

Jullundar and Hoshiarpur, etc., would have suppressed this trouble. He said in view of what these forces of law and order had done in Gurdaspur, and especially Qadian, this view did appear to be very accurate. The Imam read a cable about Qadian, dated October 5, showing that the town was being looted, occupied by Sikhs, and the police and military were indulging in indiscriminate shootings, two being killed in a mosque. He added that Britain could not shake off her responsibilities for the bloodshed and destruction that has been going on and still continues in some places. So far as Qadian and Gurdaspur district were concerned, the opportunity for the atrocities came with the award of the British president of the Boundary Commission, who thereby placed responsibility directly upon the British people.

A Member asked whether, when the Russians started moving, it would bring about a coalescence of the various Indian groups.

Dr. Spate, in reply, said that the last question hardly came within his terms of reference. He thought in the first place that Russia had quite enough on her hands and that for some time at least India might be spared the friendly solicitude of either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A.

He was not quite in agreement with some of the speakers in what they had said about the British Government. The British Government in a very short time would have found itself in the position either of trying to control India with such a large proportion of the educated classes against the Government that the wheels of administration would go hopelessly round in the air, or it would have found itself committed sooner or later to an attempt to restore peace and keep order which would have ended in taking sides in civil war and the British would have had a super-Palestine

on their hands. So much for the question of expediency. He agreed that the question of morals was more difficult and there was something in the argument that we were responsible for the masses of India. But the thing that summed it up for him was the remark made by one of his Muslim friends in Bombay during the war - a young fellow who had no political ideas at all - who said to him, "Do you think the British will really keep their promise to let us go after the war is over?" He could only say that he hoped so. There was a moral responsibility to those who had supported us during the war on the basis of those promises, and tnat was the other side of the picture.

He agreed with the Chairman about the ambiguity of the terms of reference. They were not merely ambiguous but inaccurate. The word "demarcate" suggested surveying a line with theodolites and putting in concrete posts, whereas what was intended was simply to define the area.

As to the general situation in India, he thought that, distressing as affairs were, it was too early to be completely pessimistic. Both Governments did accept the award. This acceptance might appear to have been compromised by the things that had happened, but the fact did remain that neither Government had in any way attempted to overstep the boundaries fixed by the award. The boundaries had been respected by both sides. There were signs that the really responsible people on both sides did realize the vital importance of pulling together.

One speaker had made a comparison of India with China. It was a good comparison. Since the 1911 in China there had been bloodshed up and down the country, and

yet in the last war, if it had been said to an intelligent Chinese, "It is true that there is frightful taxation, famine, oppression, and misery in China; would it not be better to be run efficiently by a country like Japan?" what would he have said? That was what Indian also would say.

The meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the chairman and the author.

Professor Kirpal Singh.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PARTITION

By Sir Arthur Waugh, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Since I received the honour of being invited to address you, I have had time to reflect on various good reasons against doing so. I left India some eight months ago, during which time events have proceeded at a speed hitherto unknown. Again, up to its final hour, the All-India Civil Service remained an undermanned, overworked body; and, as always, it is the onlooker who sees most of the game. More important, in Sir Archibald Rowlands and others, we have distinguished members who have recently seen with their own eyes what the first-fruits of partition are, and who have a clearer view of the shape of things to come than I can claim. My excuse for being here must be the persuasive charm of our esteemed friend Sir Frank Brown, and he must share responsibility for my remarks.

Nevertheless, there are two fundamental economic facts which nothing short of a miracle is likely to alter. Obvious though they may be, it is necessary, I think, to restate them as the unavoidable background to economic policy in the two Dominions. The first fact is that the subcontinent is overwhelmingly agricultural in character; the second that she is not far from the brink of starvation.

The Countryside

Let me recall that nearly nine-tenths of the people live in the 700,000 villages which dot the landscape from end to end. Agriculture is the direct occupation of three-fourths

of them. Poverty is extreme by any Western standards. Life is very much a question of consuming the equivalent of what you grow, with only the most slender of margins to purchase the other necessities of life - clothing, oil, and salt. The yield of the main food crops - wheat, rice, and so on - averages only one-third of a ton per acre, or, with irrigation, one-half a ton, compared with Japan's pre-war yield of over one ton. There is little truly cultivable waste left, except in established grazing grounds, or in some of the forests. And it is vital to conserve, even to extend, the forests, if the mighty rivers of the Himalayas and the central plateau are to be harnessed for irrigation and power. With a population which has risen from 100 to 400 millions in a century, and which is still rising by some 5 millions a year, the hunger question grows more and more acute. At the meagre figure of 8 to 12 ounces of grain per head a day this additional population would require an additional 400,000 to 600,000 tons every year, progressively. The sub-continent was already importing a million tons of what a year before the war; and in October last India's Food Minister estimated his present need of imports at over 2 million tons. To those of us who in 1943 saw villagers streaming into Calcutta, often to die on the pavements or as they stood in the food queues, the Bengal famine came as the first clear warning that the country can no longer support the burden of an ever-growing population. The guant visitor who used to come only for brief visits when the monsoon failed has (at last) taken up his position on the doorstep.

How was this fundamental problem being tackled on the eve of partition? Briefly, the Central Government and the Provincial Governments came, I think, to realise as never before the imperative need of growing more food per acre. And so originated great new irrigation and power-producing schemes such as the Damodar Valley project for Bengal and Bihar; the Mahanadi scheme for Orissa; the Sarda and Garhwal

schemes for the United Provinces; the Bhakra Dam, and a new Himalayan headworks, for the Punjab; a second barrage on the Indus for Sind. The first of several fertilizer schemes originated by the old Central Government, the erection of a fertilizer factory in Bihar, is in hand. It is designed to produce 350,000 tons of ammonium sulphate a year, a quantity sufficient for over 9 million acres, and, properly used, capable of producing an extra million tons of food. It was scheduled to be in production by the end of this year. These schemes transcend provincial and State boundaries. In this fertilizer factory the major Provinces are shareholders, to be supplied, impartially, according to their investment and their indents.

But it will take time to manufacture, ship, and assemble the equipment for these projects. Nature may not wait for Man's attempts to meet the situation. Last October India's Food Minister stated that the Dominions held only fourteen days' stock of food (except for one Province). About the same time Pakistan's Food Minister said that, owing to floods in East Bengal and the Punjab troubles. Pakistan would have no immediate surplus for export. Viewed against this background of internal shortage and world scarcity the continuance of strife between the two Dominions is an appaling tragedy.

The Industrial Background

I have said a good deal about the agricultural background because of its intrinsic importance. But it is true that the sub-continent is poorly industralized for its size and people. She has exported to themanufacturing countries large quantities of raw materials of industry: manganese ore, bauxite, mica, wool to the Western hemisphere; raw jute to Britain and the U.S.A.; groundnut oil and pig-iron to Britain; steel scrap to Japan; raw cotton to China. Of the

major industires only the textile, coal, and steel industries have so developed as to meet the bulk of the country's needs. The policy of trying to convert a much larger share of the country's raw materials into goods, within the country itself, is very understandable. Think of the manpower available, and of the contrast between India's 30 million tons of coal a year and Britain's 200 million tons, between India's 1 million tons of steel and Britain's 14 million tons. Moreover, the sub-continent's leaders have realized the need for a strong engineering industry in the interests of defence,

Another lesson learned in the war is the need for dispersal when establishing new industrial units. The existing steel works lie on the borders of Bengal and Bihar, on the principal fields of coal, iron ore, and limestone. Seventy-five per cent. of all the existing engineering capacity is concentrated in West Bengal and Bihar. And although the Central Government had adopted a policy of "dispersing" the factories even before the war, the long haul from the coalfields and the steel works to the northern, western, and southern regions gives the railways a task to which they are hardly equal.

There you have a major trouble for the two Dominions. The railways are not in a state to move all that needs to be moved for day-to-day requirements. To take one item of which we in Britain hear every day; coal. India's coal production reached its peak figure of 30 million tons in 1946. In 1947 it was heading for 32 million tons. But pithead stocks, usually very low in December -- say, 250, 000 tons - are reported at over 1 million tons. Coal production has therefore to be restricted for lack of room to stock and because the railways cannot turn the wagons found quickly.

Labour Unrest

A second major trouble is labour unrest. The workman is oppressed by insecurity, bad housing, scarcity, rising prices. For example, Cawnpore, the industrial centre of the United Provinces, has a population which rose in the war to about 700,000. But it has housing for 250,000 only. The conditions can be imagined. As to scarcity, it was estimated in 1943 that the cultivator need only eat one extra ounce a day for the towns to starve. No wonder that labour is an easy prey to agitators who promise an early millennium through revolution, strikes, sabotage, and the like. The trade union movement has still to find a solid basis.

In mentioning such adverse factors, I do not wish to be thought discouraging. Only it would be wrong to ignore structural weaknesses which have to be remedied. There are welcome signs in both Dominions that leaders in Government and in industry are anxious to get away from paper "targetry", of which there has been rather a lot in the last few years, and to get down to brass tacks.

Economic Effects of Partition

I turn now to the more dangerous task of attempting to estimate the economic effects of partition.

Let us take the Dominion of India first. In the vital field of food supplies she is deficit. At present she cannot pay for her imports of food and essential goods except by starving her people of such things as cloth and food-oils, or by limiting her targets of industrial expansion through the export of the raw materials of industry. Of her requirements of food imports - 2 to 4 tons a year - the greater part must come from overseas, if obtainable. Her bargaining position is weakened by an actual decline in the output of cotton textiles, as compared with pre-war output, and by the failure of steel, cement, and other basic production to reach even the levels required for renewals and rehabilitation.

In the case of cotton textile industry is illuminating, for in its rise and growth you have one of the main achievements of India's nationals. In 1938-39 the output of cotton piece-goods was, roundly and including hand-loom or "cottage" production, 6,000 million yards, in 1945-46 6,200 million yards, but in 1946-47 it fell to 5,400 yards. The pre-war distribution of cloth per head was nearly 16 yards; the minimum that India's leaders judge necessary is 18 to 21 yards; today's distribution, with exports reduced to the lowest figure in many years of "peace", is about 13 yards per head.

Now,the Dominion of India possesses nearly all the mills but produces only two-thirds of all the raw cotton. Substantial quantities of superior East African cotton, as well as Pakistan's cotton, have to be imported yearly. So India has to pay be exports for cotton and grain from Pakistan and overseas if her mills are to get their raw material. She cannot afford to restore to cotton the acreage she had to surrender to food growing. More mill production is the only cure. And it is highly significant that recently the Dominion Government decided to restore in the mills the nine-hour shift, which was abolished in August, 1946, under labour pressure. A second point of significance in that decision is that the hope of increasing production by installing a third shift in addition to the usual two shifts has been abandoned; there is no housing for a third shift.

India's Requirements And Resources

Besides food, the Dominion requires imports of petroleum, of machinery for renewals and for irrigation and power schemes, and for "the tools to make the tools", if her industry is to expand. What can she offer in exchange? She has ceased to export coal, pig-iron, scrap, groundnut oil. She still exports manganese ore, mica, hessians, tea, inferior raw and waste cotton, and some 350 million yards of cotton textiles. These cannot cover her essential imports.

In November last Mr. Bhabha, India's Minister of Commerce, estimated India's deficit on the import/export position at £150 to £165 million per annum. He reckoned that releases from the sterling balances and rigorous restrictions on non-essential imports might reduce the gap to £75 million. He suggested that India should fill this gap by exporting more of shellac and its products; coir, luxury goods, and toys; and cheap goods to markets formerly supplied by Japan. The emphasis is on the last-mentioned category, for the products of hand-craftsmanship can hardly make a substantial financial contribution. And the mass production of cheap goods to caprure a market which is already passhing elsewhere, requires that essential internal demands be met, wages stabilized, and production brought to a level exceeding anything reached during tne war. But the resources of the Dominion are very substantial. She produces 90 per cent. of the sub-continent's coal, 92 per cent. of its iron and steel. The coal and mineral reserves are great. It is true that the life the known reserves of metallurgical coal is limited - sixty-five years is the estimate - but the Dominion has most of the best sites for the development of hydro-electric power, aluminium, and cement. In Travancore State she has uranium, and all it may stand for. Today, notwithstanding marked rises in costs and prices, her coal and steel are probably the cheapest in the world. She could, I think, draw sufficient revenue from these and other products and resources to obtain much of her essential imports. For capital investment there is a lost of purchasing power seeking an outlet, and in an enterprising way. For example, a group of leading cotton textile industrialists last year entered into partnership with leading British manufacturers for the manufacture of textile machinery in India. A considerable sum is involved, both for the Indian and the British

participants; and those concerned have entrusted the working out of the project to a trusted British officer of the old regime.

Indian Budget Estimates

In these circumstances great interest attaches to the Railways and General Budgets, presented last month, for the first seven and a half months of the Dominion's existence. A deficit on railway working is to be made good by substantially increased charged for carrying coal and steel and by increases in passenger and merchandise rates. An expected deficit of some £18½ million on the General Budget is to be filled partially by a much enhanced duty on exported cloth and yarn. The Finance Minister hinted at the possibility of reviewing the levels of direct taxation adopted last April, which have been attacked persistently as destroying industrial incentive. And, since he spoke, the value of stocks and shares has generally recovered up to and in some cases beyond the levels at which they stood on the eve of partition.

Naturally, increases, however small, in the cost of basic materials do not help to check inflation or to stabilize wages and dearness allowances. An "export duty" policy can have boomerang results, and does not help to capture the cheap goods export market, though doubtless it will be used with great discretion. But it is when we look at the distribution of expenditure that the full burden of the present troubles becomes apparent. Of an estimated outlay of £150 million, £69 million, or 47 per cent., are for the armed forces. £16 million is outlay on refugees, and another £16 million is for subsidizing food imports. The Dominion Government intends to honour its promise of assistance to the Provinces in health, housing and development schemes. But, as the Finance Minister says, priorities will have to be redrawn. More recently Pandit Nehru indicated that hydro-electric schemes designed to raise food output must come first, and, among these, projects likely to yield the earliest and greatest results, such as the Damodar Valley scheme. When we consider the outlay urgently

required for industrial housing to replace some of the dismal bustees and chawls in the big cities,and for the conquest of malaria and of its effects on production and happiness, to mention nothing else, we have some measure of what could have been started now, were it not that some £50 million of expenditure in this Budget has to be devoted to the avoidance of fratricidal strife and to its consequences. In varying degrees similar considerations hald good for the constituent members, the Provinces, particularly if the ideal of prohibition, with its loss of excise revenue, is pursued.

Controls

It is, at least partly, a growing sense of the magnitude of the finance neces ary for the Dominion's development plans which accounts for revisions of policy, and for some uncertainty, in respect of controls, nationalization, foreign assistance, and labour.

The Commodity Prices Board, established last May, had only a short life. Evidently import and export control must remain to safeguard essential supplies for the community. Control over the production and distribution of coal and steel continues. After much debate, it has been decided to continue cloth control for the time being, and it remains to be seen whether the latest cloth production scheme will give the consumer reasonalbe quantities of the kinds of cloth he wants. Recently there have been experiments in food control. Sugar was decontrolled over two months ago, and prices shot up markedly. At the same time salt was brought under control again. As to food grains, the Provinces have been invited to reduce the scope of rationing and to finance their own food procurement and distribution, the Centre subsidizing food imports and seeking to build up a reserve of ½ to 1 million tons against emergencies. The Finance Minister, I think, faced the facts of the international ex
change situation with realism and courage

in his Budget speech. And very naturally he desires to see the Dominion's resources of foreign exchange spent on capital equipment rather than on imports of food.

Natural, too, is the caution displayed in framing a definite policy in respect of nationilization and foreign assistance. The recent industrial conference had no difficulty in urging the import of vasic materials such as steel and the recruitment of overseas technical assistance as a short-term policy. Very recently Mr. Godgil, India's Minister for Power and Fuel, strongly emphasized the need of capital and other assistance from overseas for India's vast development undertakings. But the main economic concern for the Dominion in the near future must be/attitude of labour. Pandit Nehru, whose sumpathy for the poor man is beyond question, recently attributed much of the fall in production to the workers' suspicion of the employer. His plea for a three-year truce in industrial relations and for abandonment of a token strike in Bombay were ignored. A later attempt to stage a similar strike in Calcutta, however, was a failure, and the Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel spoke strongly to a great Calcutta meeting on the need for discipline and for putting production first. It is of the utmost importance that labour should trust its own elected Government. It may be that one method of securing that result is the establishment of public corporations for the production of coal, of new steel works, of hydro-electric and public utility undertakings, and of other activities essential to the life of the community. But, as so often, it is one thing to set up a body to produce and distribute goods for the service of the public and quite another to ensure that the machinery works smoothly.

Pakistan Prospects

To come to Pakistan, of which I speak with more than the usual trepidation: at first sight Pakistan looks like an economic impossibility. You have West Pakistan, with some

30 million population in the north-west; the West Punjab as the core, together with Sind, a slightly deficit Province, and the very deficit areas of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. One thousand miles away lies East Pakistan with its 40 millions of people, consisting of East Bengal, Sythet, and the Chittagong Hill tracts: a deficit area. Pakistan possesses perhaps 10 to 20 per cent. of the sister Dominion's monetary wealth. Industrially she is weak. The coal to be found in North-West India is inferior, readily combustible or with high ash content. Her chief minerals are gypsum (a cement and fertilizer base), salt, chromite, and some remotely situated sulphur. Most of the best sites for hydro-electric energy lie outside her borders. So far there is little organized mill production. Unless she is to look overseas for her requirements of coal and steel she is ddependent on the sister Dominion for both, and the long lead from the coal and iron fields makes deliveries frequently erratic and unsatisfactory.

As a result of the recent troubles she has the problem of resettling some five million refugees, as against India's four million. There has been a substantial flight of capital along with its owners. We have had an indication of what India's armed forces and refugees are costing her. We do not know Pakistan's outlay or budget; but on a short-term view the inroad on her immediate resources, coupled with a deficit on railway working, must be considerable.

On a long-term view, however, and given political stability, Pakistan can feed herself and have a surplus of perhaps half a million tons. There is less pressure on the soil in the West Punjab, where 80 per cent of the cultivators are peasant proprietors with larger holdings and more lightly assessed than is the case in India. Consider, too, the character of that peasantry, its vigour and manliness. West Pakistan produces one-third of the sub-continent's raw cotton; good

good cotton at that. East Pakistan produces three-fourths of the subcontitent's jute, or the bulk of the world's supply. Pakistan has oil in the north-west, at Attock and near by in Joya Inair, successfully prospected in 1944. There may well be further oil in this area, in Baluchistan, Sind, and the north-east. Part of her railway system already runs on fuel oil, and Karachi is also the natural airport for shipments from the Persian Gulf. Karachi is also the natural airport junction between East and West. Pakistan's Commerce Minister has announced the intention to develop Chittagong into a port handling two million tons of shipping. Quite apart from planning, circumstances may force the development of Chittagong as a seaport if silting in the Hoogli should diminish the importance of Calcutta, as it may.

From its exportable surplus of jute, grain, and cotton needed by the sister Dominion, and of the wool, leather, and hides demanded by the West, Pakistan should have a favourabe trade balance, as her Industries Minister recently emphasized. He outlined at the same time Pakistan's development plans, including a ten-year target for the establishment of jute mills, a five-year target for textile mills, and immediate investigation of hydro-electric power sites in the Himalayas of West Pakistan and the Chittagong Hill tracts.

Not only ideologically but in practice there is, and should be, less cause for social discontents than in India. So far organised industry is in its infancy and there are few rich men.

Capital Equipment

It is inherent in Pakistan's position that she should look abroad for capital equipment and a sistance to start her industries. While her Industries Minister recently indicated to an industries conference that the Dominion would probably "nationalise" hydro-electric projects, in addition to the railways and ports, there would appear to be a larger

field left open to private enterprise - for example, in shipping and shipbuilding. A well-known British firm has (it is stated) entered into a £4,000,000 contract to build shipyards in Karachi to turn out ships to ten to fifteen thousand tonnage. The project has the approval of the Pakistan Government, and is said to be financed by Hyderabad. The past few months have provided considerable other evidence of eagerness to press on both long-term and short-term projects, with overseas help.

But Pakistan needs time to stand on her own feet, and her immediate requirements of resources are pressing. She can certainly no more afford a continuance of fratricidal strife than can India. Last month, with agreement reached on Pakistan's share of the pre-partiton surplus and of military stores on arms production and on the payment of her share of the uncovered public debt, it looked as if economic peace and freedom for reconstruction were in sight, even though the vexed questions of Customs revenue and of Pakistan's export duty on raw jute over her land frontiers were left for future settlement. Since then the clouds of political and communal passion and mistrust have again darkened the sky.

Interdependence

Partiton, with consent on both sides solemnly given, is an accomplished fact; and these remarks have of necessity been speculations about the economic future of two self-governing Dominions. But it would be harmful, I submit, to dwell on the possibility of the two Dominions leading virtually separate lives. In a world struggling with inflation and shortages, it is clearly uneconomic for either Dominion to look overseas for what she can get, or used to get, from her sister. As Sir Alfred Watson said a few months ago, "the sinews of the industrial life of India cannot be wrenched asunder without bringing paralysis." More recently the

Economist said that "the financial and economic partition of what hitherto has been an integral unit must tend to impoverish each part". One may respectfully pead that this need not necessarily be so. Given peace, the rise of industries in Pakistan, and expansion of industries in India, can stimulate greatly production, demands, and supplies as from one Dominion to the other, as between overseas countries and both Dominions.

In withdrawing from the sub-continent, our country has had to relinquish its achievement, and ideal, of a United Incdia. But she has left behind a greater legacy: a belief in individual liberty and in democracy, which both Mr. Jinnan and Pandit Nehru have recently affirmed as their own faith. Twice in our lifetime the hopes of the freedom-loving peoples have been in great danger. The totalitarian shadow still broods over Eastern Europe and up to the confines of the sub-continent. I am sure that any Briton who cherishes the ideas for which our Commonwealth stands must fervently wish that the Dominion's leaders will overcome the passions and the scarcities which at the moment menace the future, and must hope to see free democracy flourish and grow in the country where we held trusteeship for so long. But there is little time for putting the house in order before economic distress deepens over the land. And there is a two-handed engine at the door.

DISCUSSION ON THE FOREGOING PAPER

A joint meeting of the Association and the Overseas League was held at Overseas House, St. James's, S.W.I., on Wednesday, January 21, 1948, with the President of the Association, the Earl of Scarbrough, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., in the chair.

The President said that Sir Walter Monckton, who had promised to preside, had been unable to do so owing to an important legal engagement. He would be missed at that meeting because of his deep interest in the questions to be discussed and he had been in India very recently and was in close touch with what had been going on.

It was a great pleasure to introduce Sir Arthur Waugh, who was extremely well qualified to speak on the economic effects of partition. In the later years of his service in India he was both Secretary and Member for the Supply Department and he had only given up these duties some few months previously.

Sir Arthur Waugh then read his paper.

The Chairman said that Sir Arthur Waugh had stressed at the end of his address the vital importance of the interdependence of the two new Dominions and it must be hoped that sense of interdependence would revive and grow. One could have just a little confidence that the improvement in relations which had been noticed in the past few days might be strengthened and might lead to firm friendship without which the economic future of both Dominions was bound to be extremely difficult. Sir Arthur also stressed the great importance to both Dominions, particularly to the Dominion of India, of the food question. He recalled an address to the East India Association by Sir John Woodhead shortly after he had returned from the inquiry into the famine in Bengal and the lesson which had brought out that the famine was not just an unlucky chance, it was something which might happen over again whenever something went a little wrong, because there was not enough food grown in India to meet the needs of the

rapidly increasing population. Sir Arthur Waugh in pointing to the vital importance of the food problem had once again emphasized what the believed to be the most vital economic problem in India.

One another point he would like to touch on. Sir Arthur stressed the importance particularly for the Dominion of India of a contented labour population if her industrial progress was to be as great as her leaders desired. Once again, he felt that this was a matter of great importance to the future of the Dominion of India. He remembered a good deal of labour trouble in Bombay. It had been noticeable that in the city of Bombay amongst the large mill population the Congress ideology had not taken hold, whereas in another part of the Province in the great mill population of Ahmedabad the Congress could control the mill labour. He understood that there had not been any great change amonst the mill population in that regard in Bombay City and the more extreme elements were able to take charge from time to time.

He had listened to Sir Arthur Waugh's address with interest because those who retained their interest in India were always wondering what was going to be the future before the new Dominions. His naalysis of the economic problems before India and Pakistan had been extremely interesting and very helpful to them all.

Sir Maurice Hallet said that he left India over two years ago and he felt that compared with Sir Arthur Waugh he was almost prehistoric, or,at any rate, that he belonged to the Victorian or to the imperialistic age, but there were two or three fundamental facts which had not changed and would not change except after generations or centuries or even longer. One was the fact that India was an agricultural country, and another was that its population was growing

at a tremendous pace. At a meeting of the Association which he attended not long ago the lecturer commented that during his speech, which lasted for half an hour, 1,500 babies were born in India. He had often quoted that remark because it brought home quite bluntly the fact that the population was increasing at an extraordinarily rapid pace.

Sir Arthur Waugh, apart from being Supply Member and Secretary of the Supply Department, knew a good deal about life in an Indian district and he recognized that it was absolutely essential to increase the country's food supply. One of his own advisers in the United Provinces had pointed out three or four years ago that practically the whole of the sterling balance, or rather more than the sterling balance, of India would be expended in one year if imports of food grains were such that the people of India had a really adequate diet. It was important to realize that if the villagers, the cultivators, ate one or two ounces more every day - and that was not very much to add to their diet - it meant that the landless labbourers and the town-dwellers would go entirely without food. It was realized three or four years ago in the United Provinces that there was ahead of India the risk of a terrible famine, for worse than any that had occurred in the past. It was also recognized that there was very little new land left which could be brought under the plough, and that the real remedy was in an improvement of cultivation by an intensification of cultivation, extending existing sources of irrigation, canals, tube wells, etc., and introducing fertilisers and other means. There was one area in the United Provinces which seemed to be an area which could be brought under the plough, but the difficulty was that it was such a hotbed of malaria that no one could live there. The use of D.D.T. might have improved the situation, but otherwise it would have been necessary to introduce an enormous drainage scheme as large as that which

Mussolini introduced into the Pontine Marshes. This showed the difficulties facing the question of feeding the increased population. Irrigation schemes were extremely urgent, and the regrettable point was that owing to the shortages of production in all countries of the world they might have to wait for some time before the necessary equipment could be obtained for the hydro-electric works.

There were other matters which the Governments would have to tackle in regard to the development of agriculture. In the Provinces which he knew best they were talking of the abolotion of the land-holders and the zamindars. He trusted that would go through smoothly and without any trouble in the rural areas. If it caused trouble in the rural areas it meant that there would be still further diminution of the supply of food. Having got over that, they would have to tackle problems such as the consolidation of holdings or the development of some form of co-operative farming, but one could hope and trust that they would tackle the problems connected with the development of agriculture successfully.

As to industries, he did not know many industrial centres. He knew a certain amount about the coalfields and he was glad to hear that the stock of coal was fairly satisfactory. During the war there was a great deal of trouble over recruiting sufficient men to man the minies, and from a recent notice in the Statesman it seemed that they wanted considerably more labour in the coalfields; as one step to attract more workers they had instituted a provident fund, a sort of system of old-age pensions, for the colliery workers. He trusted that it would be possible to get sufficient labour in that area.

But it was not only a question of labour. He remembered once going down a mine before the war and talking

to a colliery manager, who told him that in spite of the fact that labour was plentiful the mines could never really be satisfactorily worked unles they had the most up-to-date machinery for working them. India would have to look to the Western countries to supply that need.

One difficult seemed to be the danger of labour becoming discontented. He heard from a friend not long ago who referred to the danger of rising prices causing trouble among labour, and reference was also made by a Minister in a recent speech to the possibility of labour troubles and to the outbreak of unnecessary strikes, not because they had any real grievances, but they were stirred up by their own so-called leaders. He had hoped that the war-time "Bevin boys", the young Indians sent to this country to learn how to use machinery and to gain technical knowledge, would also learn a good deal about British trade unions, and would adopt the principles and ideals which were held by trade unionists in this country, so that they took their places as leaders of their fellow-countrymen they would do so in a responsible fashion. One complaint made by an Indian Minister was that although some concessions had been given to labour in the coalfields it had adopted a policy of "going slow", thus reducing production.

It seemed that the present Governments in India did not regard any big schemes of nationalization as practicable at present. They hold that the present capitalistic system should go on for some time, and what was rather striking was the recognition by Ministers of the Dominion of India that foreign capital would be necessary to supplement Indian capital in the development of industries and public works. He knew that Pakistan and supporters of Pakistan were always in favour of getting British capital. He remembered once talking to a leading member of the Muslim League and arguing with him that Pakistan economically would be rather difficult because there were so few industries in that part

of the country and they would have to be developed; his reply was, "We will do it with British money and British brains". It looked as if the sister Dominion was now looking at this problem on the same lines.

He was optismistic enough to think that all would go well. Things looked a little brighter in the last few days. British co-operation would be needed, and the two Dominions should be able to work together for their own good and that of the world in general. It was useful to have facts such as those which Sir Arthur Waugh put forward on which to base one's opinions.

Sir Archibald Rowlands said that he left Pakistan six weeks ago and therefore he was already out of date. The astonishing thing about the sub-continent of India was one got out of date in a very short time after leaving it, no matter how one tried to keep in touch. He had had the opportunity of three and a half months' pretty close study of the economic possibilities of Pakistan, and there was no blinking the fact that in the short time in which it has been in operation partition had dealt a severe blow to the economy of the whole of sub-continent. He was not thinking so much of the immediate effects, although they were serious. Consider the effects on next year's crops and harvests in the Punjab, where 9,000,000 people had been uprooted and had lost much of their equipment, and there was bound to be a fall in the output in that area next April. Consider what happened to the railways. The East India Railway was manned to a considerable extent by Mussulmans, and they had left under the idea that it was unpatriotic to work for the Indian railways. Then, again, the commercial community in the Punjab was largely in the hands of Hindus. The only banks which could be said to be working

at all there were two British banks and one Muslim bank, the others had practically thrown their hands in; a large part of the financing and the growing of the cotton crop was in the hands of the Hindus, and it was difficult to get into the factories. In Sind the difficulties had been overcome and 98 per cent of the crop was being gathered in and was being ginned. Thanks to energetic action on the part of the Central Pakistan Government a large percentage of the cotton crop in the Punjab would also be picked and processed.

With regard to the amount which kept hundreds of thousands of the refugees alive - thousands were dying - the cost of trying to do what could be done for them was going to take a great deal of the resources which would otherwise be devoted to productive and social betterment schemes both in Pakistan and India. The immediate effect of partition had therefore been very detrimental to the economy of both Dominions. In the short-term aspect, too (as distinct from the immediate aspect), there was no doubt about it, partition will involve the maintenance, at least for some years to come of armed forces considerably larger in the aggregate than would have been the case had the sub-continent remained undivided. Both sides were desperately suspicious of each other at the moment and had much larger forces than they would otherwise have had, and this would again divert capital and revenue from productive and social betterment schemes.

Consider the jute industry; Pakistan produced 73 percent of the jute of the sub-continent and yet had not a single jute mill. They would not rest content with that situation and would install baling presses and jute mills. Take the hides and skins industry: there was not a single tannery in East Pakistan; Bengal was now going to install its own tanneries, but there would

not be any greater output than there was before, so that in the short term the effect of partition was bound to be detrimental. But it did not follow that that would be the case in the long term.

In the long term Pakistan would embark on a policy of industrialization. It would set up its own cotton mills. At the moment it produced a third of the cotton of India, but only had about one-sixth of the cotton mills. The world was short of textiles, and additional cotton mills in Pakistan would increase the supply to both the Indian market and the export market. Pakistan would develop its own natural resources. In Sind there were two large schemes which would be advanced by partition which would bring six million acres under cultivation, and any one who had been to the Sind Barrage would recognise what would happen under an irrigation scheme on the desert of Sind. The crops which could be grown there had to be seen to be believed, so that in the long term partition would not, in cases such as this, be detrimental to the sub-continent of India.

He had been asked on more than one occasion if Pakistan was viable, and he had replied "If you mean by viable, can they go on living as they are now? the answer is'Yes', undoubtedly; can they progress industrially? again I say 'Yes'. They are more than self-sufficient in the primary requirements of life and should have a favourable balance of trade with the outside world. What better basis of viability do you want than that? " There was under-population in some places, particularly in Sind; the peasant could not cultivate all the land he had. If the two Dominions were to get the best out of partition they would have to compose their differences. While Pakistan would not be content to be merely the suppliers of raw materials for the Union of India, the fact remained that

they were each other's best markets. Any policy of customs barriers would be suicidal, and he believed that when the present bitterness and passions had died down - he did not want to under-estimate them - there would be a recognition that it would be fatal to both to try to live on a basis of hostility. No one wanted 2,500 miles of customs barriers with all it would entail.

In conclusion Sir Archibald said that he was very optimistic about the future of Pakistan; it would, of course, need a great deal of help and it would welcome that help from this country.

The President had to leave the meeting for another engagement and Sir Arthur Lothian took the chair.

Mr. Basanta Mookerjea said that whatever the economic effects of partition on India one could not deny that restoration of normality was the need of the hour. Today India was instinct with new life; until yesterday she was in agonizing pain: destructive forces were working on all sides; mutual mistrust, the arousing of bygone grievances had, above all, brought about the turmoil and bloodshed which all deplored. Mahatma Gandhi had taken a fast unto death to alleviate the suffering and misery and that had brought about an unbelievable change of heart. Pessimism and mistrust had been succeeded by confidence and goodwill. Today there was the recognition of the need for mutual forgiveness and readjustment. Now that it was over, these black acts of loot, arson, and murder could be put into the past and India could look forward to uniting her ancient peace with her newly acquired freedom. To many this uprising of feeling might appear to be transient, and one might ask whether it would endure, but there was a frank

recognition of altered circumstances; there was the realization of the truth that if the people of Hindustan and Pakistan were willing there could be peace. Whatever might happen in the future Gandhi's fast had secured an opportunity of building an enduring peace. The problem of today was not precisely the problem of yesterday. It must be remembered that freedom was not the right to do what one pleased, but liberty to do as one should. "In the belief that the dark shall be light, and the wrong made right, let us ring out the old and ring in the new".

Miss Rangarao said that she was very interested in all that the speaker had said, though it was a distressing tale. She would like to ask the audience if she was right in saying that the word "education" was not mentioned even once. What had education to do with economics? She was not there to answer that question, but it was a/significant now as it was in Britain in 1870 after the industrial revolution and the Reform Acts.

Some of the discussion had brought it home that the greatest need of the hour was more goodwill. If a young British child who had not been given any preconceived ideas about India or Britain could have heard the speakers today, it would ask its father sadly, "Then why did you allow the partition?" There are several answers to that, but most British fathers would like to say that it was because the Indians wanted it. The little child who had no preconceived ideas would say, "How foolish of those Indians to have asked for something which means so much harm to them. Why did'nt you tell them so ?" Miss Rangarao said that her own answer would be "because of the deplorable lack of education." Even of mere literacy there was a mere 10 to 14 per cent, and the little there

was of higher education was not the right kind, being unrelated to the needs of the present-day problems. Among the problems enumerated today the biggest seems to be the discontent of labour masses, and the answer to that was again ed_ucation.

A large abount of money was to be spent on defence, and another large abount would be spent on preventing fratricidal war, which meant that even the elementary needs of life would have to be sacrificed to establishing mere security. Ed_ucation must be thought of alongside every kind of industrial progress. As for the deplorably low economic output her head caused by suspicion and distrust, not all the capital in the world, not all the organizing machinery in the world would help if there was not the right human factor, and this could only be brought about by education. The only way of remedying these evils was by creating in the men more confidence by removing the cause of suspicion and by educating them to be less suspicious by nature. Having done that they must feel complete trust in the standards of their masters. So on both sides there must be education, masters and servants, to establish goodwill.

Sir Arthur Waugh, in reply, said that he had had the good fortune to call forth the most valuable views and opinions from the first two speakers. Two moving appeals had also been made for the preservation of communal peace and for making the most of the hopes which had been raised in the last few days that matters would revert to a less passionate atmosphere. Miss Rao said that he did not mention education and he freely admitted his fault. He would not venture to argue as to whether more education would not have prevented what had now come to pass. After all, some might say that the recent rulers of Germany were "educated". Miss Rao took a very noble and deep view of

education, and having heard what she said he was sure it would be agreed that the kind of education she would like to see in the sub-continent would do a world of good to mitigate the passions which had during these months devastated it. He was sure that the two Dominions were inter-dependent, not only economically, but culturally, and he would venture to repeat the hope that we should see in the two Dominions two countries full of free democracy of the kind which we ourselves cherished.

Sir Atul Chatterjee thanked the two Chairmen, the Earl of Scarbrough and Sir Arthur Lothian, and the speaker, for a very interesting afternoon. He would not enter into the merits of the discussion, but it was a very important subject full of possibilities both disaster and of progress. Although the paper began in a gloomy strain it ended with a silver lining, and the speeches of Sir Maurice Hallett and Sir Archibald Rowlands were very encouraging.

Prof. Kirpal Singh.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE EAST INDIA ASSOCIATION

(INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BURMA)

LORD MOUNTBATTEN ON HIS VICEROYALTY

Reception at the Imperial Institute

Rear-Admiral Earl Mountbatten of Burma and the Countess of Mountbatten were guests of the Association at a reception at the Imperial Institute on June 29, 1948, within a few days of his return from being the last of British Viceroys of India and Governor-General in Council, and then for a few months Governor-General of the Indian Dominion. The occasion was rendered memorable and historic by the speech of Lord Mountbatten describing the course of events in his time as Viceroy, leading up to the transfer of power and throwing much light on the inner history of that momentous period.

Lord and Lady Mountbatten were with the President (Lord Scarbrough) and Lady Scarbfough when they received the 500 guests, and films of Indian life were shown in the Cinema Hall. At the speech-making which followed the President and the guests of honour were accompanied on the platform by Lady Scarbrough, Field-Marshal Lord Wavell and Lady Wavell, Marie Marchioness of Willingdon, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Lord Listowel, the High Commissioner for India (Mr. Krishna Menon), Mr. L.S. Amery, Sir John Woodhead, Sir Harry and Lady Lindsay, Sir Atul Chatterjee, and Sir Thomas Smith. The speeches were loudly and frequently applauded.

The President (Lord Scarbrough), addressing the guests of honour, said:

You have greatly honoured and pleased our Association by accepting our invitation and by giving us this opportunity to welcome you within a very few days of your return to this country. We appreciate that very much, and I would like to thank you for so generously giving to us one of the first and, I dare say, one of the few afternoons of your leisure.

As you know, this is a gathering of the East India Association. Each of us who has come to welcome you here has some special link with India, either because it is his own country, or through service of some kind, or through friends, or through some special cultural or other interest perhaps long pursued. With all of us, to apply a phrase of Lord Curzon's, "the undying magic of India and its people remains."

The main purpose of our Association is, to-day, the same as it has been for eighty years and more - namely, "the independent and disinterested advocacy and promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of India generally." It is that overriding purpose which enables persons whose approaches to Indian problems may differ, and whose political views may not at all be the same, to find on many occasions a common platform and, in welcoming a Viceroy and Governor-General on his return from distinguished service to India and Great Britain.

I cannot help thinking that our Association, by providing occasions of this kind, has helped to make us more humane than our ancestors, for the measure of welcome and gratitude which we offer to you today, which comes from persons with - may we claim? - some understanding of Indian problems, the short speeches which we shall inflict upon you, and the refreshment, humble though it may be, of which you may soon partake, that welcome which we provide today is in striking contrast to, and we trust is more bearable, than that which his countrymen provided for the

first Governor-General at the end of bis great period of office. One hundred and sixty-three years have passed since Warren Hastings came home to be met with seven years' trial in Westminster Hall; today we have arrived at another homecoming, very different, but one, also, which history will m_ark.

I would guess, however, that none of the angels in heaven, in the past week since you left New Delhi, has begun to write the history of your period of office. It would, therefore, be immodest of me to step in where they have not yet trod. Indeed, we can all see that in the past fifteen months has come one of the great turning-points in Indian and British history, and with so vast a change a complete and fair judgment upon it should, I would say, be left to the wise men of perhaps a hundred years hence, who will be able to see the effect of forces which are to us incalculable.

But some things which are alre_ady above controversy can and should be said now. The task with which you were entrusted was quite unlike any of the tasks which fell to the lot of any of the thirty-three previous holders of the great office which you took up in March of the last year. If their tasks might in a very general way be likened to the work of architects - designing, building, preserving- yours might be described as the work of a surgeon who has been called in to carry out a great surgical operation at a critical stage. A surgical operation must leave behind some wounds, which time and careful handling may heal, but if it carries the patient through a very dangerous crisis, and if the patient lives, the surgeon has done a great work.

In this operation in statecraft even those who may have disagreed with the diagnosis of the consultants acclaim the surgeon's supreme skill, his quick, bold, perhaps vital decisions and the striking confidence and

affection which he inspired. Very little of the story of the days of the transfer of power has yet been unfolded to us in this country, but, in spite of that, to very interested onlookers - I expect all of us here were that - it was those qualities of yours that stood out and which exercised a solving influence on what appeared at the outset to be an almost impossible task. Thankfulness - and some national pride - that the British champanion in those formidable lists had such qualities at his command is uppermost in our minds as we greet you today. We were so conscious of the difficulty and complexity of your task; we are so grateful that it has been carried through with a large measure of goodwill.

We want also to offer a very warm welcome to Lady Mountbatten. We know, or at least we have some little idea of it, how full and active she made her days in India and how much help she was able to bring to the Governor-General's crowded hours, to Ministers in their heavy tasks, and to many humble folk. I have no doubt that there are countless people in India who will retain for many years to come a special memory of Lady Mountbatten.

There remains the future. We cannot foretull it; we do not direct it, but we still have our hopes for it. Setting all controversies aside, every one of us hopes that all the peoples in the sub-continent of India are set on the road to a great future, that peace will reign over their lands, and that moral and material progress will make the giant strides that they desire, and, too, that friendship and goodwill will remain between us and them.

You, our guests of honour today, have done your best to make that so, a fine and devoted best, and we offer you our gratitude - it springs from just an inkling of the future of your task and from a recognition of the courage and skill with which you carried it out - and

we say to you that it is a great privilege to welcome you to this gathering of ours on your return from your labours in India.

Lord Mountbatten on the Transition Period

Earl Mountbatten said:

I should like on behalf of my wife and myself to express our deep sense of gratitude to the East India Association for honouring us at this reception this afternoon.

I was in a slight quandary when I accepted the invitation because it involved speaking on Inda. I pointed out to Lord Scarbrough that it would be difficult, if not improper, for me to discuss in any detail what had occurred during the time I was a servant of free India. But he replied that on account of the limited size of the newspapers and amount of positive news that comes through about India it would not be unwelcome if I spoke in some detail about the period of my Viceroyalty and more briefly on the constitutional period which followed.

In March of last year when I was sworn in as Viceroy and Governor-General in Delhi, although I found there was no space in the programme for a speech, I nevertheless did say a few words on that occasion in order to convey a message to the people of India. I said I was under no illusion as to the immense difficulty of the task confronting me, and pointed out that this task could be brought to a successful conclusion only if there was the utmost goodwill from the greatest number of people. I asked India for that goodwill. During the course of my talk today I hope you will see that I got a full measure of that goodwill, more than anyone could have expected or deserved.

Before I left for India there were discussions in London with the Prime Minister and the India-Burma

Committee of the Cabinet, and we agreed upon a programme or rather a time-table on how the transfer of power was to be handled. We came to the conclusion that my first six or seven months there should be spent in studying the problem on the spot. Before the end of 1947 I was to communicate back my proposals for the transfer of power to enable legislation to be introduced early in 1948, so that the actual transfer could take place this month, June, 1948.

When I got out to India I realized (as had so often my past experience in war) that when one gets up to the front situation looks a little different from the way it appeared in London. I found that, although we in London had visualised the programme of transfer for being much too slow. Everybody there was agreed on this point: the leaders, leading British officials, my staff advisers. Everybody was certain that an early and correct decision as well as an early announcement on the position would have to be made if we were going to arrest the increasing swing of the pendulum. There were riots and reprisals for riots. They had already occurred in three Provinces and had started in the North-West Frontier Province the month I arrived out there.

Discussions with Party Leaders

Looking at the problem, the first thing that struck me (and an opinion which I have not changed) was that the right answer would have been to have kept united India.

The admirable Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 was accepted by every party in India at one time or another, though never by all parties at the same time. It was, in fact, one of those plans that could be made to work only by the active will and co-operation of all parties.

It could not be enforced on the people any more than one could force a horse to drink after it had been led to the water.

I started off by seeing as many of the leaders as I could. I went on hour after hour, day after day, and when I first had interviews with people like Gandhi, Jinnah, and Nehru I refused to talk business at all. I simply got to know them. They told me about their early days. Gandhi went right through his history in South Africa and his early days in London. Jinnah told me the tale of his life at the Bar in London. It was several hours before I would talk about India at all. But after we got to know one another and had made friends we were able to progress fairly quickly. I soon realized that nothing I could do or say could deflect the Muslim League from its intention to insist absolutely on partition of the country. No other solution would have been peacefully accepted by the Muslim League.

The next problem was to see if the Congress Party, who had always stood for united India, would be prepared to consider partition as the price for a quick transfer of power and the restoration of peace. The Congress Party have always stood for non-coercion, and they said that, provided no non-Muslim majority community went into the partition areas against its will, they would raise no objection. It was pointed out that in the case of Provinces like the Punjab and Bengal partition would undoubtedly be involved. When this was put to Jinnah he was against the performance of a surgical operation on Provinces which had ancient histories of unity. A man was a Punjabi or a Bengali before he was a Muslim or a Hindu. I agreed. I said that the feeling invoked in his heart by the prospect of the partition of these Provinces was the feeling invoked in my heart and the heart of Congress against the partition of India itself. And so we went, as one might say, around

the mulberry bush, always coming back to the same point.

Open Diplomacy

Having worked out the rough outline for partition and how it could be effected, the next problem was to find out whether or not this was really the will of the people. Of course, the right way to have found this out would have been to have taken a plebiscite on the basis of adult franchise, but that would have taken years, not months. The only alternative was to use the Legislative Assemblies, elected as recently as 1946 and presumably, therefore, representing the will of the people. Now I will not go into the details, which were widely publicized, but I would point out that the Plan of June 3, 1947, was a plan created by the process of open diplomacy. Its every stage and every point was the result of frank discussion with all the leaders. The Plan was not put on paper for several weeks, but I kept notes, and at every turn I spoke and tried to reconcile the different points of view and gain points of common ground. I am not going to pretend that the Plan of June 3 was ideal; I know it was "far from satisfactory to all the parties concerned." But, on the other hand, it was quite impossible to give everybody complete satisfaction, for had that been possible my services would never have been required. Long ago the leaders would have found a solution for themselves without the tremendous turmoil and riots then going on in India.

The Sikhs

Although we were able to resolve the problem of the major communities, we were left with the problem of one of the minor communities. As you know, the greatest community, the Hindu community, is just under 300,000,000 strong. The Muslim community number is just under 100,000,000. Then come the Christians, and fourthly come the Sikhs, numbering just

under 6,000,000. They were small but very compact, a warlike and dominating race, and they live entirely in the Punjab. The week before I arrived Congress had put up a resolution on their behalf, which Lord Wavell passed to me, saying that they wished for the Punjab to be partitioned in accordance with the Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. I naturally accepted that and assumed that the Sikhs knew what they were about. But I was greatly surprised to find upon examining the population map that by their own resolution they were proposing to bisect themselves into almost two equal halves.

It was then too late to change the basis of partition, and if we were to adhere to the principles concerning Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas, the principles accepted and conceded to both sides, only a miracle could have kept the Sikhs together in one part of India. Well, we were not able to work miracles and we did not find a solution. The best thing we were able to do was to arrange for the leaders, including the Sikh leaders, to nominate a Committee to produce the terms of reference for the Boundary Commissions so that the boundaries might be drawn up on lines acceptable to all those concerned.

Deciding the Date of Transfer

The next point that arose was: When was the transfer of power to take place? On that point there was absolutely no difference of opinion, at least no difference of opinion that made itself heard to me. Everybody wanted the greatest possible speed, everybody wanted the transfer of power to take place quickly. Indeed, why wait? For in waiting there would be the risk of continued and increasing riots. There would be increasing friction and difficulty in keeping together the Indian Coalition Government, of which, I was virtually the Prime Minister, and which was then running along on completely divergent lines. So we

went ahead and fixed a date. It took two years to separate Sind from Bombay. We separated 400,000,000 people in two and a half months. We set up a Partition Council with an immense number of sub-committees, which settled and resolved matters in record time.

Overcoming a Constitutional Difficulty

But in spite of that I was still left with a major problem (I am coming back to the Plan itself). How was I going to transfer power quickly to one or two nations or countries which had not yet got a Constitution of their own? One of them, it was trude, had a Constituent Assembly, so that by June, 1948, they might perhaps have produced a Constitution. With regard to the other we did not know, theoretically at least, if it was going to come into being. If it did it was not until August 15 that they would be able to set up a Constituent Assembly. It was a legal conundrum of the first magnitude, and a completely new element entered into the situation when we came to try and solve this particular conundrum, because the only solution I could see at the time was to continue to use the existing Constitution. That Constitution had been set up by the 1935 Government of India Act, and was rightly claimed as being one of the most remarkable pieces of legislation of our time. It was said that upwards of 15,000 questions were answered were answered about it by the Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare, before the Joint Select Committee, and not a single clause of the Act had had to be changed.

It was proposed that this should be amended in the way the future Dominion Governments would wish, and that they should be given the power to continue to amend the Act after the transfer of power. This was the only

quick way of transfer of power, and they both readily accepted. I should like to add that I know of no other countries in the world today in the fortune position of having a Constitution that is already a woring Constitution, but which can be amended by a stroke of the pen day by day to be made to work more agreeably to themselves.

Talks with the Cabinet

While all these discussions were going on between both parties in Delhi we must not forget that there was a third party in London. That third party was His Majesty's Government, who were in fact constitutionally responsible. It was therefore clear that before the Plan could be finalized I should have to fly home and see His Majesty's Govefment. I arrived on a Monday afternoon in May, and by tea-time I was hard at work with the India-Burma Committee of the Cabinet. I was able to give the new proposals for transfer to the Government, and I pointed out that they could be made to work only if the legislation went through that session, which had only two months to run. I was told that it would take seven or eight monts before an important Act of that type could be drafted, passed through the committee stages of both Houses, and then become law; if there was opposition it would take longer. I therefore said that, unless all my work in India was to be lost, this had to be passed within two months or not at all. The Prime Minister was encouraging and told me that he would see what he could do. I came back the following day and found the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown in the Cabinet room. They had worked all night on the first rough draft of the Indian Independence Bill, and we went through it together at No. 10, Downing Street.

As you know, that legislation was passed within

which must have been an all-time legislative record. It would not have been possible with opposition. The Prime Minister had authorized me to see the leaders of Opposition and to answer all their questions freely, and I was able to convince them that a speedy enactment was in the interests of the future of India and the good relations between India and this country, and that it was a national and not a party matter. As I have said, the measure passed through with the approval of both parties in Parliament before the end of the session, and so the Plan of June 3 became a legal possibility. It was accepted by all the leaders, and by August 15 we were able to transfer power.

The Indian States Problem

Nevertheless, after June 3, after having set up the Partition Council and the machinery to carry out this vast process, I was left with a problem the magnitude of which I had not appreciated before I went out there. "I had not realized that it was going to be such a serious problem." What were we going to do with the 565 Indian States, with upwards of 100,000,000 inhabitants? The only co-ordinating link in the overall administration of India was the fact that one and the same man always happened to hold the offices of Viceroy and Crown representative. By the Cabinet Mission statement of May 12, 1946, the States were to become independent sovereign states, and up to the middle of June I had not got an inkling of what we were going to do about these 565 States to avoid the greatest possible catastrophe one could imagine - to avoid transferring power to so many different units in a way which might throw the whole sub-continent into a state of chaos.

The first thing it was necessary to do was to set up the machinery whereby the future Dominion Governments could enter into negotiations with the rulers of the various

States. I therefore proposed that we should set up two State Departments (now known as State Ministries), one each for the impending Dominions of India and Pakistan. The main object was to nogotiate agreements between the States and the future Dominions. In theory any State could remain independent or join either Dominion, but in practice there were, of course, geographical compulsions, and it was obviously necessary to consider the composition of the population. I made this very clear to a practically full house of the Chamber of Princess when I addressed them early in July, and all except three took my advice. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the future Deputy Prime Minister, took over the new Indian States Ministry. At the same time the new Secretaryship of this Ministry was taken over by my own Reforms Commissioner, and between the three of us and the Pakistan representatives we worked out a proposal whereby the States would be offered the opportunity of acceding to the Dominion of their choice.

The proposal was that their accession should be limited to the three subjects laid down in the original Cabinet Mission Plan, which were Defence, External Affairs, and Communications. In the case of Defence, practically no State wished to conduct its own defence, and indeed no State could really do so. Therefore there was no particular difficulty in getting over that point. That led us to the question of External Affairs. This was inextricably linked with the question of Defence. Although one or two of the largest States might have liked to have their own ambassadors, obviously that would have been a waste of money, and so they nearly all accepted the proposal on that point. On the question of Communications the matter was very vital, since it affected the very life-blood of the sub-continent,

and obviously they had to come to an understanding with the Central Governments. So an instrument of accession was drawn up. It was amended, discussed, and re-amended by a full meeting of the Chamber of Princes held during the last week of July in Delhi. It was finalized before the end of July, and practically all the States signed up before August 15. Out of the 565 States, the vast majority acceded to the Dominion of India. The remainder, with the exception of three of them, acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan.

Junagadh

With regard to the three exceptions, the first was the State of Junagadh. The strong advice I had given to the effect that the States should join up in accordance with geographical compulsions and the wishes of the majorities of their populations was not taken. Junagadh, with its 82 per cent Hindu population and 18 per cent Muslim population, joined up with Pakistan. As you know, a plebiscite has been held since that time, and as a result of an overwhelming majority it has joined up with India, and India has offered to allow U.N.O. to conduct a further plebiscite, if desired, to show whether the result of the first one was correct.

Kashmir

The second State that did not take my advice was the State of Kashmir. In the case of Kashmir I went up personally and saw the Maharaja. I spent four days with him in July, and on every one of those four days I persisted with the same advice: "Ascertain the will of your people by any means and join whichever Dominion your people wish you to join by August 14 this year." He did not do that, and what happened can be seen. Had he acceded to Pakistan

before August 14 the future Government of India had allowed me to give His Highness an assurance that no objection would be raised by them. Had His Highness acceded to India by August 14, Pakistan did not then exist, and therefore could not have interfered. The only trouble that could have been raised was by non-accession to either side, and this was unfortunately the very course followed by the Maharaja.

Hyderabad

The third State I have referred to was Hyderabad, by far the biggest State in India as far as population is concerned. It is not quite so large as Kashmir, which has an area of just over 84,000 squire miles, but the population is 17,000,000. It consists of 14 per cent Muslim and 86 per cent Hindu. We had long discussions in trying to bring about a solution for this great State, and these discussions continued until about ten days ago. Sir Walter Monckton, Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam, came to all these discussions and was absolutely first class, because, while being completely loyal to the ruler of Hyderabad, he proved himself to be a high-minded humanitarian. His object was the same as mine - namely, to find a solution which would avoid friction and possible consequent bloodshed.

The Government of India proved itself to be very high-minded, in my opinion, and was anxious to find a solution. It was heart-breaking to Sir Watler Monckton and myself, quite apart from the people now left with the responsibility in India, that the final proposals were not accepted by Hyderabad. I am very sorry that has happened, and can only hope and pray that a peaceable solution will be found there after all.

The Punjab Trouble

That is all I have to say about the period during which I was Viceroy, and I have gone a little beyond it.

As for the constitutional period, as I said at the beginnig, I was the servant of the Government of India, and it is not my business to discuss the way they have conducted their affairs beyond saying this: The Government of India came into power at a very difficult time, at a time when massacres had started in the Punjab, which spread to Delhi, and the situation was practically out of hand. Any government would have had the greatest difficulty in maintaining control under the conditions facing them. This Government rose magnificently to the occasion. An Emergency Committee of the Cabinet was formed, and they dealt with matters in an admirable and speedy way at their daily meetings.

My wife took on the work of the co-ordination of all welfare bodies and voluntary relief organizations in India, and did, if I may say so, a most amazing job. All the way through she has been of the utmost strength in India which hitherto had been hardly touched. I refer to the women of India. My wife was able to make friends of the wives and daughters and friends of the leaders. She was able to do a great deal when the trouble started with the refugees. I have spoken about the goodwill in India, and that goodwill is really wonderful. There has been a warmness of heart, and they have been ready to pay tribute and express gratitude for anything she has done. In the refugee camps during the last week, people who had lost everything scraped together their annas so that one of them could travel by train to bring up their pathetic little gifts which they had made themselves - anything, just as a tribute to show they were grateful.

The Services

I must mention the Indian Civial Service, which is now nearly 100 per cent Indian. There are a few Britishers left, but not many. They have been absolutely

magnificent, and the professional administrators have carried on loyally and efficiently. There have been far too few of them, because, do not forget, a democracy always requires more Civil Service administrators. They have been greatly overworked, but they have done an absolutely first-class job, which has not yet been fully recognized by the country as a whole.

Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Nehru

Finally, I would like to mention Gandhiji. It is impossible to convey what his death has meant to India, but I will say that it did one thing. The shock pulled the country together in a most wonderful way. That effect still exists to a large extent, but, make no mistake, his absence is acutely felt. "He was the father of the nation in every sense of the word." Everybody from the Prime Minister downwards went to him for advice, and he held together all the threads of that great country. His passing away caused a particularly heavy burden to be placed on the Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, a man admirably fitted to deal with that burden. I have no doubt that he is one of the great men, not of this time only, but of any time. Apart from that, he is one of the most delightful and entertaining people one could ever wish to have as a friend. I have great faith faith in him, knowing that he is a really wise and balanced statesman who is very will fitted for the responsibilities he has to bear.

I am certain that India is going from strength to strength. She is bound to face the most appalling difficulties, which are absolutely inevitable with the sudden accession of self-government and partition at a time when there are such immense difficulties in every part of the world. Nevertheless, I maintain that she is going from strength to strength. The good feeling that India has for this country has never been higher, and nothing

short of criminal lunacy in this country would wish to destroy that feeling. It is there, whatever the future holds, I hope for good.

Lord Mountbatten

The Countess of Mountbatten yielded to the request of the President to speak. She thanked all present for their very generous and charming welcome to her as well as to her husband, and added: I think he deserves everything that has been said. I do not. I will confess he has always been my number one pin-up boy. I will tell you one thing that both he and I feel; that is that it has been heart-warming this afternoon to have been surrounded by all of you who have given so many years of your lives to the service of India. Your contribution has meant so much to what has been achieved in India, and your love for that country, like ours, has been so very well.

We have been asked two questions since arriving back in England. The first has been: Are we glad to be back in this country? Of course we are glad to be back in this grand little country with all its dear people. The other question was: Were we sad at having to leave India? Again the answer is surely obvious. We were very sad indeed to leave a country of which we had grown so fond, and we were heart-broken to leave the people who had given us such unbelievable generosity of spirit, confidence, and trust, and real inspiration as well as true friendship and, indeed, affection.

Anything that has been accomplished has been because of the wonderful way we have been received by the people of India. That has been something for which we shall always feel grateful.

The High Privilege of Service

It has been a high privilege to me to serve India in my own small way and to have been of some help

to my husband in his ceaseless labours. What I have valued more than anything else has been the way that the people, in the length and breadth of that great country, have accepted me. They have allowed me to work with them as a comrade, and their example of courage and devotion to duty and service has been something I shall never forget. I think the bonds that exist between the people of India and the Mountbattens will never be broken, because their feeling for our country is more precious and true now than it has ever been before. We have come back feeling rather humble and very grateful to the people of India for what they have done for us. They have given us a glimpse of their glorious heritage.

We were with them at the moment of their greatest rejoicings and achievement on that wonderul day, August 15 last. We were also with them at the moment of India's, and indeed world's, greatest calamity - at Gandhiji's death. So we have joined in their sorrows and their joys, their disappointments and hopes, and we have been grateful for that privilege.

My husband has referred to India's magnificient Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and I would like to say what an inspiration he has been to all of us who tried to help him in the past difficult months. He has been an inspiration to the doctors and nurses, to the welfare workers, and to the refugees themselves. I shall always remember the help and courage and the wise counsel he gave to me and to my colleagues at all times.

Again I thank you for the very generous and charming welcome you have given to us both.

Prof. Kirpal Singh.

THE NEW STATESMAN AND NATION

February 1, 1947

(page 86, Col. 2

Mr. Jinnah's Private Army

The outlook in India, already far from promising, has been overcluded still further by the weak and clumsy action of the Punjab Coalition Government. Alarmed by the growth of private communal armies on both sides, it raided the headquarters in Lahore both of the Hindu formation and of the National Guard promoted by the Muslim League. At the latter, where the police met with resistance, 1,000 steel helmets were found, with spears and other arms, and eight Muslim leaders were arrested, among them the heads of some o f the chief feudal families of the province, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, the Nawab of Mamdot and the Begum Shah Nawaz. As was to be expected, violent demonstrations followed in the streets, while furious protests were made by two Muslim Members of the Central Government (or should we call it the Viceroy's Council?) and by Mr. Jinnah, who called on the Viceroy to interfere. Did he do so? Whatever influences were at work, the eight leaders were released after 48 hours' detention, with a public apology from the Punjab Premier. After that, renewed confusion ensued. Processions of protest, led by a Member of the Viceroy's Council, continued, in spite of the ban upon them, and most of the Muslim leaders were re-arrested. On the other hand, the Provincial Government announced the lifting of the veto on the National Guard and its Hindu counterpart. In short, the League has trimphantly vindicated its right to recruit a private army. It looks as if complete chaos prevailed at the Centre. For example,

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a police raid was made simultaneously in eight provinces, two weeks ago, on the presses and offices of the Communist Party, and documents were seized on which it is said that a charge of fomenting communal strife will be based. Who planned and synchronised this action? Mr. Patel, the Home Member, denies all knowledge of it.

Prof. Kirpal Singh.

THE NEW STATESMAN AND NATION

September 6, 1947.

THE PUNJAB'S PRICE FOR FREEDOM

The deliberate press compaign designed to convince the British public that the end of British rule in India has thrown the entire country into a state of anarchy is as wicked as it is misleading. Every incident in the Punjab tragedy indicative of local breakdowns in administration is exaggerated and distorted to give the impression of nation-wide collapse. When the Boundary Force, always intended by the Joint Defence Council for temporary use, is disbanded, so that mixed units can be replaced by larger formations of a single community under the separate control of the two Dominion Governments, the Daily Express at once, and typically headlines "India turns on British officers", and suggests that the changed composition of the force to deal with the disturbances, agreed to by the Joint Defence Council under the chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten, is d_ue to accusations of partiality made against British officers by the Indians. No effort is spared to hold up the Governments of the two Member States of the British Commonwealth to contempt and ridicule and to label them after three weeks as unfit to rule.

But over vast areas of the sub-continent there is calm. Even in Calcutta, the danger spot of Bengal, there has been only one riot since August 15th. Bombay is quiet and so are the towns of the United Provinces and Bihar, many of which contain strong Muslim minorities.

In the South there has been no disturbance. As a whole the 400 million people of India have accepted the sudden and most tremendous changes in their long history with tranquility and remarkable restraint. The exception to the orderly transfer of power is the frontier region of the Punjab. There, as was always anticipated, it has been impossible to provide any arrangement to satisfy the Sikhs. Their population, property and holy shrines are distributed in such a way as to make it inevitable that powerful elements of the community would find themselves on either side of the boundary.

The Sikhs were bitter at not having a State of their own. It was worse that a million of them should be compelled to live in Pakistan among their traditional Muslim enemies. For the Sikhs to register a protest by arson and pillage is not uncommon. More fanatical, more courageous and more determined than any other sect in India, they set out to destroy the Muslims on the Indian side of the border. As reports reached Pakistan of their violence, retaliatory measures were taken by Muslims against Sikhs, until on both sides of the frontier, Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims became engaged in conflict. The riots will not end until either the fires of Sikh passion die down or superior military force is applied to the troubled districts.

In the meanwhile there is some danger that disaffection may spread in the Punjab. This is by no means the fault of the Boundary Force, now disbanded, or of the two Dominion Governments. The Boundary Force did a magnificient job against overwhelming difficulties, and without them the slaughter would have been far greater. That, here there, the communal ties of the troops employed broke down their impartiality was not surprising in view of the emotions to which they must have been subjected. The Dominion Governments cannot be held respon-

sible because it was always inherent in any division of the Punjab that the Sikhs would be provoked, and the task of controlling the now inflamed Muslims and Sikhs, grouped into marauding bands, is not easily accomplished. Now that the small Boundary Force is to be replaced by the full weight of the Dominion armies there is reasonable chance that order will be restored within a few weeks. Certainly there is no lack of the co-operation required between the respective Premiers to achieve this end. Ellicudde

Suffering is great and many thousands have already lost their lives. But that is no justification for the silly suggestion in some newspapers that the Indian settlement was a mistake. If settlement had not been made, instead of trouble in the centre of the Punjab, there would have been bloodshed and famine over all India, as the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs combined against the British and afterwards set upon each other to divide the spoils. It is also an error to describe the thousands moving in opposite directions across the frontier as all being refugees fleeing before the terror. The majority are those who decided from the outset to migrate to the country of their preference. The present massacres are a ghastly by-product of painful re-birth in India; but they are much less serious than, say, the 1943 Bengal famine (barely reported in England), when one and a half million died. In Bengal to-day outbreaks have been curbed by the patient efforts of Mr. Gandhi. In the Punjab the Congress and League High Commands are equally well intentioned, and once they have had time to bring the necessary force into action, there is no reason to doubt that they will pass the first test of their rule.

Prof. Kirpal Singh.

THE NEW STATESMAN AND NATION

October 4, 1947.

THE TWO INDIAS

No one would wish to minimise the horrors of the continuing tragedy in the Punjab. The ceaseless columns of refugees moving hopelessly each way across the border are now variously estimated in number at between two and five millions. Conditions in the refugee camps, aggravated by heavy rains and cessation of normal food supplies, are inevitably even more miserable than their poverty-stricken inmates are accustomed to in their own homes. No refugee convoy or train is safe from murderous attacks, sometimes carried out with the connivance of those entrusted with its safe guidance. The death roll has risen until it is now in the neighbourhood of 100,000. Cultivation is being neglected: in some parts crops are beig prematurely gathered while in others they may not be cut at all, with the consequence that the margin for India between starvation and sussistence becomes smaller and she is thereby the more dependent on imports for her food.

On humane and economic grounds, the outlook is black. Politically also the situation grows daily more dangerous. Recriminations and wild statements hinting at war are on the increase. Both sides are convinced that the other is not doing its best to quell the disturbances. Pakistan believes that India is deliberately trying to engineer her destruction. India fears that Pakistan is aiming to draw Britain, together with the Commonwealth, once again into the internal affairs of India and so whittle away her newly won independence at the outset. To top it all, Mr. Churchill, in a speech

as violent and as incautios as any made by any Indian leader, informs the world that we are only at the beginning of the horrors and the butcheries which Indians have "perpetrated upon one another with the ferocity of cannibals" and that the British Government should have applied the methods of Palestine to maintain control of India and to ensure an orderly transition of power. By this Mr. Churchill presumably means that the British left too soon, without doing what they could to ensure good administration after their departure, and that the two new Dominion Governments are unfit to rule. That, at any rate, is the interpretation put on his words by Indians who are hardly likely to be encouraged to remain in the Commonwealth by this attitude of contempt and hostility on the part of a great British statesman.

In a situation so confused and uncertain it is important to maintain a clear view of the certainities. First on the list is that, apart from all moral considerations, Britain had to leave India and could not have left it later than last August. After the war, the British administration was so depleted and so run down that the British Government had only two alternatives open to it. She could have reinforced the Civil Service, the Police, and doubled the size of the pre-war British Forces in India. That would have ensured effective control. At the same time, it would have been impossible to continue progress towards self-government. No popular Ministries could have been allowed in the Provinces or at the Centre. Such governments would of necessity have had a vastly different approach to that of the British administration and could therefore not have been tolerated. In the absence of popular governments there would have been country-wide risings obliging the authorities to reincarcerate all the Indian leaders and many others, or be swept away. In every sense of

India would have been a Fascist country - the Fascists being supplied by us. In addition, the period of Fascist rule could not at the minimum have been fixed at less than twenty years. A long period would have been essential in order to obtain recruits for the administrative machine and thoroughly to re-establish the prestige of the British Raj on the basis of force. So for twenty years Britain would have maintained, with diminishing chances of keeping order, far larger forces than in Palestine in face of the odium of the world and rising popular opposition throughout India; for what?

Her other course was to go, and to go before the administration collapsed, as it surely would have done now. On that point all those with wide experience of India, including Lord Linlithgow, would agree. But when you hand over the control of a country to its inhabitants you cannot, as Mr. Churchill seems to think, dictate the form in which you will hand it over. The fors is determined by the views of the recipients of power. If the entire government had been given to Congress the disturbances created by the Moslems would have made the present carnage in the Punjab look like a scuffle at the tail end of a meeting of the British League of Ex-Servicemen. Hence the division of India, with the consent of the people, offered the best prospect of ensuring peace. Nor was it possible to force more co-operation on the two States than they were willing to give each other.

The second certainly is that, having by artificial means maintained "law and order" in India for over a hundred years, the British could not hope to leave without some disturbances following her departure. At whatever date British went - 1947, 1967, or 2007 - the communal problems, held in check by British power, were bound to arise, and the later the date the worse the problems.

By handing over the power the British have at least avoided their own participation in them. By the establishment of Pakistan the problems were lessened. Only the possibility of providing an effective solution for the Sikhs has caused the trouble.

The third certainly is, as already pointed out in this journal, that the disturbances in proportion to the rest of the sub-continet, affect onlya fraction of its area and population. So far riots have spread no further than the refugees have travelled. Now there is every reason to hope that the great land mass of India will remain untouched by them. Their initial violence, against which no government could have done more than has been done by Pakistan and India and particularly by the newly created Provincial Governments of East and West Punjab, is dying down.

The chief remaining danger is that, as a result of wh t has already happened and of whay may still occur in the weeks before order is finally restored, relations between Pakistan and India may become permanently estranged. On both sides there are those ready to talk of war and the bitterness engendered is not likely to disappear for years. At a moment when the greatest restraint was needed on the top level, it was disturbing in the extreme that Mr. Gandhi, although carefully reiterating his own adherence to non-violence, should have said "if there is no other way of securing justice from Pakistan, and if Pakistan persistently refuses to see its proved error and continues to minimise it, the Indian Union Government would have to go to war against it." No doubt Mr. Gandhi intended this as a warning of the hideous possibilities in store if recriminations were not dropped and if the authorities did not exert themselves even further in the task of regaining control. It was spilled out of him by his disgust at the slaugher around him. Unfortunately, unscrupulous publicists in

India and Pakistan have seized on the remark as a justification for their war-mongering activities. It is to be hoped that his immediate disavowal of any desire for war will damp this campaign before its gets in its stride.

More alarming, by virtue of its being the act of a government, is the appeal of Pakistan for help from the Dominions. Being a new government, and with a far smaller territory than India, the shock of the disturbances falls more heavily on her than it does on India. It is understandable that she should be desperate for the means of ending the trouble so that she can begin the task of building up her economy and administration. Every day that passes in rioting represents to her an insupportable loss of revenue and of food. But the appeal is ill-considered for two reasons. First, because, short of despatching troops, there is nothing that this country or any other can do to stop tje troubles. Secondly, because, if the appeal were answered, and support given to Pakistan, India, who has not associated herself with the appeal, would resent it to the extent of breaking away from the Commonwealth altogether. Nothing can be gained by dragging other Powers into the arena. The only way out is constructive co-operation between the two Dominions, which will not be forthcoming so long as the tendency of the leaders to distrust each other flourishes. The best answer that can be given by the older Dominions is to urge this co-operation and to eschew direct intervention. Talk of civil war need not yet be taken seriously, but much has to be done to promote the good relations vital to both Dominions if they are to exist together in the same sub-continent.

In the meanwhile, any practical aid like medical, food and other supplies that the Dominions could send

would be invaluable. It would be a token of friendship that would bear great dividends in the future. Every effort should be made by this country to see that any food we may have contracted to buy in the U.S.A., but cannot through dollar shortage, goes to India. Concentration on the concrete economic and administrative needs of the moment is the surest cure for the hagged emotions now being roused on both sides of the Punjab border.

Prof. Kirpal Singh.