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CHRISTINE EFFENBERG

THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE SIKHS

**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOUTH ASIA RESEARCH
SOUTH ASIA INSTITUTE
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**THE POLITICAL STATUS
OF THE SIKHS
DURING
THE INDIAN NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
1935-1947**

by

CHRISTINE EFFENBERG

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Publishers' Note (English Edition)

The Sikhs in Punjab have played, interestingly, a dual role. On the one hand they formed the sinews of power for the British, being the forerunners of the regiments fighting for the prolongation of their rule; and on the other they also formed the sinews of the forces that were fighting to oust the British as rulers.

Their contribution has, therefore, been remarkable in history. The last act of Master Tara Singh proved a nail in the coffin of the staggering British empire when he, exactly on March 3, 1945, climbed the stairs of the Punjab Secretariat and cut the Muslim League flag asunder. The Master had got infuriated over unfurling by the pro-Pakistani agitators their flag in the then united India. It is from there that the riots started and the British Government decided suddenly to leave this country lock, stock and barrel.

Earlier, following the death of Guru Gobind Singh, who had also been fighting for an independent entity, many such movements had been organised in this part of the country. In the post-Ranjit Singh period, Kuka movement also was led by the Sikhs mainly. An average Panjabi because of the Gurus' influence was enamoured of the Sikh scriptures. Sikhs and Hindus literally lived on the horse-backs in the jungles for the sake of protecting the honour of their women folk who were a constant target of the invaders. The Panjabis bore the brunt. The Sikhs were always patriotic thus.

The period between 1935 and 1947 which is the subject of our study in the current volume, has been a crucial culmination of the past movements now taken over by the patriotic Sikhs, more vigorously.

Christine Effenberg who has made a research into the subject and taken pains to consult numerous books and other data for the benefit of the readers has indeed made a mark by this monumental study in the German language.

We have taken the liberty to present the English version of the book. The translation has been as free as possible and still conforming strictly to the text. At places we were unable to decide as to the need for the presentation of the names of the books referred to, in English. We ultimately allowed the German names to be retained in the Bibliography while in the text these names also were translated into English for a convenient reading.

The work published originally in German and now translated into English deserves to be rendered into other languages, too.

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Introduction

The present work discusses the political status of the Sikhs within the Indian National Movement from 1935 to 1947.

The period 1935-1947 in British-India, in which the first and the second general elections to "Provincial legislatures" took place, is of significant importance in the history of India and Pakistan. It is this period that decided about the division of India and the establishment of Pakistan.

Of significant importance in this period was Punjab, a northern province of India. Punjab deviated from the rest of India, because it heralded three communities instead of two:- the Muslims 57.1%, the Hindus 27.8% and the Sikhs, the natives of Punjab 13.2%.^a

Punjab was noteworthy in the time 1935-1947 as a "peaceful" province, since the best results had been achieved there with the provincial autonomous government. For this reason, Punjab was the only state, that never came under the direct rule of the Britishers.^b

The Partition of the Punjab area in 1947 however shattered the peace of this state through a civil war, which brought the exodus and the massacre of the Sikhs and the Muslims above all.

The Sikhs originated as a religious community in the Punjab, which, in due course of time, developed itself to a political community and also won political influence.

The history and the further development of the Sikh Community begins with Guru Nanak, who lived from 1496 to 1539.

The confession of Guru Nanak, the Sikhism, whose followers are called Sikhs, has originated from the available doctrines, the teachings of the Hindu-Bhaktas and the Muslim-Sufis, together with the newly introduced ideas of Guru Nanak. The Sikhism developed to a new and independent religion.

After Guru Nanak, the process of change from religious to political character of the Sikh community began. From that followed the further development of the Independence and the power status of the Sikhs. This power status made itself apparent already in the Mughal era under Guru Gobind Singh, 1666-1708, and his successor Banda Bahadur. The Sikhs achieved a main power-status in Punjab during the so-called Mist-period, and reached their crowning zenith under the

regime of Ranjit Singh, 1799-1839. After the destruction of the Sikh empire by the Britisher, the process of development for the Sikh community to self-consciousness began anew in 1849. Religious Sikh-reform movements were taken up first of all. The Nirankari-Namdhari and the Singh Sabha movements contributed towards the formation of a "Sikh identity".

After the achievement of a Sikh identity around the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, groups of Sikhs took active part in the political happenings in British-India as loyalists and Nationalists. Besides, they also took part as Extremists in the Ghadr Movement from 1913 onwards and in the Indian National Army during the second world-war.

The Akali party, the political organ of the Sikhs in the 20th century, composed of the Moderate and the Radicals, crystallised from the Gurdwara Reform Movement. The Pro-Britishers Khalsa national party arose in 1936 from the Chief Khalsa Dewan as the second important Sikh Party. The Government in Punjab was formed in 1937 by a coalition of the Unionist Party, consisting mainly of Muslim and Hindu (Jat) members, and Khalsa National Party.

The Muslim League played no important political role in Punjab, till the official announcement of the Pakistan-Plans in 1940.

During 1940-1947 the political parties of the Sikhs tried to win the best possible rights and privileges for their community from the Britishers, as the establishment of Pakistan and a division of Punjab, their homeland, made itself apparent. The Sikhs were all the more important for the Britishers, as they constituted a major proposition of soldiers for the British-Indian armies. Therefore, the Shiromani Akali Dal hoped demand for an own Sikh state, in case of Britishers conceding Pakistan.

The following study about the political relationships of the single political Sikh-parties in the last phase of the Indian freedom struggle is necessary, as till now no work has appeared for this topic, that gives information about all the political parties in the time from 1935-1947 and their co-operation or non-cooperation with the representatives of the Indian National movement.

Following works have been published for the period 1935-1947 about the Sikhs till now:

1. By Kailash Chander Gulati, "The Akalis Past and Present, New Delhi 1974", which concerns itself mainly with the Akali party and does

not take the other Sikh political groupings into consideration. It is, therefore, wanting in the book that K. Ch. Gulati did not use primary sources, but based his statements on secondary literature and newspapers.

2. The contribution of Baldev Raj Nayar, "Minority Politics in the Punjab, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966" which surveys the political developments in Punjab and describes only in general the political Sikh groupings.
3. The Dissertation by M.S. Sahni, "the Sikh Politics, 1927-1947, Patiala 1980" gives a good general overview of the political groupings of the Sikhs during 1927-1947. M.S. Sahni takes into consideration the constitutional developments in India during this time and its effects on the Sikhs. Unfortunately, he used neither the All India Congress Papers nor the Jawaharlal Nehru Papers for his dissertations, which are available in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi and give information about the relationship between Congress party and Sikh parties.

I therefore emphasise the following crucial points for my book, "the Political Status of the Sikhs during the Indian National Movement 1935-1947".

The behaviour of the political Sikh groupings, Akali parties (anti-British), Khalsa National Party (Pro-British), Sikh Congress Party (anti-British), Kirtis and Communists (anti-British) within the Indian National Movement; their co-operation or non-cooperation with the Hindus and Muslims and the following effects on the Indian Freedom 1947.

My study bases itself primarily on the All India Congress Committee Papers, Home Political Files, Sunder Singh Majithia Papers, Jawaharlal Nehru Papers, Linlithgow Collection as well as the Source Collection by Nicholas Mansergh (Ed.), the Transfer of Power 1942-1947, vol.I-IX, London 1970-1980. These sources and others give information about the political programme, the political sikh-groupings, their political affiliation (Pro-British, Pro-Congress, Pro-Unionists, Pro-Communists) as well as their splits within the concerned group. Besides, the statements of the sources made possible the following explanations:

Relationship Khalsa National Party--Shiromani Akali Dal--Central Akali Dal.

Relationship Khalsa National Party - Unionist Party

“ Akalis - Congress Party

“ Akalis - Unionists Party

It should be noted down here, that the Sikh Congress Party has hardly been mentioned in the sources as well as the secondary literatures, so that very little could be said about the Sikh Congress Party in this study.

It appears sensible to me, to devote the first two chapters of this book to the development of history of the Sikhs, so that the transition from the religious to political community becomes clear.

Attention is drawn hereby to the fact, that the places from where the sources have been taken, have been abbreviated as follows:

NAI/Delhi = National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

NMM&L/Delhi = Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi, India.

IOL/London = India Office Library, London, Great Britain.

Not to get into the danger of falsifying the sense, symbols have been taken in English language, and not translated, in doubtful cases.

My sincere thanks to Professor Dr. Dietmar Rothermund, Head of the History department, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg, who stood at my side, with fair and helpful advices and contributions.

Dr. Horst Joachim Leue, assistant Professor at the Department of History, South Asia Institute, and Dr. Dieter Halcour, Administrator of South-Asia Institute - I thank them for their co-operation, which they have given me since my student days at the South Asia Institute.

Footnotes:

a. Figures from Stephen Oren. The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937-1945, in *Modern Asian Studies*, 8, 3 (1974), S. 397.

b. See Stephen Oren, *The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists*, a.a.O., S.397.

I. Development of the Religious Sikh-Community to Political Community

1. The Sikhs under the Gurus

Nanak, a Hindu from Punjab¹ was the founder of Sikhism.

Two different interpretations try to explain the origination of this new faith in 1499.

The first of these states, that Nanak, in his first mysterious encounter with God, recognised that there is only one God. He got the instructions from God, to pronounce his message to the mankind, that there would be no Hindus or Muslims.²

The second version explains the cause of the origination of Sikhism not only in the Religiosity of Nanak, but also in his worries about the situation of the Hindus in Punjab area in his time,³ because Punjab got the highest number of converts to Islam since the establishment of the Muslim empire in India, and the origins of true Hinduism in the time of Nanak were throttled by superstitions, egotism of the Priests and the indifference of the public. Hinduism was confined in this time, to special forms of eating and drinking, special types of bathing and daubing of the fire-head and other mechanical Customs.

Besides, the orders of the Brahmins were to be followed strictly and also costly gifts were to be given to the Brahmins. Traces of the once Hindu power had faded out and the Hindus found themselves in a precarious position. Since, according to this version, a political effort from Nanak was bound to fail,⁴ Nanak saw a religious revival as the only means, to save the Hindu community from this threatening destruction.

Nanak intended to change the social and religious thinking of the Hindus by this revival, to bring them back to a simple and sincere religion through rules and examples, and to make them able, to claim themselves as a nation.⁵

Nanak preached the doctrine of only one God, which is formless and knows neither birth nor death. Only this God is to be revered. Only the love towards him is the most important, instead of the religious rituals and ceremonies. The only way of redemption is achieved by devotion to God, together with the good deeds. Only a true Guru as a true leader to truth can show the way to redemption.⁶

The new confession of Nanak was taken and formed from the available doctrines, as every religious movement. It developed itself to a new and independent religion.⁷

Along with the newly introduced ideas in his confession, Nanak also included the teachings of the Hindu-Bhaktas and the Muslim Sufis.

New in Nanak's teachings was the idea, that there is no reincarnation of God, that he is not infinite, cannot die and cannot take up human form. New was also its non-sectarian character, its non withdrawal from wordly life. In addition the teachings were preached in Punjabi¹³ and the practical thrust against caste system came with the construction of "free dining halls", called "Langar".¹⁴

As a result of the teachings of Nanak, the awakening of the consciousness of a common nationality succeeded, especially Nanak did not identify himself with a particular party.¹⁵

Guru Nanak is considered¹⁶ to be the first successful Hindu-reformer of our times, as well as the first Popular Leader of Punjab, who awakened the Punjabi-consciousness and Punjabi-nationality.¹⁷

Nanak's teachings were mainly concerned with the Hindus of the lower classes and the poor Muslim Population.¹⁸ He won a big number of followers from amongst the Punjabi Jats, Military talented farmers, the "Prime" of the village Population, who formed the back-bone of the Sikh army in later times.¹⁹

During the time of Nanak, his followers, the Sikhs i.e. the disciples of the Guru, made no clear independent sect.²⁰ A renouncement from their original confession, from Hinduism or Islam, began only through their changed way of life, shown by Guru Nanak.²¹ The Sikhs took another place for reverence and another form for service of God, sang hymns of Nanak in Punjabi, ate together and used the greeting form of the Gurus: Sat Kartar = True Creator. Since they did not show any noteworthy features, by which they could be clearly differentiated from other sects of Hinduism, they formed no independent sect, but only a religious community.²²

Between 1539 and 1708, the Sikhs developed themselves step by step to a steadily growing religious community with a political character and not to be overseen unfolding of power. This happened through a consolidation of their religious foundations and together with a deviation from religious to political character of the community.

Guru Angad, 1504-1552, disciple and follower of Guru Nanak, began with a strengthening of the religious foundations, when he turned

to the dangers, which threatened the early Sikhism.

The danger of secession of the followers stood for Sikhism through an amalgamation with the Hindu masses,²³ as well as a degeneration in a small sect of ascetics, named Udasi-sect, founded by Srichand, a son of Guru Nanak.²⁴ Guru Angad provided for the Sikhs an individuality, by taking up the Gurmukhi script,²⁵ which became the special script of the Sikhs, by compilation of the memories and teachings of Guru Nanak in Punjabi which ultimately made up the 'Holy Book' of the Sikhs, and by construction of further Langars, which served for propaganda activity and the refraction of the caste system.²⁶

With that the Sikhs began to form a new group, a kind of brotherhood and to develop a new sense, to be a separate people.²⁷

The followers of the confession of Nanak became an independent community under Guru Amar Das, the third Guru of the Sikhs. The number of the followers was in thousand within the Punjab area.²⁸ For this reason, Amar Das divided the areas populated by the followers in 22 districts, called "Manjas".²⁹ At the top of a Manja stood a Sikh as masand i.e. representative, trader of the Gurus, who carried out the pastoral work and also collected the offerings and the gifts.

Amar Das succeeded in the first step towards organisation of the Sikh community with the setting up of the Manjas.³⁰ The basis for the political development of the Sikh community was prepared with that. The construction of buildings and cities together with the publication of the teachings of Guru Nanak resulted in an increase in the number of followers, brought the Gurus ever-increasing power and influence³¹ and strengthened the religious foundations.

The change of the Guru-secession contributed similarly to the growth of Sikh-Power.³² Since the time of Nanak it was normal to name a person as a successor of the Guru, who was true, firm in beliefs, ideal and named by the Guru himself.

Ram Das, the fourth Guru (1534-1581) introduced a hereditary succession of Gurus.

The result of the above introduction was a change in the leadership of the Guru, since the Guru was now considered by his followers not only as spiritual (Satguru), but also as worldly leader, as ruler (Sachcha Padschah).³³

This change of Gurus to world wide leaders made up yet another step on the political way of the Sikhs.

Guru Arjun, the fifth Guru (1563-1606) introduced the

compilation of the *Adi Granth*,³⁴ the construction of Amritsar with the Golden Temple as a centre of Sikh activities,³⁵ the winning of a considerable proportion of Jats from the Majha-area as followers,³⁶ introduction of the income-system³⁷ and the setting up of horse-trade.

These innovations served the religious foundations, a separation from the Hindus and above all the political power of the Sikhs through the connected financial strengthening and construction of a basis for the future army of the Khalsa.³⁸

The development of the Sikh community introduced by Guru Arjun brought some introductory elements of an infant theocratical state, with the Guru as the *Sachcha Padschah*.³⁹

The Sikh Community carried out during the time of Guru Arjun a form of autonomy within the Mughal Empire, with power, growth of prestige and development to a factor in the political life in the Punjab area.

Within a century, from Guru Nanak to Guru Arjun, a relatively small circle of followers became a community with power, independence and political importance.

This led to the friendship of the Mughal emperor Akbar⁴⁰ with Guru Amar Das and Guru Ram Das, which brought more prestige to the Sikh religion with Akbar's approval and thereby contributed to an increase in its influence and circle of followers.

The increasing popularity of the community led to the first distresses and persecutions of the Sikhs under Emperor Jahangir (1569-1627), son of Akbar, and Shah Jahan⁴¹ (1592-1666).

This was not begun by the Mughals, but by the Brahmins who felt themselves threatened by the innovations and the followers of Guru Amar Das.⁴² The distresses reinforced the feelings of unity and togetherness within the community and thus contributed to the political importance of the Sikhs.⁴³

After the execution of Guru Arjun in 1606, whose increase of power as worldwide leader posed a threat to the Mughal emperor,⁴⁴ the political character developed itself not for the reason of measures with religious foundations, but through changes, which themselves rested on a military and political character.

Hargovind, the son of Arjun and the sixth Guru of the Sikhs (1595-1644) introduced the wearing of the sword and the symbol of the Kingdom.⁴⁵ He requested gifts from his followers in form of horses, weapons and other equipment and turned his attention not to medita-

tion, but to physical exercises such as wrestling, riding, fencing and hunting.⁴⁶

His introductions show clearly the advent of the new military line. Hargovind succeeded in setting up a small army, in leading three victorious battles against the Mughals⁴⁷ and in being the first Guru of the Sikhs with a military career.⁴⁸

Main reasons for the military character of the Sikh community under Hargovind are: (i) a retaliation for the death of Guru Arjun, (ii) a protective measure for the Sikh faith i.e. the spreading of the faith,⁴⁹ and (iii) the thinking of freeing the Punjab Land from the pressures of the Mughal empire.⁵⁰

Hargovind succeeded in a military set-up only because of a milder persecution by Jahangir and Shah Jahan.⁵¹ The aspirations and the unfolding of power was removed however only under Aurangzeb⁵² (1618-1707). Alongwith an increased oppression of the Sikhs, the peaceful character of the Gurus after Hargovind was also a reason for this stagnation in the blossoming of the Sikh-power.

Hari Rai (1630-1661), Hari Krishan (1656-1664) and Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675) concerned themselves only with the religious interests of the community. They had no other choice because of the strong persecutions by Aurangzeb.⁵³

Only Govind Singh, the tenth Guru (1666-1708), succeeded in forming again his community in a strong, military power at the end of the regime of Aurangzeb against the background of the degeneration of the Mughal empire.

Govind was proclaimed as the Guru of the oppressed and persecuted sikh-community by the order of Aurangzeb, after the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth Guru in 1675. He changed radically the character of Sikhism through his innovations, which influenced the social life of the Sikhs.⁵⁴

There were many reasons for the introduction of these innovations by Govind Singh. One reason was the situation within the sikh community. In the movement, diversity and decay had entered through the constant fightings over the successor of the Guru and through the Masands, who had forgotten their actual task and were filling their own pockets.⁵⁵

Govind abolished, therefore, the Masands and the Guru leadership employed the book, the Adi Granth, the "Holy Book" of the Sikhs for spiritual leadership, and for worldly leadership, the "Khalsa", the Pure.⁵⁶

Govind wanted to consolidate the thought of the struggle against the Mughal empire because of its tyranny and despotism by the establishment of the Khalsa.⁵⁷

Guru Govind intended with the innovations, to avoid the danger of the obliteration of the Sikh community, which stood since the time of Hargovind. He also hoped to fight other strong sects, which demanded Guru leadership and tried to soften Sikhism, and also to drive a wedge between the Sikhs and the Mughul rulers.⁵⁸

Govind also intended alongwith to create a Punjabi nation.⁵⁹ Advantageous to Govind were the Sikh-hate against the Mughul rulers, coming from the execution of Tegh Bahadur and an unsatisfaction of the Hindu population, brought about by the introduction of a new tax by Auragzeb, the Jizya.⁶⁰ The increasing power of the Marathas was also a great help to Govind, as Aurangzeb had to divert his attention to them.

By the establishment of the Khalsa, a military brotherhood, in which the lowest were the same as the highest,⁶¹ Govind succeeded in bringing up a united and equipped community, which was ready to plunge in the war.

Govind achieved the unity of his followers by an abolition of the caste, equalness of the privileged, a special inauguration ceremony called Pahul, in which the Khalsa took up the nickname "Singh" = the Lion. Besides, they were to wear a turban and were always to have the five K's with them:

Kesh = Long hair and long beard

Kangha = Comb

Kirpan = Sword or knife

Kara = Steel Arm Band

Kachh = Underwear⁶²

The external symbols validated their commonness and their membership.⁶³

Within a few months, "new people" originated, with beards, turbans, weapons, whose important signs were only a wish for war and bravery.⁶⁴

The leadership of the Sikh community, also changed and went over from the non-military Khatris to the Jat farmers, the major portion of the converts. The rise of the military Sikhism became the rise of the Jat-power in Punjab.⁶⁵

From his united and military community, Govind formed a small

army, with which he fought with the neighbouring small princes and the Mughul troops. The first military success of the Sikhs was however not achieved by Govind, but by Banda Bahadur, who was converted to Sikhism by Govind.

2. Ascent and Consolidation of the Sikh-Power after Persecution.

Banda Bahadur,⁶⁶ son of Rajput parents and an original name of Lachman Das, continued the struggle begun by Govind Singh against the Mughals.

Along with the Sikh followers from villages, his army also comprised the Jats from Malwa and Majha areas. These followers came together because of the measures proclaimed by Banda Bahadur, to protect all the oppressed and to fight against their oppression. The farmers therefore rose against the Zamindars and the local officers and supported the army of Banda Bahadur.⁶⁸

Banda's army became the army of farmers, he became the helper of the land population and the Sikhs spearheaded the opposition movement against the tyranny of the Mughals.⁶⁹

Banda's conquests began with the victories at Kaithal and Samana on 26.11.1707,⁷⁰ followed by those at Ghuram Shahabad, Mustafabad, Kapuri and Sadhaura and the conquest of Sirhind on 30.5.1710. The Muslim population was killed and plundered to a large extent in these victories.⁷¹

With the conquest of Sirhind, Banda's empire stretched to the areas between the Sutlej and the Jumna.⁷² As a result of these conquests a large number of Muslim and Hindu population changed over to Sikhism.⁷³

Banda Bahadur strengthened his hold through a change in the ruling structure of the conquered areas. In place of Mughals, the Sikhs now became governors of Sirhind, Samana and Thaneswar.⁷⁴

Banda crossed the Jamuna and conquered Saharanpur after the conquest of Sirhind.⁷⁵ Behat, Ambheta, Nanauta, Karnal and the whole area till Panipat fell after that. The Mughal authority stretched in Punjab only till Lahore and the Afghan border. The Mughals had to face the danger of Banda marching towards Delhi.⁷⁶

The Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah⁷⁷ took protective measures by mobilising all the armies in Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Oudh and by proclaiming a "holy war" = Jihad against the Sikhs. Besides, Bahadur

Shah was also supported by Bundela Rajputs.⁷⁸

The defeat of Sikhs with heavy losses at Amingarh in 1710 led to the loss of Thanesar, Karnal and Shahabad and the resurrection of the Mughul empire in the Malwa valley. A further defeat and killings on 11.12.1710 brought the siege of the Sikhs who had fled to the Fort of Mukhlisarh by the Mughals. The Mughals were supported by the Meos, Pathans, Afghans and the Rajputs. Banda fled into the mountains⁷⁹ with his followers. He remained in the mountains except for small outbursts as in Batala and Kalanaur. He attacked anew in Kalanaur and Batala and was defeated at Kot Mirza Jan near Kalanaur by the Mughal armies. On 17.12.1715 he was kept in the Fort of Gurdaspur and forced to do menial jobs.

The victory of Mughals was followed by mass executions, execution of Banda and his officers in June, 1716.⁸⁰ Persecutions and executions of those, who had become Sikhs, was carried out for decades.

A result of the struggle by Banda was a change in the class systems in the southern half of Punjab by liquidation of Muslim Zamindars, families from Malwa and the Jullundhar Doab.

The Muslim population also started a movement against the Sikhs following the killings of Muslims in the areas conquered by the Sikhs.⁸¹ One can see a foundation for a later Sikh sovereignty alongwith a change in the Zamindari system.⁸² This movement of the Muslims against the Sikhs brought a setback to the Sikhs who tried to regain their solidarity against the Muslims.

The policy of Banda Bahadur and the following defeat did not however lead to an obliteration of Sikhism - instead the Sikhs appeared once again in the mountains under a new leadership after hiding for a long time.

In spite of the long lasting persecution since 1716 after the execution of Banda Bahadur, the Sikhs could regain once again their lost power due to certain internal measures from 1724 onwards.

The Sahadhari Sikhs, who gave up their external features of Sikhism,⁸³ came into existence as a result of this long persecution; the "loyal, true" Kesadhari Sikhs fled into the jungles, mountains and deserts of Rajputana and Bikaner.

The underground Sikhs appeared in small bands after 1724.⁸⁴ These bands plundered the Punjab valley. They fought like Guerillas i.e. attack from behind, plunder and retreat in the mountains, so as

to punish their traitors⁸⁵ and to take revenge against the Mughals.⁸⁶

After the breaking up of Banda power, the Sikhs had no proper leader. As a protective measure arose the tradition, to take community decisions twice in a year - at Baisakhi and Diwali. This institution, called as Sarbat Khalsa, then also named the leaders for the community and chose representatives, who formed small bands of their own.⁸⁷

The increasing power of the bands and the disturbances led the Mughuls in 1733 to grant the Sikhs a Jagir for Rs. 100,000 and the title of Nawab for their leader through Zakariya Khan, Governor of Lahore. This was done to keep the Sikh community peaceful.

In 1734, the Jats and the bands united themselves for the first time in Dal Khalsa, the army of Khalsa, which had Amritsar as its Headquarters. The Dal Khalsa consisted of two divisions,⁸⁸ the Budha Dal (the Old) and the Taruna Dal (the Young), as well as five other groups led by Sikh-leaders.

The Sikhs began anew their plunderings in 1735 with this new organisation, and carried an open battle with the Diwan of Lahore. This battle brought the victory for the newly organised Sikh army over the Mughul army of Hujra Shah Muqim.

Towards further strengthening of the Sikh power, a more important factor was the appearance of Nadir Shah, rather than the plunderings and the victory over Hujra Shah Muqim.

The invasion of Nadir Shah, in 1739 was used by the Sikhs to attack and plunder him while he retreated back to Indus and to free the Indian prisoners, without fighting an open battle. This changed the public opinion about the Sikhs. From street robbers, they became freedom fighters.

The result was again an increasing support from the farmers. This strengthened the Sikh power further and led to the construction of the headquarters, the fort of Dallewa near Dera Baba Nanak on Ravi, East of Lahore.⁸⁹

The Sikh bands were united in 1745 in 25 cavalier regiments by a resolution of the Sarbat Khalsa under the leadership of Sikh Sardars.

The Sikh Sardars collected taxes from the farmers in the vicinity of Eminabad. With that they drew the attention of the Mughals once again to themselves, which reached its Zenith in the mass execution of thousands of Sikhs in Lahore,⁹⁰ known as "Ghallughara" (the Holocaust) in June 1746.⁹¹

The successors of Zakariya Khan and the invasion of the Afghans

under Ahmed Shah Abdali became advantageous to the Sikhs to resurrect their power after this new weakening.

The first invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdali in North India in 1747, who plundered Lahore in 1748 and was driven away by Mir Mannu, led to a division of the 25 Sikh regiments in more than 60 Bands⁹² and to a plundering of the retreating Afghans. These Bands organised themselves in the Dal Khalsa,⁹³ which had mainly the willing Jat farmers.⁹⁴

Dal Khalsa was further divided into 12 misls,⁹⁵ that were led by a misldar. The idea behind this sub-division was to fight the enemies of Punjab with a united and a reinforced army.⁹⁶

The struggle of the Sikhs for the rule of Punjab covered the entire period of the nine Afghan invasions in India 1747-1769. In the battle against the Afghans the Sikhs were supported by the Marathas,⁹⁷ who marched in Punjab in 1758, but were defeated by the Mughals and the Afghans in the battle of Panipat in 1761.

After the retreat of the Afghans in 1769, the misldars ruled the areas between the Chenab and the Ravi, the Ravi and the Beas and the Beas and the Sutlej.⁹⁸

The twelve Sikhs misls had formed themselves to independent ruling groups with own areas after 1769. They increased in power till 1773 from Saharanpur in East, to Attock in West from Multan in south to Kangra and Jammu in North.⁹⁹

The Sarbat Khalsa showed itself as the highest power during the Afghan invasions, around which the misldars collected, held together by a common religious faith, and that towards a common danger¹⁰⁰: a kind of alliance, that resolution of Sarbat Khalsa bound the separate misldars to Dal Khalsaji¹⁰¹ and fought collectively against the enemy.

In 1770, after the danger had passed, the alliance broke up and the misldars revolted. The result was a constant weakening of the Sarbat Khalsa and an unmistakable increase of the power of misldars till 1799.¹⁰²

The power sphere of the misls increased through the successful conquests. The possession of an own army lead the misldars, not to recognise Sarbat Khalsa as the highest power in the Sikh community, but to free themselves of this alliance and to become independent. The misldars enjoyed independence by governing the matters concerned with the misls through their own army, their own area, and own victories.¹⁰³

To this also came the financial independence of the misldars, who got their receipts from their conquered areas, by plundering or by introducing the "Rakhi-System".¹⁰⁴

Rakhi or Jamdari, similar to the Chauth Maratha,¹⁰⁵ was taken by the misldars from the areas threatened by them, but not under their direct control, in form of money as guarantee against any further attacks¹⁰⁶ and amounted to one-fifth of the yearly income.¹⁰⁷ The population was then attacked neither by the misldars nor by the neighbours or other ruling groups. Rakhi is therefore a sort of black mail, because of the idea of the misldars behind it, not to attack further together with the demand of a pay off.

The system of the misls can be called as a sort of feudal system. The misldars were the powerful feudal lords, however with the limitation, not to be in the true sense feudal as in Europe.¹⁰⁸

The misldars distributed pieces of land¹⁰⁹ in goodwill with duties to collect followers who were to support the misldars militarily, who were but independent and free as compared to the feudal beings of Europe. Free in the sense, that the followers could leave the misldars any time and choose another misldar as their leader.¹¹⁰

The function of the Khalsa structure proved to be very weak. Disagreement, competitive battles fought by the misldars as well as the non-availability of a common group within the Sikh community led to a chaos in Punjab. This presented a major danger to the rise of power of Sikhs around the end of the 18th century.¹¹¹

Their areas were split by fighting among themselves and were threatened by the bordering Afghans, Britishers, Rajputs, Gurkhas and Marathas from the outside.

The only choice left for the Sikh community to survive as a power was to unite the whole Sikh community under a common leadership, as they had united under the Sarbat Khalsa during the Afghan invasions.

Ranjit Singh (1780-1839)¹¹² succeeded in uniting the Sikh community again and giving them a higher status. He came from Sukerchakia misl and had many reasons, which not only made him the leader but also the King of the Sikhs.

He smashed the misls, fought against the external enemies and increased his Kingdom.¹¹³

He strengthened his kingdom by reforming and building the Sikh army which made a transition to artillery and was trained by European officers,¹¹⁴ as well as through relationships with Britishers and through

establishment of unity in Punjab.¹¹⁵

After the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839, there was a quick decay and weakening of the kingdom and enmity with the British, which led to the first (1845-1846) and the second (1848-1849) Anglo-Sikh war.¹¹⁶

In the second Anglo-Sikh war, the Britishers defeated the Sikhs and destroyed the kingdom set up by Ranjit Singh.¹¹⁷ The Britishers annexed Punjab.¹¹⁸

The first measure of the Board of Administrators,¹¹⁹ the dissolution of the Khalsa Army of the defeated Sikh kingdom and the sacking of the Sikh soldiers, met with the most important power support¹²⁰ - pillar of Sikhs.

The result of this dissolution was the loss by many Sikh-soldiers of their only source of income, who could not employ themselves as farmers and were not given any further employment opportunities. Besides, the Sikhs in civil professions also lost their jobs. The Britishers also became very strict against the Sikhs.¹²¹

This shows, that the Britishers acted very hostile against the Sikhs after the annexation of Punjab, till the British rule in Punjab consolidated itself.¹²²

The measures taken by the Britishers together with the oppression of the Sikhs effected a retreat of many "new" Sikhs from Sikhism. These were former Hindus who had entered the Khalsa-brotherhood during the time of Ranjit Singh.¹²³

A considerable number of old Sikhs also turned to the orthodox Hinduism, and took up the old Hindu-practices. An action, which came into existence during the regime of the successor of Ranjit Singh itself.¹²⁴

Sir Geo Clerk, governor from 1847-1848, stated his opinion in 1849, that the Sikh community would cease to exist in five years.¹²⁵

How little the Sikhs themselves were interested in adhering to and emphasising their own independence, was shown by the first census-report in Punjab in 1854, published under the first Chief Commissioner of Punjab from 1853-1859, John Lawrence.¹²⁶

In contrast to the wild guesses of 1849,¹²⁷ a population of 13 million Punjabis was ascertained as against a predicted 10 million, which was made up of 7.5 million Muslims and 5.5 million Hindus. Concrete figures for the Sikhs were not given in this report, as they had been counted as Hindus. The only exception was the Lahore district, where the Sikhs were heavily concentrated and were, therefore, given

separately.¹²⁸ Either they considered themselves as Hindu, or they did not think it to be important, to demand a separation from the Hindus.¹²⁹

The danger of falling back in the Hindu Community was highest for the Sikhs at this time than at any other time. The process of the establishment of a self-consciousness, a Sikh identity began for them afresh, after the occupation of Punjab by the Britishers and the destruction of their power. The first step towards the establishment of this consciousness came from a religious basis with a religious revival. The Sikh reformer began to praise the old Sikh values.

Footnotes:

1. Born on 15.4.1461 in Talwandi Rai Bhoie, today called Nankana Sahib, near Lahore, Pakistan; died on 22.9.1539 in Kartarpur. From Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*. Vol.I, Princeton, New Jersey 1963. S.29, 30.

2. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.o., S.31-33. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, *A Short History of the Sikhs*. Vol.I, (1469-1765). Bombay, Calcutta, Madras 1950. S.4, 5.

Harbans Singh, *The Heritage of the Sikhs*. Calcutta....1964. S.20.

G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in History of the Punjab*. Vol.I, Jullundhur 1960. S.56.

3. Gokul Chand Narang, *Transition of Sikhism into a Political Organisation*. Lahore 1910 (Diss.) S 3-6.

4. For political failure see Gokul Chand Narang, *Transition of Sikhism*, a.a.O., S.3.

5. Gokul Chand Narang, *Transition of Sikhism into....*, a.a.O., S. 6, 15.

6. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 39, 43. Gokul Chand Narang, *Transition of Sikhism into...*, a.a.O., S. 11, 12.

7. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 17, 39. See also Helmuth Von Glasenapp, *the non-Christian religions*, Frankfurt 1957, p. 274, which also considers Sikhism as an independent religion.

8. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Col.I, a.a.O., S. 41, 46.

9. Comes from Tamil-Land, 11th Century, from Fischer *World History*, Vol.17, edited by Ainslie T. Embree and Friedrich Wilhelm, Frankfurt 1967, S.163.

10. The Alvars were followers of Vishnu, the Adyars followers of Shiva. See for that Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 22-24.

11. Birthdate not clear, either 1299 or 1398. Death date not known, from G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.37.

12. Life dates controversial, died in 1518, from Fischer World History, India, Vol.17, a.a.O., S.222.

13. Own language of the Sikhs, derived from Hindi Script called Gurumukhi, from Pritam Singh Gill, History of the Sikh Nation, Julluandhur 1978. S.100.

14. Langer-Kitchen, where everybody, even a non-Sikh, gets food free of cost. Langer is always joined with a Sikh temple, a Gurudwara, from G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.73.

15. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.12, 13.

16. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S. 11.

17. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 48.

18. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 37.

19. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., a.a.O., S.108, 310.

20. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 37.

Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S. 15.

21. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 48.

Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S. 16.

22. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 49, 50.

Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S. 21.

G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 123, 124.

Syad Muhammad Latif, History of the Punjab, New Delhi, 1964. S. 25.

23. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of..., a.a.O., S.17.

24. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of..., a.a.O., S.21.

Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.49, 50.

Syad Mohammad Latif, History of the Punjab, a.a.O., S.251.

For origination and importance of the Udasi Sect, see G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.21-23.

25. For importance of the acceptance see G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.17, Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short History..., a.a.O., S.19.

Harbans Singh, The Heritage..., a a.O., S.24.

26. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.19.

27. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 17-20.

- Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.50-52.
G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, S.124.
28. Exact numbers were neither given by Khushwant Singh G.C. Narang, Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, Harbans Singh, G.S. Chhabra nor by S.M. Latif.
29. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism..., a.a.O., S. 23.
Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short History..., a.a.O., S. 23.
Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S. 24.
G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.130. See also Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O. page 53, which credits Amar Singh simply with an increase in the number of Manjas.
30. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.23.
31. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.24.
Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.55.
32. Gokul Chand Narang, Transition of..., a.a.O., S.29.
G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, S.146.
33. G.C. Narang, Transition, a.a.O., S. 30.
G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 147, 148.
Syad Muhammad Latif, History of the Punjab, a.a.O., S. 253. For problem of "Sachcha Padschah" and for political meaning for the Sikhs see I. Banerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa, Vol.I, Calcutta 1963. S.253-266.
34. Has importance for the Sikhs, as Bible for Christians, see further G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 31.
35. Amritsar became Sikh Capital.
36. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 57, speaks of thousands, however no exact number is given.
37. The amount of presents by the followers was ascertained as one tenths of the income and was collected by Masands. See for that Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 57.
S.M. Latif, History of the Punjab, a.a.O., S. 254.
38. G.C. Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.35, 36.
39. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a a.O., S.33.
40. See for that G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 25-29 which gives examples for the friendship between Akbar, Amar Das.
Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.59.
41. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 59, 64. Besides that, in detail Surjit Singh, Sikh Mughal Relation, in, The Sikh Review, Dec. 1973, S. 43-47 that considers the relations only till Guru Gobind Singh.

42. For that, Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a a.O., S.53. , which gives statements for the action of Brahmans.

43. G.C. Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.39.

G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.165.

44. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.39, 40.

Surjit Singh, Sikh Mughal Relation, in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.44.

45. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.54.

G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.197.

46. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.54.

Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.63.

47. For reasons and courses of the battle see G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 57-60. In detail for that Fauja Singh, Guru Hargobind and his struggle against the Mughals, in The Missionary, Sept. 1961, S. 33-39. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 214-217. For Hargovinds army see G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.72. Further G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.197-198.

48. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 64-67, G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.60.

49. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.66. Harbans Singh, Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S. 34.

50. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.55.

51. See for that Surjit Singh, Sikh Mughul Relation, in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.45, 46.

52. G.C. Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.62.

53. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.62-67.

54. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S.68. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.89, I. Banerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.92. Harbans Singh, Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S.38. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., a.a.O., Vol.I, S. 190, 279. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short History..., a.a.O., S.66, 68. S.M. Latif, History of the Punjab, a.a.O., S. 261.

55. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 81, 82. I. Banerjee, Evolution..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.108-111. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short..., a.a.O., S.70. Surinder Singh Johar, Guru Gobind Singh, Jullundhur 1967, S.140. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.280. Harbans Singh, Heritage..., a.a.O., S.39.

56. The Khalsa is an institution similar to Panchayat see Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 81. Sher Singh, Social and Political Philosophy of Guru Gobind Singh, Jullunder 1967, S. 208-

229 which depicts the development of the Panchayat system in election to the Khalsa by Guru Nanak till in the 20th century.

57. G.C. Narang, *Transition of Sikhism into...*, a.a.O., S.68, 76, 77. S.S. Johar, *Guru Gobind Singh*, a.a.O., S.137, 138. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 279. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, *A Short History...*, a.a.O., S. 70. Teja Singh, *The Khalsa - Was it a new Religion*, in *The Sikh Review*, Dec. 1960, S.22, 23. R.L. Soni, *Lore of the Khalsa Knighthood*, in *The Sikh Review*, March 1967, S. 5, 6, G.S. Mansukhani, *The Khalsa Ideal*, in *The Sikh Review*, March 1967, S.78. J.S. Grewal, *The Khalsa of Guru Govind Singh, A Problem in Historiography*, in *Punjab History Conference, Second Session, Oct. 28-30, 1966*. S.85.

58. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 81, 82. I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 111-112. Banerjee names Mirias, Dhirmalias & the Ram Rayees as sects.

59. G.C. Narang, *Transition....*, a.a.O., S.68, 76, 77. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced....*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.290, 291. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, *A Short History...*, a.a.O., S.72.

60. G.C. Narang, *Transition....*, a.a.O., S.69, 70.

61. G.C. Narang, *Transition of Sikhism...*, a.a.O., S. 74. Teja Singh, *The Khalsa Panth*, in *The Missionary*, Oct-Dec. 1960, S. 23. R.L. Soni, *Lore of the Khalsa Knighthood*, in *The Sikh Review*, a.a.O., S. 7. G.S. Mansukhani, *The Khalsa Ideal*, in *The Sikh Review*, a.a.O., S. 82. For origination of the Khalsa see Khushwant Singh, *A History of...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 82-84.

62. For meaning of the five K's and for reason see Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.86. Hazara Singh, *Foundation of the Khalsa*, in *The Sikh Review*, April 1973, S. 26, 27. Teja Singh, *The Khalsa...*, in *The Sikh Review*, a.a.O., S.31. Kapur Singh, *Yo Evam Veda--Truth about the Birth of the Khalsa*, in *The Sikh Review*, July 1960, S. 49-51. See Appendix 1.

63. G.C. Narang, *Transition....*, a.a.O., S.82. For external features see Appendix 1.

64. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.89.

G.C. Narang, *Transition....*, a.a.O., S. 68.

65. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.89, I. Banerjee, *Evolution of the Khalsa*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.124.

66. Banda = Sklave, Sklave Guru Govinds, See for that Ganda Singh, *Banda Bahadur the First Liberator of Punjab*, in *The Sikh Review*,

August 1971, S.17.

67. G.C. Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 5. Aufl., New Delhi 1960, S.99. Ganda Singh, Banda Bahadur..., in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.17.

68. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 103, 105, 109. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5. Aufl., a.a.O., page 101 gives figures - in 2 or 3 months, 4000 men by Horses and 7000 or 8000 on foot; their number became very soon 8000 or 9000, and then 40,000. Ganda Singh, Banda Bahadur..., in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S. 20, Gurbux Singh Bhatia, The First Sikh Government: Its Objective and Methods, in The Sikh Review, Feb. 1971, S. 30.

69. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I a.a.O., S.105, 109.

70. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol. I, a.a.O., S. 104 names the conquest of Samanas as the first important vicotry for Sikhs.

71. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5. Aufl., S.102, S.M. Latif, History of the Punjab, a.a.O., S.277/278. Siri Daya Singh/Gurubanda Singh Khalsa, Sikh Freedom Fighters in the age of Revolution, in The Sikh Review. August 1977, S.6 G.S. Chhabra, Banda Bahadur, Part III, in The Sikh Review, June 1961, S.38.

72. G.C. Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 5 Aufl., a.a.O., S. 101-103. Khushwant Singh, A History of..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.104-106.

73. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.106.

74. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5 Aufl..., a.a.O., S.103.

75. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5 Aufl..., a.a.O., S.104.

76. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.107.

77. Accession to the throne, 1707-1712 from Fischer World History India, a.a.O., S. 276.

78. Khushwant Singh, A History of..., Vol.I; a.a.O., S.108, 109. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5 Aufl., a.a.O., S.103.

79. Khushwant Singh, A History of..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S.110, 111. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5 Aufl..., a.a.O., S.105.

80. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.113-117. G.C. Narang, Transformation..., 5 Aufl. a.a.O., S. 108.

81. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 118, 119.

82. Harbans Singh, Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S. 47. Siri Daya Singh/Guruband Singh Khalsa, Sikh Freedom Fighters.... in the Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.6, G.S. Chhabra, Banda..., Part III, in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.38, 41. Gurbux Singh Bhatia, The First Sikh Government..., in The Sikh Review, a.a.O., S.29, 30.

83. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 121. G.C. Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., Diss, a.a.O., S. 124. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short..., a.a.O., page 110 states that "Sahadharis" were originally called "Khulasas", irreguiars.

84. G.C. Narang, Transition of Sikhism into..., a.a.O., S.124. N.K. Sinha, Rise of the Sikh Pover, Calcutta 1960, S.4. Fauja Singh, Emergence of the Dal Khalsa, in The Missionary, April-June 1962, S.46.

85. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 121, means by traitors perhaps the Sikhs separated from Banda Bahadur as Tatwa Khalsa; these joined the Mughuls and signed an agreement against Banda; reason for Banda's defeat.

86. Fauja Singh, Emergence of the Dal Khalsa, in The Missionary, a.a.O., S.47.

87. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.121. Teja Singh/Ganda Singh, A Short History of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S.121.

88. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 123. G.C. Narang, Transition..., a.a.O., S. 126. Fauja Singh, Emergence of the Dal Khalsa in The Missionary, a.a.O., S. 47. which gives a strength of 1200-2000 men for each of the five groups.

89. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.125.

90. Shahidgang = place of martyrdom.

91. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.125-128. G.C. Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 5. Aufl., a.a.O., S.133.

92. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study in History of the Punjab, Vol.I a.a.O., S.495, spricht von 65 Gruppen.

93. For Dal Khalsa see Fauja Singh, Emergence of..., in The Missionary, a.a.O., S. 48, 49 which makes closer statements to importance and further development.

94. Fauja Singh, Emergence of..., in The Missionary, a.a.O., S.49.

95. Original meaning for equal = same.

96. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.131, 134.

97. See for that Ganda Singh, The Maratha-Sikh Relation, in Panjab Past and Present, Vol.I, Part II, Oct. 1967, S. 311-351, which depicts all the relations or Kirpal Singh, The Marathas and the Sikhs, in The Sikh Review, July 1961, S. 15-21. For Marathas and Sikhs as introduction see N.K. Sinha, The Rise of the Sikh Power, a.a.O., S. 24-26.

98. G.C. Narang, Transformation of Sikhism, 5. Aufl., a.a.O., S. 134.

99. N.K. Sinha, Rise of the Sikh Power, a.a.O., S. 36.

100. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, a.a.O., S.108. G.C. Narang, *Transformation....*, 5 Aufl., a.a.O., S. 145.

101. = big army, N.K. Sinha, *Rise of....*, a.a.O., S. 108.

102. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, a.a.O., S. 117.

103. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.133, G.C. Narang, *Transformation....*, 5 Aufl., a.a.O., S.170. Hari Ram Gupta, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, Simla 1952, 2. Aufl., S.327. Indu Banga, *The Nature of the Sikhs Rule*, in Punjab History Conference, Seventh Session, Sept. 29-30, 1972, S.65, 66. Fauja Singh, *The Misaldari period of Sikh History*, in *The Missionary*, March 1960, S.46.

104. G.C. Narang, *Transformation...*, 5. Aufl., a.a.O., S.170. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of...*, a.a.O., S.115. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 172.

105. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of....*, a.a.O., S.115.

106. H.R. Gupta, *History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.98.

107. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, a.a.O., S.115.

108. N.K. Sinha, *Rise of the Sikh Power*, a.a.O., S.110. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in History of...*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 518. G.C. Narang, *Transformation of Sikhism*, 5. Aufl., a.a.O., S. 170. H.R. Gupta, *History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 327. More to appointment of misldars and difference from the European feudal lords explains neither Bhagat Singh in his study, *Sikh Polity*, New Delhi, 1979, which gives one chapter to misl-organisation, S. 88-136, nor the essay for Fauja Singh, *The misaldari period of Sikh History*, in *The Missionary*, March 1960, Number 2, S. 42-46.

109. 4 kinds of land ownerships were there in the time of misls in Punjab; a) Pattidari, b) Misaldari, c) Tabadari, d) Jagirdari. For meaning and distribution see G.C. Narang, *Transformation...*, 5. Aufl., a.a.O., S.175, 176, N.K. Sinha, *Rise...*, a.a.O., S. 114, 115.

110. G.C. Narang, *Transformation....*, 5 Aufl., a.a.O., S.170. Fauja Singh, *Misaldari Period...*, in *The Missionary*, a.a.O., S.43-45.

111. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.182, 183, 189-191.

112. See the following Monographs:

Khushwant Singh, Ranjit Singh, London 1962. Narendra Krishna Sinha, Ranjit Singh, Calcutta 1960. S.N. Banerjee, Ranjit Singh, Lahore O.J.

113. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in the History of the Punjab*, Vol.II, Ludhiana 1962, S.40-77. Khushwant Singh, *A History*

of the Sikhs, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.187-218.

114. For that in detail the study by Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Military System of the Sikhs*, Delhi...., 1964.

Fauja Singh, *Maharaja Ranjit Singh's Military System and Art of Warfare -- A Critical Study*, in the *Missionary*, Jan.-March 1961, S.73-79. Bai Ram Singh Marwaha, *Ranjit Singh*, in the *Missionary*, Oct.-Dec. 1962, S.72-75. B.N. Majumdar, *The Sikh Military System in the Missionary*, Dec. 1959, S.45-60. For European officers in the reign of Ranjit Singh see Gulcharan Singh, *Europeans in the service of Maharaja Ranjit Singh*, in *The Sikh Review*, July 1973, S. 28-33.

115. Prithipal Singh Kapur, *Maharaja Ranjit Singh as a Secular Ruler* in *The Missionary*, April-June 1961, S.57-66. Amarjit Singh, *The Judicial Administration of Maharaja Ranjit Singh*, in *The Panjab Past and Present*, Vol.II, Part II, October 1968, S. 340-353.

116. See for that Barkat Rai Chopra, *Kingdom of the Punjab 1839-45*, Hoshiarpur, 1969. Hari Ram Gupta, *The Fall of the Kingdom of the Punjab*, Calcutta 1962, Sita Ram Kohli, *Sunset of the Sikh Empire* New Delhi 1967. Bakshish Singh Nijjar, *Anglo-Sikh Wars, 1845-1849*, New Delhi, 1967.

117. *Dissolution of the Kingdom on 29 May, 1849* see for that Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, S. 82.

118. Area of the annexed Punjab areas CIS-Sutlej-Trans Sutlej and Trans-Indus areas - 73,000 square miles. See for that Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol. II, a.a.O., S.90, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in History of the Panjab*, Vol.II, Ludhiana, 1962, S. 311.

119. Constructed by Lord Dalhousie, born 1812, died 1860. Members of the Board of Administration were:

Henry Lawrence - military and political affairs

John Lawrence - revenue and land settlement

Charles Mansel - judicial matter;

B. Singh Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule*, Vol. I, New Delhi 1974, S. 35-38. Karnail Singh Doll, *Administration of the Annexed Punjab - The First Phase*, in the *Sikh Review*, April 1971, S. 38. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.89.

120. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.83, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.314. Kripal Chandra Yadav, *British Policy towards Sikhs 1849-1857*, in *Punjab History Conference, Second Session*, Oct. 28-30, 1966, S.171. Karnail Singh

Doll, Administration...., in *The Sikh Review*, a.a.O., S.38.

121. K.C. Yadav, *British Policy....*, a.a.O., S.178. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.94.

122. K.C. Yadav, *British Policy towards Sikhs*, in *Punjab History Conference*, a.a.O., S.164.

123. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II a.a.O., S.95, 96.

124. Harbans Singh, *Heritage of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., S.129.

125. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.96, in this is given Letter of May 7, 1849, *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, S.69.

126. B. Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.68, 69.

127. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.90, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced....* Vol.II, S.311.

128. B. Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S.69.

129. B. Nijjar, *Punjab....*, Vol.I, a.a.O., S. 69, estimates the Sikh population in 1854 in Punjab to be approx. 3 Million.

II. Reform Movements and Sects of the Sikhs under the British Empire

1. Nirankari Movement

The first big Sikh reform movement was that of the Nirankaris, which became significant from 1823 onwards.¹³⁰

Its beginner was Dyal Das,¹³¹ a former merchant from Peshawar, who came from a Hindu Sikh community, and belonged to the Khatri-Arora or Bania Castes.¹³²

The religious, unpolitical Nirankari movement originated as a reaction to the behaviour of a greater part of the Sikh Community. During the reign of Ranjit Singh (1799-1839), a strong retreat was noted from the religious Sikh faith. This new turning to the old Hindu practices like the cult of Brahmins, Sati, expensive marriage and death ceremonies, that were fought by the ten Gurus of the Sikhs,¹³³ increased further the danger of falling back in Hinduism.¹³⁴ The Nirankaries demanded a reminiscence of the old religious Sikh customs and values and a retreat from Hinduism.¹³⁵

As a crowning end to the division from the Hindus, was the perception of the Sikh-marriage ceremony, that was clearly different from that of the Hindus,¹³⁶ and was introduced by Dyal Das in 1808.

The Sikh community accepted the ceremony in the following time. Officially it was taken up by the Singh Sabha in 1893.¹³⁷

The introduction of this new marriage-form is to be considered as the most important result of the Nirankari movement, because it effected the first step towards a Sikh-separation and a lessening of the integration process of the Sikh community in the Hinduism.¹³⁸

The non-Jat Sikhs and the Hindus of the Arora Zargar i.e. the Goldsmiths and of Kshatriya caste belonged to this movement to a large extent.¹³⁹

In 1891, the Nirankari movement had 50,724 followers,¹⁴⁰ who came from the north western and eastern districts of Punjab.¹⁴¹ The Nirankaris were not successful, to address to the Sikh masses and to become a mass movement they achieved the status of a Sikh-sect.¹⁴²

The reason for that may be the diverse opinions of the orthodox Sikhism and the Nirankaris about the succession of the Gurus.¹⁴³ The orthodox Sikhism saw the line of the Gurus ended with Guru Gobind Singh, whereas the Nirankaris continued their line of Gurus with Dyal

Das and his successors as “Sri Satguru = the true Guru” and “Sri Hazur Sahib = His Holy Eminence”.

2. Namdhari Movement

The Namdharis also, mostly called Kukas,¹⁴⁴ were a Reform Movement of the Sikhs with almost the same religious programme as the Nirankaris.¹⁴⁵

The Kukas also originated in response to the danger of falling back in the Hinduism and the newly arrived Church missions, which spelled doom for the Sikh community.¹⁴⁶

Balak Singh, 1797-1862, son of a Goldsmith, was the founder of the Kuka Movement. His successor Ram Singh, 1816-1885 gave the movement a political meaning through his innovations from 1857 onwards.¹⁴⁷

The followers of the Kukas were mainly the lowest classes and the farmers as Sikh-groups of Jats, Tarkhans, Chamars and Mazhibis,¹⁴⁸ as well as from the lowest classes of the Hindus. They could have been the Sahadhari Sikhs, who had fallen back in the old Hindu practices and were lying on the borderline between Hindus and Sikhs.

The Punjab census of 1891 ascertained the followers of the Kukas to be 10,541. In 1901 there were only 13,788 of them in whole of India.¹⁴⁹

This shows, that the Kuka Movement was not very popular. It addressed itself only to a particular group of Sikhs and ended in a sect, as the Nirankaris.¹⁵⁰

Special features of the Kukas and also of their sect is the simple, white, handwoven dress of the Kukas and also their special art of binding the turban.¹⁵¹

Decisive for the origination of the sect was the acceptance of the title “Guru” by the Kuka leaders. This separated them from the Sikh masses.¹⁵²

A further reason for the limited followers is the christening ceremony¹⁵³ introduced by Ram Singh in 1857, which seems to be borrowed from Guru Gobind Singh’s policy of Khalsa establishment and further alienated available Sikh groups from the Kuka movement.

Because of certain institutions and actions of the Kukas, no clear opinion has been expressed about the aims and intentions of the Kuka movement in the time of Ram Singh.

The institutions were the Subas and the special Postsystem. Under the actions is the Kuka outburst of 1868, that reached its peak in the massacre of the Muslim butchers in 1872, as well as the non-cooperation policy of the Kukas with the Britishers, e.g. by boycotting British goods and rights.¹⁵⁴

In order to do a religious propaganda, Ram Singh formed a group of musicians, raji jathas, who roamed about and sang only the hymns from the Adi Granth.¹⁵⁵ He also set-up a number of missionaries, about 22 after 1863, that were called Subas¹⁵⁶ and had a particular area under them for missionary activities.¹⁵⁷

The post system of the Kukas, called the Dak-system, became known to the Britishers in 1867 and served for the publication of the calls of Ram Singh and for sending their secrets according to the Britishers.¹⁵⁸

Thus the Kukas acquired a status of a political and rebellious movement with a political aim wanting to build a Sikh state, and were driven away by the Britishers.¹⁵⁹

The post system of the Kukas is considered something special, that gave out secret informations, e.g. plan of a revolt etc. To add to this is the construction of the Subas, which made possible for the Kukas, a form of self-government. The massacre of the Muslim butchers at Malerkotla on 15.1.1872¹⁶⁰ is considered as a sign of revolt against the Britishers, who also felt likewise. The Britishers defeated the Kukas, executed them and exiled Ram Singh.

In spite of that, the Kuka movement is valued as a pure religious-social movement of the fanatics, that not just took up revolt against the Britishers by the massacre of the Muslims at Malerkotla but also held fast to its religious programme and objected with this death-bringing action against the butchering of cows by the Britishers.¹⁶¹

The Kuka movement has been given a special place in the Indian freedom struggle by its representatives, who dedicated themselves to the political aims of the Kukas. The Kukas are considered as predecessors of all India patriots, who used non-cooperation and swadeshi movements for the first time as political weapons and designed an important step in the development of a national consciousness in Punjab.¹⁶² Besides, they also effect a mistrust of the Britishers for Sikh loyalty. This led to a dissociation and enmity of the Kukas from the loyal groups of Sikhs.¹⁶³

3. Singh Sabha Movement

The Singh Sabha movement, established in 1873 in Amritsar with the first Singh Sabha, was in the beginning a religious social movement. It reacted to the weakening of the Sikh community by conversion to Hinduism and to Christianity.¹⁶⁴

The protest gathering of the Sikh landowners, upper class of Amritsar, was the evident cause of the Singh Sabha Amritsar 1873.¹⁶⁵ They united, called themselves Singh Sabha and protested against the unworthy remarks of Hindus to Sikh faith and especially to the life of Guru Nanak.¹⁶⁶

This gathering was supported by rich Sikh land owners and orthodox.

The aim of this Singh Sabha, Amritsar was to again preach the teachings of the Gurus of the original Sikhism, to publish historical and religious books, to protest against illiteracy and to publish newspapers and magazines in Punjabi. Added to this was the effort to attract high British officials to their programme, so as to get the support of the British empire.¹⁶⁷

In order that the patronage of the British government would become certain, the Sabha decided to prove its loyalty.¹⁶⁸ This was met with success as the Britishers granted consent to the programme of the Sabha.

The management of the Singh Sabha was done by an executive committee, that consisted of a President, a Secretary and some other members.¹⁶⁹

The followers of the Sabha lost after some time their enthusiasm for the aims of the Sabha.

A separate Singh Sabha was established by Professor Bhai Gurmukh Singh on 2 November, 1879 at Lahore.¹⁷⁰

Sharp differences arose between the leaders of the Sabha, so that the Sabha started showing signs of disappearance. Bhai Gurmukh Singh made therefore a new programme in 1876, with which he intended to preserve the Sikh faith and to mobilise the movement.

The new programme had the following points:

- a. To produce national literature in Punjabi.
- b. To import religious education to the Sikhs.
- c. To save the Sikhs falling from their faith.

d. All such activities to be carried on in cooperation with the British Government.¹⁷¹

The aims of this Sabha were the same as those of the earlier Singh Sabha Amritsar except for some minor differences.¹⁷²

The Singh Sabha Lahore opened up settlements in many cities, sent missionaries in the villages and began to publish newspapers in Punjabi.¹⁷³ It formed the educational committee so as to gain insight into the education needs of the Sikhs. Moreover, it tried to bind the Sikh regiments together with the British-Indian army, as the Sikhs had a recruitment proportion of about 40%¹⁷⁴ in this army in 1875.

The leaders of this Sabha belonged to a group of well-educated people.¹⁷⁵

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Robert Egerton, was the protector of the Lahore Singh Sabha. Moreover, the Viceking Lord Landsdowne gave the Sabha his support.¹⁷⁶

On April 11, 1880, a General Sabha came into existence following a coalition of Singh Sabha Amritsar and Singh Sabha Lahore.

It was a central place for both the Singh Sabhas, in which its actions were controlled and directed,¹⁷⁷ or brought in a common direction.

The establishment of the General Sabha rested on a rivalry between the Amritsar - and Lahore Singh Sabhas, which endangered the future of the movement.¹⁷⁸

A better co-operation was hoped with the operation of the General Sabha. A further reason was a rapid rise of Singh Sabha in all the parts of Punjab. This made the establishment of a central committee necessary for directing and controlling the activities of the individual Singh Sabhas.¹⁷⁹

The committee of the General Sabha consisted of the members of the Amritsar - and Lahore - Sabhas, who had to meet half yearly to view and control Sabha's progress.¹⁸⁰ Around 1883, the Khalsa Dewan was suggested as a replacement for the non-functional General Sabha with the task of directing and controlling the work of 36 or 37 Singh Sabhas.¹⁸¹

The Khalsa Dewan was however not successful in normalising the rivalry between the Amritsar - and Lahore - Singh Sabha through a common programme, who fought for their leadership.¹⁸²

Bhai Gurmukh Singh and his colleagues therefore constituted a separate Khalsa Dewan in Lahore in 1886, that was united with 30 Singh Sabhas.¹⁸³

Both the Khalsa Dewans succeeded in establishing a Khalsa college for Sikh community in Amritsar, with the support of Britishers, in spite of their existing rivalry. The foundation stone was laid by

Lieutenant Governor Sir James Lyall on 5 March, 1892.¹⁸⁴

On 30 October, 1902, the Chief Khalsa Dewan was found, whose most important leader was Sunder Singh Majithia. The Chief Khalsa Dewan presented an "All Sikh Body" who was responsible to all the Sikhs.¹⁸⁵ It was made up of five committees:

1. General Committee
2. Executive Committee
3. Finance Committee
4. Advisory Committee
5. Life-Members Committee¹⁸⁶

The objective of the Chief Khalsa Dewan¹⁸⁷ was the preservation of Sikh loyalty to the Britishers to protect the rights of Sikhs against other communities and to strive for a reasonable Sikh representation, especially in the Army.^{187a}

The Singh Sabha movement promoted the Gurumukhi script through publication of books and magazines,¹⁸⁸ through school settlements, education and religious rituals.

The result of this promotion was a dissociation from the Hindu community.¹⁸⁹

The promotions brought the Sikhs not only their independence as a community,¹⁹⁰ but also as a political consciousness. This made itself apparent in the efforts of the Sikhs, to be considered as a separate community in the politics, in the laws, and in the granting of rights.

It can be concluded from this, that the Sikh community had achieved its independence, its Sikh-identity around the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century.

By their religious and social demands, the Nirankari, Namdhari and Singh Sabha movements succeeded in dividing themselves clearly as Sikhs from the Hindus,¹⁹¹ as well as in developing and strengthening a Sikh self-consciousness.¹⁹²

The Sikhs in Punjab remained loyal to the Britishers during the 1857 mutiny.¹⁹³

To the promotion of the Sikh-independence came the favouring by the Britishers of the Kesadhari-Sikhs in Agriculture and by employment in the Army¹⁹⁴ after the mutiny.

The result was a strong increase in the Sikh population, aroused by Sahadhari Sikhs as well as Hindus. They took up the five K's of the orthodox Sikhism as a result of the Britishers favouring the Kesadhari-Sikhs. They also hoped thereby to enjoy the favour of the Britishers.¹⁹⁵

The Anand Marriage Act, passed by the Britishers in 1909, by which the Sikh form of marriage was legalised, introduced by the Nirankaris,¹⁹⁶ put officially the British Stamp on the Sikh-independence.

Footnotes:

130. For the term Nirankari: The belief of this movement was the belief in "The Formless One" Nirankari see Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.123. Harbans Singh, Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S.129. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, in The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.II, Part I, April 1973, S. 1.

131. Born on 17 May, 1783, died on 30 Jan., 1855.

132. For a closer explanation of this Hindu Sikh community see Khushwant Singh, A History of..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 121. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, in The Panjab Past and Present, a.a.O., S. 2.

133. See Appendix No. 1a = List of Sikh Gurus.

134. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study, in History of the Punjab, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.365. Harbans Singh, The Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S.129. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, in The Punjab Past and Present, a.a.O., S.5.

135. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.124. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.366. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, in The Panjab..., a.a.O., S.8.

136. See for that Man Singh Nirankari, Nirankaris..., a.a.O., S.6, that depicts the development of the ceremony.

137. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, a.a.O., S.8.

138. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.125.

139. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.124.

140. There were 38,907 Kesdhari Sikhs and 11,817 Sahadhari Sikhs. See for that Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 124. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 368. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris, in The Panjab..., a.a.O., S. 10.

141. Harbans Singh, Heritage of the Sikhs, a.a.O., S.129, 130. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris..., a.a.O., S.10.

142. Man Singh Nirankari, The Nirankaris..., a.a.O., S.9, 10.

143. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S:124, 125.

144. Because of this loud cry = kuks, the followers got their name

KUKA. See for that Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 128, 129. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in History of the Panjab*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.369. Prithipal Singh Kapur, Baba Ram Singh Namdhari, in *The Missionary*, April-June 1962, S. 61. Bhagat Singh, *The KUKA Movement*, in the *Panjab Past and Present*, Vol VII, Part II, Oct. 1973, S. 149.

145. For religious programme see Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka Movement*, an important phase in Panjab's role in India's struggle for freedom, Delhi 1965, S. 22-26.

146. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.129, 130. M.M. Ahluwalia, *The Freedom Fighters of the Punjab*, Bombay 1965. S.46. Fauja Singh, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.10-16. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.369. P.S. Kapur, Baba Ram Singh Namdhari, in *The Missionary*, a.a.O., S.57, 58.

147. P.S. Kapur, Baba Ram Singh Namdhari, in *The Missionary*, a.a.O., S.59. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.128, 129.

148. Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka movement*, a.a.O., S.31. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.129, M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas, The Freedom Fighters....*, a.a.O., S.80, G.S. Chhabra, *Social and Economic History of the Punjab, 1849-1901*. Jullundhur City 1962, S.129, 130.

149. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.379. G.S. Chhabra, *Social and Economic....*, a.a.O., S.131.

150. Harbans Singh, *Heritage of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., S.137. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.134.

151. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.129. Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.40.

152. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.370.

153. M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kuka*, a.a.O., S.135. P.S. Kapur, Baba Ram Singh Namdhari, in *The Missionary*, a.a.O., S.59. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.128.

154. M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S.74, 80. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.135. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study in History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.376.

155. Fauja Singh, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.32.

156. To Suba term: Swaran Singh Sanesi, *Foremost freedom fighters*, published by Satguru Ram Singh Deportation Centenary Committee, 22 Rutland Place, Maidenhead/Bers. 1972(?), Page 4, calls the Suba a lieutenant, the formation of Subas a parallel government of Ram Singh to the Britishers.

P.S. Kapur, Baba Ram Singh Namdhari, in *The Missionary*, a.a.O.

S. 60. depicts the Suba as Governor, who also owned the formation of a military training.'

Harbans Singh, *Heritage of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., S. 131.

157. Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.32. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study...*, Vol.II, S.169, 170 Swaran Singh Saneshi, *Foremost Freedom Fighters...*, S. 4. M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S.66, introduces also the action of the Subas for social betterment and for a possible political freedom besides its missionary activities. For the 22 Subas with the areas see: Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S. 33 and M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S. 65, which gives a list of 22 Subas with their regions that was known to the Britishers.

158. Fauja Singh, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.54, Harbans Singh, *Heritage of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., S. 132. M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S.60.

159. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.130. G.S. Chhabra, *Social and....*, a.a.O., S.130, M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S.21, 28, 136. Fauja Singh, *Kuka...*, a.a.O., S.22, 39.

160. Besides previously in Amritsar and Raikot 1871. See for that M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S. 74, 80, 82.

161. Ganda Singh, *Was the Kuka Movement a Rebellion against the British Government*, in *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol.VIII, Part II, S.325-341. Bhagat Singh, *The Kuka Movement*, in *The Punjab Past and Present* Vol.VII, Part II, Oct. 1973, S.154.

162. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.135. Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka Movement*, a.a.O., S.41, M.M. Ahluwalia, *Kukas*, a.a.O., S.136. Harbans Singh, *Heritage of....*, a.a.O., S.136.

163. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.133. Satya M. Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, New Delhi, 1965. S.27.

164. Man Singh Nirankari, *The Nirankaris*, in *The Punjab Past and present*, a.a.O., S. 7, 10, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced Study...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.380-82. Fauja Singh Bajwa, *Kuka...*, a.a.O., S.194. Harbans Singh, *Heritage of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., S.138, Harbans Singh, *Origin of the Singh Sabha*, in *The Panjab past and present*, Vol.VII, part 1, April 1973, S. 23, 24, 26, 28. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.136, 141. Satva M. Rai, *Partition of the Punjab*, a.a.O., S.27., Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966, S.62. Teja Singh, *Singh Sabha Movement*, in *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, S.31.

165. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.141. Harbans Singh, Origin of..., a.a.O., S.29.

166. See for that Harbans Singh, Origin of..., a.a.O., S. 28, 29, who names the expressor as Shardha Ram Phillauri. Harbans Singh, Heritage..., a.a.O., S. 140. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 382, who depicts Sharda Ram Phillauri a merchant of the Britishers.

167. Harbans Singh, Origin of..., a.a.O., S.29. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.141.

168. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.142.

169. For management of the Singh Sabha in detail Gurdarshan Singh, Origin and Development of the Singh Sabha Movement, in The Panjab Past and Present, Vol.VII, Part-I, April 1973, S.46., First President of Singh Sabha Amritsar was Thakur Singh Sanhawalia, First Secretary Giani Gian Singh. See also Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 142. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced Study in History of the Punjab, Vol.II, S. 382.

170. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, S.142. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.383. Harbans Singh, Heritage of..., a.a.O., S.141. Teja Singh, Singh Sabha Movement, in The Punjab Past and Present, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, S.47.

171. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.383.

172. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 384, 385.

173. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.143.

174. Gurdarshan Singh, Origin and Development of the Singh Sabha Movement, a.a.O., S.48. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol.98: To Tara Singh, Allahabad, 12 December, 1939, reporting about his meeting with Kartar Singh about Sikh grievances against Congress, in NMM&L/Delhi.

175. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.143.

176. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.142. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.384.

177. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.185. Gurdarshan Singh, Origin and..., a.a.O., S.49. Harbans Singh, Heritage of..., a.a.O., S.141.

178. Gurdarshan Singh, Origin and..., a.a.O., S.49. G.S. Chhabra, The Advanced..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.185.

179. Gurdarshan Singh, Origin and..., a.a.O., S.49. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.143. Harbans Singh, Heritage..., a.a.O., S.141.

180. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, S.385.
181. Gurdarshan Singh, *Origin and Development*, a.a.O., S.49, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.383. Harbans Singh, *Heritage...*, a.a.O., S.141.
182. Gurdarshan Singh, *Origin...*, a.a.O., S.50. Teja Singh, *Singh Sabha Movement*, in *The Punjab Past and Present*, a.a.O., S.34. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.386. Harbans Singh, *Heritage...*, a.a.O., S.141.
183. Harbans Singh, *Heritage...*, a.a.O., S.141. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.386. Teja Singh, *Singh Sabha Movement*, a.a.O., S.35.
184. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.144. Harbans Singh, *Origin of the Singh Sabha*, a.a.O., S.37, G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 387. For details see Ruchi Ram Sahni, *Struggle for Reform in Sikh Shrines*, published by Ithas Research Board, S.G.P.C., Amritsar, o.J., S.22-37. Teja Singh, *Khalsa College Amritsar*, in *The Punjab Past and Present*, Vol.VII, Part I, April 1973, S.76-83.
185. G.S. Chhabra, *The Advanced...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.188. Harbans Singh, *Heritage of...*, a.a.O., S.143-145. Teja Singh, *Singh Sabha Movement*, a.a.O., S.38-40. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.145.
186. Gurdarshan Singh, *Origin and Development of the Singh Sabha*, a.a.O., S.56-58.
187. For areas of work see Ruchi Ram Sahni, *Struggle for Reform...*, a.a.O., S. 19-21, who gives Chief Khalsa Dewan institutions as Khalsa tract society.
- 187a. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 145.
188. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 145.
189. B.R. Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*, a.a.O., S.62, 63. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.146.
190. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.122.
191. For relations and enmity of the Singh Sabha and Arya Samaj see Khushwant Singh, *A History...* Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 143, 146, 147.
192. Besides, see for that Paul R. Brass *Language, Religion and Politics in North India*, Cambridge University Press 1974, S.281-283.
193. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 98-115.
194. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.116, 119.
195. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.119.

1881 = 1 706 165 Sikhs; 1911 = 2 883 729 Sikhs, also Khushwant Singh, A History...., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.146, Footnote 31.

196. Khushwant Singh, A History.... Vol.II, a.a.O., S.124, 218.

III. Loyalists and Nationalists: The Sikhs and the Indian Freedom Struggle

The end of the 19th century had the mark of an “identity” for the Sikh community and also of the loyalty of the Singh Sabha to the Britishers.

But still in the beginning of the 20th century, the loyalty of the Sikh community called upon by the Singh Sabha began to show signs of change.

Sikh groups formed themselves as extremists outside India in the Ghadr Movement.

As moderates and radicals within India, they achieved a political leadership for the Sikh masses by the loyal Chief Khalsa Dewan, the former political organ of the Sikhs, through the Gurudwara reform movement.

1. Explanation of the terms “Loyalists” and “Nationalists”

In the portrayal of Sikhs, the political attitude of the community is designated as “Loyalists” or “Nationalists”. Unfortunately the concerned authors did not give any clear explanations of these terms.

M.S. Sahni also gave no clear explanation of these terms in his dissertation “The Sikh Politics, 1927-47”, Patiala 1980 whose main points were on the political attitude of the Sikh parties.

The citizens, who stood by the Britishers, were named as Loyalists in the beginning of the 20th century.

Very often they appeared in their services and gave themselves mostly as “half-Britishers”.¹⁹⁷

They enjoyed an education of British style. They came, to a large extent, from the “upper classes”. Many of these political leaders were honoured by the Britishers by the title “Sir” e.g. the Sikh leader Sir Sunder Singh Majithia.

They were blamed for acting only to the advantage of the Britisher rather than to that of the representatives. This blame also came on the first true political organ of the Sikhs, the Chief Khalsa Dewan.

The Sikh community classified the Chief Khalsa Dewan as unworthy of following in due course of time, as it appeared only to represent the interest of the Britishers.¹⁹⁸

Because of the reason of the Indian struggle for freedom and in that context the constitutional measures met by the Britishers, the Sikh loyalists dedicated themselves only to the rights of the Sikh community in the last phase of the freedom struggle. This happened with the compromise, to harmonise their political line with that of the Britishers and not to incur the anger of Great Britain.¹⁹⁹

Among the Sikhs were many who were loyal, because they hoped to put through their wishes much better to the Britishers.

The nationalists were in general against the Britishers i.e. against their rule in India. They demanded immediate freedom for India and considered Britishers as intruders and enemies.

The nationalists divided themselves in “moderates” and “radicals”.²⁰⁰ The terrorists belonged to the radicals and could not be differentiated ideologically from them.²⁰¹

These groupings considered different measures as important for achievement of freedom.

The “Moderates” tried to free India from Great Britain through co-operation with the Britishers.²⁰²

The “Radicals” believed to achieve their aim of India’s freedom through passive protests and non-violent agitation against the Britishers.

The “Terrorists” considered the “Peaceful measures” of the moderates and radicals to be useless in driving the Britishers out of India. To put through their demand of freedom, they took the help of violence.²⁰³

2. Ghadr Movement: Extremists

An alteration of the loyalist Sikh-leadership showed itself in the 20th century, a swing of the Sikh masses to the nationalists. How did it happen?

Many Indians, Sikh farmers above all, migrated from their native states because of bad agricultural condition,²⁰⁴ to earn their living in other states. They began occasionally, but then gradually emigrated to Canada and the U.S.A.²⁰⁵

The countries, to which they emigrated, developed gradually an anti-asian feeling.²⁰⁶

This made itself apparent through institutions e.g. the Asiatic Exclusion League of 1908 in California, the pogroms against the

oriental organised²⁰⁷ and by Emigrants constructed, as the Immigration Act of 1910 of Canada, that allowed only a small number of travellers.²⁰⁸

The migrated Indians, the worker groups,²⁰⁹ constructed anti-reaction institutions, that looked after their interests.

The first organisation of the Sikhs had the task of constructing Gurudwaras in the beginning for their religious needs.

The Gurudwaras then became a meeting point for political conversations about the problems of the Immigration Act and racial discrimination.²¹⁰

The Khalsa Dewan society originated in Vancouver in 1907 with branches in Victoria.²¹¹

The organisation of the workers "Hindustani workers of the Pacific" came into being by a meeting of the Indians living in Canada and the USA in 1913 in Stockton by Jwala Singh²¹² and Hardayal.²¹³ This organisation later became famous as the Ghadar Party with main office in San Francisco.

This organisation published the weekly newspaper "Ghadr" (= Revolution), that was distributed in every country and city e.g. Hongkong and Singapore, where Indians lived.²¹⁴

The Ghadr Party enjoyed the support of all the Indian emigrants from the pacific coast.²¹⁵

In 1914, the Ghadar Party had 10,000 active members.²¹⁶ The Indian soldiers also, who were stationed in e.g. Singapore, during the first world war, sympathised with the Ghadr Party.²¹⁷

The very first aim of the organisations of the Indian emigrants was a public acceptance of their rights.

The Ghadar Party set its aim to end the British rule in India. It wanted to achieve this by war with Britain abroad and by rebellion in whole of India.²¹⁸

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For this purpose, the Ghadrites made contacts with terrorist organisations in 1915 in India²¹⁹ and stood, hoping for a support, by the side of Germans at war with Britishers.²²⁰

Plans failed to send German ships with weapons to India.²²¹ The revolutions set up by the ghadrites in Punjab during the first world war, which reached their peak in the revolution of 1915, also failed.²²²

A reason for that may be the absence of support of the farmers to

the advantage of the Ghadrites, besides the insufficient supply of weapons and leadership.²²³

The Ghadarites, consisting of a large portion of Sikhs, were considered as Bandits by a large fraction of the Indian population. They did not succeed in bringing the Sikh masses on to their side.

The Chief Khalsa Dewan, the main political organ of the Sikhs in this time, remained however loyal to the Britishers.²²⁴ The nationalists like Tilak and Gandhi also showed no sympathy for the Ghadr Party. In contrast, they dissociated themselves from this extremist movement.²²⁵

A radical change of the Sikh community was named as the most important result of the outbreak of the Ghadr movement.²²⁶

This movement marked the disappearance of the overwhelming Sikh loyalty to the British empire.

The Ghadr movement was the first world wide movement of the Sikhs which aimed at attaining Indian freedom with a demand of a renewal and revival of Sikhism.²²⁷

3. Gurdwara Reform Movement: Moderates and Radicals

The Gurdwara reform movement that resulted from the efforts of the Sikh community in the beginning of the 20th century, to have control over their gurdwaras, demonstrated clearly the existing conflict between the Sikhs and the Britishers.

Cause of this open battle was the effort on part of the Sikhs in the 19th century, to snatch away the control of the Gurdwaras from the mahants, that was supported without success by the Singh Sabha and the Chief Khalsa Dewan.

The Mahants (= priests) were Sahadhari Sikhs, who belonged mostly to the Udasi sects and did not practise the orthodox Sikhism. Many times they were considered as Hindus. They had made themselves unpopular with the Sikh masses by misuse of the Gurdwara property, pollution of the Sikh religious services and immorality.²²⁸

The strengthening of the self-consciousness of the community around the end of the 19th century conspired, that the Sikhs became aware of their rights, made demands and the "enthusiasm" for the British Government fell rapidly.²²⁹

The religious demand of the Sikh masses for the control of their Gurdwara increased further with the action of the Britishers.²³⁰

This action of the Britishers e.g. the destruction of Gurdwara Rikab

Ganj in Delhi in 1914,²³¹ which moved the religious feeling of the Sikhs, not protesting against the discrimination of the emigrants by Canada and USA,²³² and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre by General Dyer²³³ in 1919 in Amritsar led to a further dissociation of the Sikhs from the Britishers.

This is noteworthy, as the Sikh soldiers of India formed a major portion of the British Army during the Ist World War. At the same time the action of the Britishers led to a dissociation of the Sikhs from Chief Khalsa Dewan, the only important political Sikh establishment in Punjab at this time, which dedicated itself to the interests of the upper classes forming a portion in British services and managerial capacities.²³⁴

After the massacre in Amritsar it beseeched the Sikh community to show further loyalty to the Britishers.²³⁵

As the community had no economic, political and communal representation on their side,²³⁶ the Sikhs established a central Sikh league in Bradlaugh Hall in Lahore in 1919.²³⁷

After Mahatma Gandhi had visited the site of Jalianwala Bagh massacre, men with nationalist views established the central Sikh league of Amritsar under his influence, and thereby brought a monopoly of the Singh Sabha over the affairs of the Sikhs.²³⁸

The leaders of the Central Sikh league were the radicals.²³⁹

The self-made constitution of the Central Sikh league of 22 July, 1922, shows that the intention of the league was to attain Swarajya through all the legitimate, peaceful and constitutional means. Besides it also aimed at Sikh unity, nourishment of patriotism and the public spirit among the Sikhs and development and organisation of their political, moral and economic goods.²⁴⁰

Sikh leagues were established till August 1921 in Gujranwala, Lahore, Lyallpur, Amritsar, Sialkot, Jhelum, Ferozepur, Jullundhur, Hoshiarpur and Delhi.²⁴¹

The prime aim of the newly established Sikh league was to achieve the prohibition of the Gurdwara management by the mahants. For this purpose they made the following decision in 1919.

Keeping up the non-cooperation with the Britishers, taking back the possession of Rikab Ganj from the Britishers,²⁴² as well as demanding the right to manage the Khalsa College in Amritsar, till then managed by the Britishers.²⁴³

The Britishers strived to keep the Sikhs peaceful and for this reason

they allowed the construction of the damaged wall of the Gurudwara Rikab Ganj.²⁴⁴ This filled the Sikh leaders with enthusiasm for their affairs.²⁴⁵

They now tried to take the possession of all the gurdwaras in India.

At this time the Akalis intervened,²⁴⁶ a sect that had continued since the time of Guru Gobind Singh. They supported the possession of the Gurdwaras and the expulsion of the Mahants.²⁴⁷

The Akalis came from the whole of Punjab in Jathas i.e. bands with the battle cry "Aa gai fauj Akali, dere kar do khali".²⁴⁸ According to their knowledge of the districts, they were set the task of the possession of the Gurdwaras.²⁴⁹

A committee of 175 members, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, originated on 15 November, 1920, for the management of the captured Gurdwaras, abbreviated as S.G.P.C.²⁵⁰

A committee of the Britishers, with the support of the Maharaja of Patiala²⁵¹ for the management of the Gurdwaras was declined by the Sikhs. This committee consisted of 36 loyalist representatives of the Sikh community.

In spite of this refusal, the members of this committee of the Britishers were incorporated in the S.G.P.C. so as to avoid the conflict with the "official committee", thus rendering useless its task.²⁵²

Thus originated a committee with the fusion of the S.G.P.C. and the 36 Sikh members of the British Committee, which had both the loyalists and the extremists as its members. Sunder Singh Majithia was named the first President of this committee. Harbans Singh and S. Sunder Ramgarhia were named as the Vice-president and Secretary respectively.²⁵³

The more radical Akalis became the aggressive wheel of the S.G.P.C. with peaceful means.²⁵⁴ This peaceful character, not corresponding to the actions of the Akali sect,²⁵⁵ was attributed to the influence of the Satyagrah Movement of Gandhi.²⁵⁶ Their struggle consisted of a non-violent capture of a Gurdwara by one Akali Jatha.

By that the Akalis hoped to compel the Britishers to remove the Mahants and to release the Gurdwaras. This non-violent policy was not accepted by all the Sikhs. The Babbar Akali organisation arose in 1922, which carried on the struggle with violence.

Its members came manifold from the Ghadi Movement and were also former soldiers.²⁵⁷

The different leaderships of the Akali Jathas were brought

together in a central organ on 14 December, 1920, 'the Shiromani Akali Dal with the task, to recruit and train willing persons for the capture of the Gurdwaras.²⁵⁸

It is to be noted that the S.G.P.C. was a non-official committee for the management of the Gurdwaras, i.e., it was not supported by the Britishers. The Shiromani Akali Dal acted as its functional arm and sought to bring the S.G.P.C. under its control for the management of the Gurdwaras.

In the beginning the Mahants surrendered and gave their Gurdwaras to the Sikhs. With the permission of the Britishers, the S.G.P.C. was given the task of running these Gurdwaras.²⁵⁹

The policy of the Britishers changed however and the peaceful Akalis who had set their task of freeing the Gurdwaras, were blamed of criminal activities and were arrested.

This lay in close connection of the relation of the Akali movement with Ghandi's non-cooperation movement, which led the Britishers to see them in this context and to fight them.

A further reason for the arrests might be that the Britishers considered the claim to the Gurdwara property as theft, as it was considered to be the property of the Mahants because of the British limitation right.²⁶⁰

The Akali struggle against the Mahants for the release of the Gurdwaras took the form of a struggle against the regional government in Punjab.

The Gurdwara reform movement became a mass demonstration against the Britishers with the help of passive protests. This demonstration of the Akalis against the Britishers is considered as the third Sikh war.²⁶¹

The Nankana Massacre on 20 February, 1921, in which the Mahants allowed the Muslims to kill 120 Sikhs,²⁶² and many other incidents,²⁶³ led the Britishers to pass the "Sikh Gurdwara and Shrines Management Act" on 7 November, 1922. This Act brought in a definite control of the Sikhs over the Mahants in the management of the Shrines, however also recognised the claims of the Mahants to the gurdwaras.²⁶⁴

Hundreds of Sikhs were killed and thousands wounded as they tried to capture the gurdwaras protected by police through peaceful means.

The Britishers made a clear position of the Sikhs by passing the Sikh Gurdwara and Shrines Act in 1925,²⁶⁵ thereby ending the third Sikh War.²⁶⁶

This law abolished the hereditary control of the Mahants over the Gurdwaras.

The control of the Gurdwaras was now officially into the hands of the S.G.P.C.

Besides the Gurdwara Act of 1925 also strengthened with its decision of the practice of the Sikh rituals and ceremonies in strict accordance with the rules of the Sikhism,²⁶⁷ the independence of the Sikh community and their separation from the Hindus.

Foot Notes:

197. B.B. Misra, *The Indian Political Parties*, Delhi 1976, S.105, 106. V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement in India*, 2 *Aufl*, New Delhi 1979, S. 131.

198. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.145, 167, 183.

199. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.239.

200. Dietmar Rothermund, *The formation of political will in India*, Wiesbaden 1965, S. 51.

201. For ideology see Dietmar Rothermund, *Nationalism and Social Change in the third world*, in Otto Dann (Edited.), *Nationalism and Social Changes*, Hamburg 1978, S. 187-209.

202. V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement*, a.a.O., S. 131. Rudolf von Albotini, *European colonial rule, 1880-1940*, Zurich 1976, S. 83.

203. V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement*, a.a.O., S.276. B.B. Misra, *The Indian Political Parties*, a.a.O., S.141, 142.

204. For details see Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 151-159, who mentions the indebtedness of the farmers to money lenders as the main reason for their bad economic conditions. He also discusses the counter measures of the Britishers, Land Alienation Act of 1900 and reactions to it, Peasant Agitation of 1907.

205. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.168.

206. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 169, 170. mentions the external appearance of the Sikhs with turban and a long beard as the reason for the anti-asiatic feeling of the Canadians against the Sikhs.

207. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.174. G.S. Deol, The Role of the Ghadar Party in the National Movement, New Delhi 1969, S.44, 45.
208. For Immigration Act and its effects see Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 172, 173.
209. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 168, states activities as trackworker with the Canadian Pacific railway, as worker in wood industries and mountain works.
210. Khushwant Singh/Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915, New Delhi, 1966, S.14.
211. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.174.
212. A rich farmer from Stockton, popularly called "potato king", from Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.176, footnote 19.
213. 1884-1938 belonged to a Kayasth family of Delhi, Professor at Stanford University. See for that Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 175, 176, Footnote 18.
214. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 176, 177. Khushwant Singh/Satindra Singh, Ghadar, a.a.O., S. 19. For further History and Leadership see N.N. Bhattacharya, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, in The Panjab Past and Present, Vol.VIII, Part II, Oct. 1974, S. 356, G.S. Deol, Role of the Ghadr Party..., a.a.O., 54-55, 57, 61.
215. Khushwant Singh/Satindra Singh, Ghadar, a.a.O., S.21.
216. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.186.
217. Khushwant Singh/Satindra Singh, Ghadar, a.a.O., S.41, 46.
218. Khushwant Singh/Satindra Singh, Ghadar, a.a.O., S.19, 36, 42-43.
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[REDACTED]

IV. The Sikhs and the Amendment of the Constitution of 1935

After the official transfer of the management of the Gurdwaras in the hands of the Sikhs by the Gurdwara Act of 1925, the Sikhs dedicated themselves anew to the policy of acceptance and strengthening of their rights.

Different political Sikh groups originated in due course of time, which are seen in context with the constitutional development of India.

1. Constitutional Development: Morley-Minto and Montague-Chelmsford Reforms

The 1st World War and the inclusion of the Indian troops in it for the Britishers led to an examination of the British policy for India, demanded by the Britishers as well as the Indians, especially by the Viceroy Lord Hardinge.

Reforms were made by the purpose of preparing India for a self-government. When and how this policy came out, whether a Dominion-Status or an inner autonomy, is till now not clear.

The Indian nationalists demanded a self-government, that could be activated as soon as possible.

On the other hand, the Britishers tried to keep the rule of India in their hands as long as possible, even when they transferred the Indian authority step-by-step through individual democratic reforms, the Morely-Minto and the Montague-Chelmsford reforms.²⁶⁸

The Morley-Minto reform emphasised the extension of the Provincial Councils and the advice of the Viceroy.

The Indian members were now also allowed to bring in resolutions. Besides, the post of a legal advisor in the Cabinet of the Viceroy was given to an Indian.²⁶⁹

The Montague-Chelmsford reform gave some of the departments e.g. education, health and agriculture in Indian hands. In the Parliament these departments were given to responsible Indian ministers.

Others, like security and finance remained with the nominated British ministers, who were responsible only to the Governor.

Like this, a system of double rule, a di-archy originated in the provinces.²⁷⁰

The vote to elect was also extended to 5 million voters, even when separate constituencies were reserved for the Muslims.²⁷¹

These reforms led to the demand of the Indian Nationalists to realise the parliamentary form of democracy. They, therefore favoured the "provincial autonomy" i.e. the formation of pure Indian Ministries in the provinces and "Dominion Status" with reference to the structure of the Central Government and its relationship to Great Britain. The favouring of the provincial autonomy was taken up by the Britishers in the next constitutional amendments ranging from 1928-1935.²⁷²

Difference of opinion was there only about the reform of the Central Government.

The Conservatives in Great Britain were not ready to make any concessions to the Indian demands, whereas the Liberals and the Labour Party favoured a kind of Diarchy in the Central Government.

On the Indian side freedom was also demanded by the nationalists.

One wanted to accept the Dominion status only when it insured a factual independence for India, as in Canada and Australia.²⁷³

2. The Sikhs at the "Round Table" and the "Communal Award Ramsey Macdonalds"

The Britishers called the Simon Commission in 1927. The Simon report came in May 1930.²⁷⁴ The Simon report concerned itself with the refusal of many Indians, as the allowance of a Dominion Status was not one of its themes.

The Dominion Status had been recommended earlier by the Nehru report, that was brought out by the Congress in order to find a peaceful solution for the British reforms.²⁷⁵

As the nationalists refused the Simon report, the Viceroy called the Round Table conferences from 1930 to 1932.²⁷⁶ The future of India was to be decided by these conferences with the involvement of the Indians.²⁷⁷

The protection of the minorities constitutionally was the main theme of the 2nd Round Table Conference.

The continuation of separate constitutencies for the Muslims as well as the protection of the untouchables also stood for debate.²⁷⁸

As the Indian representatives could not reach a consensus on these problems, they committed themselves to accept the arbitral award of the Prime Minister Ramsey Macdonald.

Officially made Public on 16 August, 1932, this award, called the "Communal Award", gave all the minorities separate constituencies.²⁷⁹

Among the minorities were the Untouchables, the Indian Christians, the Anglo Indians, the Mohammadens, the Europeans and the Sikhs.²⁸⁰

Mahatma Gandhi, who was present as a delegate at the Second Round Table conference, objected to a separate constituency for the Untouchables by threatening to fast himself to death.²⁸¹

Dr. Ambedkar, leaders of the Untouchables and a contemporary of Gandhi, made the Gandhi-Ambedkar Pact, with which he avoided the separate constituencies for the Untouchables. Gandhi compensated him for that with the reservation of a large number of seats for the representatives of the untouchables in the State Parliaments and the Central Government.

Separate constituencies meant that the Untouchables could only vote for the Untouchables, whereas in case of reserved seats, all the voters voted together for the general candidates and the representative of the Untouchables, so that their representative could not represent their special interests, but had to find the support of the majority.²⁸²

Gandhi succeeded in avoiding separate constituencies through the Gandhi-Ambedkar Pact.

Separate constituencies as the communal award remained for all other minorities, also for Sikhs.

This concession enraged the Sikhs, since by this the majority of Muslims became politically established in Punjab.²⁸³

The results of the second conference were made public by the Britishers in 1933 with the so-called "White Paper".

The representation of 30 members from Punjab in the central Legislative Assembly was scheduled after that.

It should consist of the following: 14 Muslims, 6 Sikhs, 6 Hindus, 1 Scheduled Caste, 1 Christian, 1 Anglo Indian and 1 Jagirdar.²⁸⁴

The distribution of 175 seats in the Punjab Legislative Council was as follows²⁸⁵:

	Total seats	175
Muslims	86	49.14%
Hindus	43	24.57%
Sikhs	32	18.29%
Anglo-Indians	1	0.57%
Europeans	1	0.57%
Commerce and Industry	1	0.57%
Zamindars	5	0.57%
Labour	3	3.86%
University	1	0.57%
Christians	2	1.14%
	-----	-----
	175	99.99%

The claims of the Sikhs proposed formerly during the second Round Table conference had not been met in any way.

The Sikh representatives, Sardar Ujjal Singh and Sardar Sampuran Singh made clear the demands of the Sikhs in their Memorandum of 12 November, 1931.²⁸⁶

After that they claimed because of their unrivalled position in the Punjab - historical, political and economic -- 30% representation in the provincial legislature. Besides, they also protested against "separate electorates", which strengthened the Muslims, since "the other two communities could not even influence the permanent majority (Muslims), chosen as it would be by constituents swayed by none but communal motives and aims"... "We cannot accept a constitution which relegates us for all time to the position of an ineffective opposition."

In case the Muslims did not deviate from their demand for a "reserved majority", the Sikh representatives advised a territorial rearrangement of the Punjab in their memorandum.

The Rawalpindi and the Multan districts, without the Lyallpur and Montgomery districts, which showed a Muslim population of 7 million, should be made to form a separate province or should be fused with the North -West frontier.

The result would be a Punjab with a population of about 16 million, in which no single community would have an absolute majority.

The most important demands of the Sikhs have been summarised in the following 17 points:

PUNJAB

1. The Sikhs were anxious to secure a National Government and are therefore opposed to any communal majority by Statute or any reservation of seats by law for a majority community.
2. The Sikhs occupy an unrivalled position in the Punjab as is reflected by their sacrifices in the defence of India, and in national movements and their stake in the province, and therefore, demand 30 percent representation in the Punjab Legislature and Administration.
3. In the Punjab Cabinet and the Public Service Commission the Sikh community should have a one-third share.
4. If no agreement is reached on the above basis, the boundaries of the Punjab may be so altered by transferring predominantly Muhammadan areas to the Frontier Province so as to produce a communal balance. In this reconstituted Punjab there should be joint electorates, with no reservation of seats.
5. If neither of the above alternatives is acceptable, the Punjab may be administered by the newly constituted responsible Central Government till mutual agreement on the communal question is arrived at.
6. Punjabi should be the official language of the Province. It should be optional with the Sikhs and others to use Gurmukhi script if they so desire.

CENTRAL

7. The Sikhs should be given 5 percent of the total number of seats reserved for British India in each of the Upper and Lower Houses.
8. There should always be at least one Sikh in the Central Cabinet.
9. In case an Army Council is constituted the Sikhs should be adequately represented on it.
10. The Sikhs have always had a special connection with the Army and therefore the same proportion of Sikhs should be maintained in the Army as before the war.
11. The Sikhs should have effective representative in the All-India services and should be represented on Central Public Service Commission.
12. All residuary powers should vest in the Central Government.
13. The Central Government should have special specified powers to protect minorities.

OTHER PROVINCES

14. The Sikhs should have the same weightage in other provinces as is accorded to other minorities.

GENERAL

15. The Provincial and Central Government should declare religious neutrality and while maintaining existing religious endowments should not create new ones.

16. The State should provide for teaching of Gurmukhi script where a certain fixed number of scholars is forthcoming.

17. Any safeguards guaranteed in the Constitution for the Sikhs should not be rescinded or modified without their express consent.

The Sikhs were not very satisfied with the results of the second Round Table Conference published in the "White Paper". In contrast to their demand of 5% representation in the Central Legislative Assembly of British India and 30% representation in the Punjab Legislative Council, the Sikhs got only 1.6% seats and 19% seats respectively.²⁸⁷

The Sikhs also took various measures to protest against the communal Award, which provided separate electorates for the minorities. They tried Resolutions, Anti-Communal Award Day, Boycott of the 3rd Round Table Conference and formed a Council of Action, of the Sikh leaders having different political ideas to remove the Britishers.

Another result of the protest against the Communal Award was that the Unionist Leader Sikander Hayat Khan got the support of the various Sikh leaders in an effort to take over the representation of the Governor of Punjab, absent for more than four months.²⁸⁸ Sikander had previously assured of his help to protest against the Communal Award.

This assured support of the Sikhs to Sikander Hyat-Khan was also related to the tense relations with the Congress. The Sikhs held the Congress responsible for the results of the communal Award,²⁸⁹ as Gandhi had bound himself and the Congress to the Communal Award through the Gandhi-Ambedkar Pact.

The protest actions of the Sikhs against the Award did not change the pact. In 1935 the Britishers passed the Government of India Act,²⁹⁰ which also included the Communal Award.

The Government of India Act did not however allow the Dominion Status demanded by the Congress or the abolition of the British rule in India. Nevertheless it brought a wide ranging reform of the

Montague-Chelmsford reform of 1919 and signalled a further step in the direction of a "responsible government".²⁹¹

The provincial self rule was introduced with the Government of India Act. Complete ministries and state Parliaments were now formed by the Indians in the provinces. The British Governor of Punjab however had the right of judgment in case of a constitutional emergencies, to dissolve the ministries and to take the rule in his own hands. The Central Government remained in British hands.²⁹²

Sixth Schedule of the Government of India Act ruled the franchise of the Indians. According to it, the right to vote in Punjab depended upon "taxation, property, educational qualifications, qualifications by reasons of service in His Majesty's Forces, additional qualification for women, special qualification for scheduled castes."²⁹³ There were therefore no general franchise, but only limited rights, claimable on the basis of certain special features e.g. a fixed minimum income.²⁹⁴

The Congress did not accept the Government of India Act on the basis of the rights of the Governor and Diarchy in the Central Government.

The Muslim League did not object openly to the new Constitution, however, reserved its right, to try first the "Provincial Scheme".

The Sikhs, who had already banned against the Communal Award, also spoke against the new constitution.²⁹⁵ They did not approve of the "provincial autonomy".²⁹⁶

The Government of India Act allowed the Sikhs only 33 from the 175 seats in the Punjab Legislative Assembly, 3 out of 50 seats in the North West Frontier Province, 6 out of 250 seats in the Federal Legislative Assembly, and in case one existed, 4 out of 150 seats in the Council of State. The Sikhs felt themselves drawn to incapacity in all the political areas of the State by that. No seats were given to them in the legislatures of United Provinces and Sind, where they showed a significant majority or in other provinces, where they had considerable economic interests.²⁹⁷

The Governor also had the orders to specially support the minorities, but this was not enough for the Sikhs. They demanded independent constitutional rights, in order to protect their political and cultural existence.

Besides, they also strived for a portion of the control of Punjab.²⁹⁸

3. Reaction of the Sikhs to the Results of the Amendment of Constitution

The Sikhs had to come to terms with the Communal Award, which imposed separate electorates on them, in spite of their protests.

The scheduled provincial elections in Punjab of 1937 forced them to adapt themselves to the existing political situation. They established parties within limits set by the Communal Award.

a. Nationalists:

Akali Party

The Shromani Akali Dal, central organisation of the Akalis was formed on 14 December, 1920.²⁹⁹

This organisation had the task of releasing the Gurdwaras from the Mahants and to assure the Sikhs of the leadership of Gurdwaras.

The Shromani Akali Dal broke up in two groups in 1926: The moderate Central Akali Dal under the leadership of Baba Kharak Singh/Gyani Sher Singh and the radical Shromani Akali Dal under the leadership of Master Tara Singh.³⁰⁰

The division followed as a result of the conflict within the S.G.P.C. over the management of the Gurdwaras. Differences were also there about the execution of the decisions of the Gurdwara Act of 1925.³⁰¹ Both the groups laid claims to the leadership of the Gurdwaras.³⁰²

The Central Akali Dal was established as an independent party, in 1933,³⁰³ and separated itself from the other group of the Akalis, the Shromani Akali Dal.

Aim of establishment of this party was a weakening of the Shromani Akali Dal.³⁰⁴

A British report of 1947 about the political Sikh groups gives information about the organisation of the Shromani Akali Dal. According to it a "general committee" controlled the Shromani Akali Dal.³⁰⁵ The committee was made up of the representatives, who represented the member of the Shromani Akali Dal. For every 100 members was a representative. The actual work was done by an "executive body", a functional organ. This "executive body" consisted of a President, the executives, the so-called "office-holders" and 15 other persons.

According to the British report, the Shromani Akali Dal had a membership of 80,000.

The Shromani Akali Dal was organised in "Jathas" for "district,

tehsils, thanas and zilas”.

The aims of this party are given by the “Akali Party’s Election Manifesto” of 1937:³⁰⁶

“Akali Party’s Election Manifesto, 1937”

1. The party will fight for the attainment of complete independence for the country and will co-operate with those politically advance parties whose programme and ideals approximate to those of its own.
2. It will offer strong opposition to the Communal Award, and strive to replace it by a joint and national solution.
3. It will work for the repeal of all repressive laws.
4. It will oppose all measures, legislative and executive, which are opposed to the best interests of the country.
5. It will work for the release of all political prisoners and detenues.
6. It will work for the removal of untouchability.
7. It will work for the uplift of the masses and depressed and backward classes.
8. It shall fight for the declaration of fundamental rights against granting full freedom for the profession, practice and propagation of religion with due regard to public morality.
9. It will work for the relief of rural indebtedness.
10. It will impose more taxes on the rich for the benefit of the poor sections of the country.
11. It will work for the assessment of land revenue on income tax basis.
12. It will oppose the formation of a ministry by those parties which do not agree to amend the Communal Award and replace it by a joint and national solution and will work for abrogation of the constitution in the Government of India Act 1935. The Akali Party would work for its amendment and replacement by a new constitution acceptable to the people of India.
13. It will work for the Indianisation of the Army.
14. It will protect and safeguard all legitimate rights and interests of Sikhs.
15. It will work to secure full freedom for Sikhs to carry or possess kirpans.
16. It will oppose tooth and nail all attempts on the part of Muslims throughout India to regain possession of Shaheed Ganj
17. It will work for the amendment of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925 in

accordance with the wishes of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee.

18. It will try that the water rate (Abiana) is reduced.

19. It will work for the removal of unemployment by encouraging industries and all Swadeshi enterprises.”

According to it, the Shromani Akali Dal strived for the total independence for India (No.1). It protested against the “Communal Award”, sought a common and national solution (Nos.2 and 12) and thereby protested against communalism. Besides it professed strict refusal of the constitution embodied in the Government of India Act of 1935.

The Central Akali Dal had no specific programme of its own. In other words, its programme did not differ much from that of the Shromani Akali Dal.³⁰⁷

Sometimes the Central Akali Dal had the same policy as the Shromani Akali Dal had; sometimes it appeared that it was fighting the Shromani Akali Dal only for the sake of fighting.

Thus, the Central Akali Dal participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement and like the Shromani Akali Dal, boycotted the Simon Commission in 1928. When the Shromani Akali Dal accepted the Gandhi-Irwin Pact of 1931³⁰⁸ and decided to send its leader Master Tara Singh to the second Round Table Conference, Gyani Sher Singh, the then leader of the Central Akali Dal rose against this Conference.³⁰⁹

The Central Akali Dal was made up of many Sikh political leaders like Sardar Bahadur Mehtab Singh, Gyani Sher Singh, Amar Singh Sher-i-Punjab etc.

It gave the appearance, as if the party consisted only of leaders rather than followers.³¹⁰

Sikh Congress Party

The Sikh Congress Party, also called the “Sikh Political Party”, was officially established in August 1936.³¹¹

This party was made up by Congress-oriented members of the Shromani Akali Dal³¹² and included also Sikhs, who were members of the Congress.

The Sikh Congress Party was inspired certainly by the imposition of the Communal Award on the Sikhs, whose separate electorates the

Sikhs had already refused.

This party aimed at complete freedom of India from Great Britain through all peaceful and legitimate means. It protested against communalism and other reactionary powers. It recognised Congress as the only political representation of the country in all political matters.³¹³

In its political line the Sikh Congress Party is to be classified as “moderate”.

The Sikh Congress Party showed itself to be an under organisation of the Sikhs, which accepted Congress-oriented Sikhs, so that within the Sikh Community Congress propaganda could be made and the Congress regulations could be maintained.³¹⁴

This is also clear from the rules and regulations of the Sikh Congress Party on 5 October, 1937:

“Extract-Rules & Regulations of the Sikh Congress Party, Amritsar

1. The name of this party shall be “Sikh Congress Party, Amritsar”.
2. The aim of this party shall be to do Congress Propaganda work amongst the Sikh masses, to act according to the Congress rule and creed, and make others do the same.
3. Only those Sikh Ladies and Gentlemen, who are Members of the Congress, can become the members of this Party.
4. Every member shall have to take a pledge on solemn affirmation to remain faithful to the Party and shall have to sign a declaration form to the effect, and shall also have to make a promise that he shall not do any kind of propaganda in respect of this Party for the period of one year after severing his connections with this Party.
5. The subscription shall be As. 4/-Half yearly payable in advance.
6. Admission is always open to the Congress members only”.³¹⁵

Communist: Kirti Kisan Sabha

Alongwith the nationalists stood the communists, who had similarly the aim of releasing India from the Britishers.

The first Communist Party of India was established in 1925. Its mentors were the Communist Parties of Great Britain.³¹⁶

The Britishers first called the Communist Party of India illegal.

In 1943 the Britishers decided to repeat the illegality of Communist Party alongwith its under organisations.³¹⁷

The Communist Party of India was a section of the Communist International. It got its support and directions from Moscow.³¹⁸

Exact number of the members of the Communist Party could not be ascertained. In a "Review on Communism in India", published by the Central Intelligence Bureau of Britain, it was reported in the year 1939: "The Communist Party in India has no more than a few hundred members".³¹⁹

The Indian Annual register for the year 1943 gives a membership of over 15,000 members.³²⁰

Noteworthy is that the Sikhs were the biggest number of communists in Punjab.³²¹ These came mostly from the former circle of members of the Ghadar Movement.³²² They found themselves together in the Punjab Kirti Kisan Sabha Movement.

The Punjab Kirti Kisan Party was supported financially and ideologically by the Canadian -- American Ghadrates, with the permission of Moscow.³²³ They formed the so called counterpart of the Ghadr Organisation in America.³²⁴

By the establishment of the Punjab Kirti Kisan Party, the political ideas of the countrymen reached a large circle of Sikhs.³²⁵ The Punjab Kirti Kisan Party was made communist in its methods and was in many ways in agreement with the political line of the Indian Communist Parties.

On the other hand, it also possessed a strong Sikh unity and a separate party organisation.³²⁶ As the Congress was not represented very strongly in Punjab,³²⁷ the Kirti Kisan organisation could take an independent form.

The Punjab Kirti Kisan Party stood for the interests of the poorer farmers, the landless labourers and the oppressed Punjab.³²⁸ Its scope of influence concentrated on Central Punjab. With the financial support of the Canadian -- American Ghadrates, it could activate its influence strongly on the Sikh farmers.³²⁹

Strong interest was laid with the party work on the publication of the newspaper "Kirti".³³⁰

The general aims of the Kirtis showed themselves at the first India Kisan Congress in Lucknow on 11 April, 1936, through the following resolution.³³¹

"The object of the Kisan Movement is to secure complete freedom from economic exploitation and the achievement of full economic and political power for the peasants and workers and all other exploited classes.

The main task of the Kisan Movement shall be the organisation of

peasants to fight for their immediate political and economic demands in order to prepare them for their emancipation from every form of exploitation.

The Kisan Movement stands for the achievement of ultimate economic and political power for the producing masses through its active participation in the national struggle for winning complete independence."

According to it, the Kirti Kisan Sabha strived for an abolition of the British power over India as well as for the establishment of a "Workers' and Peasants' Government in India".³³²

It was purely a farmer's organisation, as also pointed out by the name Kisan = Farmer.

It was again pointed out in the manifesto of 11 April, 1936,³³³ "Kisan means the unity of the peasants".

A plan set up by a Britisher gives information about the reach of influence of the Kirtis.³³⁴

The Kisan Sabha was banned by the Britishers in 1934.³³⁵ Therefore, it incorporated itself in the Congress, as it is today the only effective political body with a country wide organisation claiming to champion the cause of the masses. It must necessarily make the solution of the problems of the peasantry the chief plank of its political and economic policy.³³⁶

The Kisan Sabha was identical with the left wheel of the Congress.

The possibility of joining together with the Congress came for the Kisan Sabha in 1934 with the establishment of the Congress Socialist Party.³³⁷

The Congress Socialist Party achieved itself for the fulfilment of the programme, taken up at the Karachi meeting of the Congress and plead further for the dispossession of the big land owners and a general land reform.

Further it also warned against an involvement of India in the "imperialistic war". All the members were theoretically imbued with the problems of India in a marxist sense.³³⁸

As the socialist and the communist were the same in basic positions aim of class -- and casteless system, the doors of the Congress Socialist Party were opened to the Communists after the brief change of the Seventh Congress of the Cominterns in 1935.³³⁹ The Congress Party thus offered a chance of building a left united front and provided shelter to the communists.³⁴⁰

The so-called “weekly news letters” of the Punjab Congress Socialist Party also hinted at the close co-operation between the Punjab Congress Socialist Party and the Punjab Kirti Kisan Party.³⁴¹

b. Loyalists:

Khalsa National Party

The Khalsa National Party was officially founded on 27 August, 1936. The organisers of this new party were Sir Joginder Singh and Sir Sunder Singh Majithia.³⁴²

This party united the loyalist Chief Khalsa Dewan and the very moderate Central Akali Dal wheel under the leadership of Gyani Kartar Singh.³⁴³

The members of the Khalsa National Party came mainly from the west-oriented, affluent circles e.g. “big landlords”, which remained loyal to the Britishers.

On the other side stood the radical Akalis: they were “Anti-Akalis.”³⁴⁴

Before the establishment of this party, Sir Sunder Singh had tried to form a “Joint Board” with the Shiromani Akali Dal for the incoming elections of 1937.³⁴⁵

It was therefore successful to unite the Central Akali Dal wheel led by Gyani Sher Singh with the Chief Khalsa Dewan with the aim of going together as the Khalsa National Party in the forthcoming elections.³⁴⁶

The Khalsa National Party stood as a counter pole to the radical Akali Party. It was anti-Akali and pro-British³⁴⁷ in nature. Its loyalty strengthened the leaders of the Khalsa National Party in a manifesto.³⁴⁸

“... we know that freedom is only to be guaranteed under a reign of law..... England still remains the home of freedom”. The aim is given by the programme of the Khalsa National party:³⁴⁹

Creed of the Party

1. To work for the realisation of the ideals of Sikhism, i.e. the promotion of truth, tolerance, individual freedom and brotherly feelings.
2. To work for the attainment of Swaraj, i.e. full responsible Government.
3. To work for the abolition of the Communal Award and its replacement by a just and national solution.

4. To work for the unification of all communities into a united Indian Nation.
5. To work for raising the social and economic standard of the masses.

Programme of the Party

1. To promote communal concord as a prelude to development of Nationality and National self-respect.
2. To develop the resource of the Province by harnessing Urban and Rural effort.
3. To raise the standard of living in the villages:-
 - (a) By improving the methods of marketing Agricultural products and by raising agricultural prices.
 - (b) By developing Cottage and large scale industries.
 - (c) By exploring all the resources of the Province with the object of opening new avenues to provide employment for the unemployed.
4. To protect the interest of all minorities including those of the depressed classes.
5. To safeguard civil liberties and to secure abolition of all civil disabilities to which any section of the people may be subject under the existing political, social or religious systems.
6. The Khalsa National Party, without merging itself in any communal party till the Communal Award is abolished, will cooperate with any party that works for similar aims and objects.
7. As a preliminary to formal understanding with other communities the Party will require that absolute freedom should be given to all communities in the performance of religious ceremonies, e.g. taking of processions, possession of religious places of worship; to eat and drink according to one's custom and inclination.
8. The Party will protect the interests of Sikhs in services and secure the community's full share of representation in the recruitment to services and representation on local bodies etc.
9. The Party will work for relieving the burden of taxation including land revenue and water rates.
10. The Party will work for the relief of indebtedness and for the creation of agricultural credit.
11. To work for strict economy in public expenditure and to reduce the cost of Administration.
12. The Party will endeavour to unite all sections of the Panth to save the Punjab from the establishment of communal tyranny and graft.

13. To protect and promote the use of the Punjabi Language and Gurmukhi script.
14. To work for the strengthening of defence forces by increasing Indian element in the Indian Army and also to work for the progressive Indianization of higher ranks.
15. To work for the modernisation of Railway and currency policy in the interests of Agricultural and Industrial development of the Country.
16. To support the policy of protection in order to encourage indigenous industries.”

The most important were the abolition of the Communal Award, and the avoidance of communalism in the foreground. The call for an independent and free India was not present here. Only a demand for a united Indian nation was made.

It can be concluded from the papers of Sunder Singh Majithia, that the Khalsa National Party was organised efficiently.³⁵⁰

The Organisation of the party consisted of a central organisation in Amritsar, called the “Council of the Khalsa National Party”, and the branches in the districts.

Every person, above the age of 21 and dedicated to the programme of the party, could become a member.

The central and district organisation had one executive committee.

The Central Executive Committee was made up of more than 41 members; 5 of them named the President. The rest 36 elected the Central Council of the Party.

The Executive Committee of a district had 5 members. It had to obey the directions given by the central organisation in Amritsar.

The central organisation consisted of:

- 1 President
- 2 Vice-presidents
- 1 General Secretary
- 1 Joint Secretary
- 1 Treasurer
- 1 Assistant Secretary
- 1 Propaganda Secretary

The Executive Committee and the office bearers were elected every three years.

In the district organisations sat a President and a Secretary. They

were also elected every three years.

The portrayal of the various Sikh political parties 1935 onwards is as follows:

The Khalsa National Party originated because of the forthcoming provincial elections in Punjab. It dissolved the loyal Chief Khalsa Dewan, which had become politically useless for the Sikhs.

The Sikh Congress Party was also formed because of the elections. Congress oriented Sikhs were employed by the Congress for the elections.

The Akali Party developed from the Gurdwara Reform Movement. Its division into Shromani Akali Dal and the Central Akali Dal occurred because of internal conflicts. These conflicts were also about the political actions and the political aims.

In this context, the merging of the Central Akali Dal wheel led by Gyani Sher Singh with the Chief Khalsa Dewan to form the Khalsa National Party is to be understood.

Mainly the terrorist Sikhs entered in the Kirti Kisan Sabha, very often left overs of the Ghadr Movement. The origination of the Kirti Kisan Sabha took place independent of the elections scheduled for 1937. The co-operation of the Kirtis with the Congress lies clearly at their slip in illegality. The help of the Congress made it easy for them, to continue their political work.

The Akali Parties, Sikh Congress Party, the Kirti Kisan Sabha and others strived for India's independence. The aims of the Khalsa National Party were totally opposite to them.

It simply demanded a united India.

The Akali Party, the Khalsa National Party and the Kirtis formed themselves from political movements,³⁵¹ whereas the Nationalist Sikh Congress Party was established solely for the elections of 1937. To supplement, it must be pointed out that the foundation of the Khalsa National Party was also for the elections of 1937, unlike the newly formed Sikh Congress Party, the formation of the Khalsa National Party was based on the conversion of the Chief Khalsa Dewan into a party.

Noteworthy is that the Sikh Congress Party and the Khalsa National Party were established at the same time i.e. in August 1936.

Sikh loyalists and Sikh Nationalists tried with these establishments to bring the provincial elections to a successful finish.

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273. D. Rothermund, *Essentials...*, a.a.O., Darmstadt 1976, S. 98, 99.

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275. D. Rothermund, *Essentials of Indian History*, a.a.O., S. 104.

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284. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, Diss. a.a.O., S. 160.

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286. Following from Indian Round Table Conference, Second

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287. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, Diss. a.a.O., S. 160, 161.

288. So in M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, Diss., a.a.O., S. 147, which bases itself on the Punjabi-newspaper *Akali Te Pardesi*, 6.8.32.

289. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, Diss. a.a.O., S. 146, 147, 150, 151, 158, 159. Durlab Singh, *The Valiant Fighter: A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh*, Lahore 1942, S. 119.

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V. Political Development 1935-1939: Unionist Government in Punjab

1. Outline of the Relations among the Khalsa National Party, the Central Akali Dal and the Shiromani Akali Dal

During 1935-1939, the Khalsa National Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal had no friendly relations between them. The Loyalist Khalsa National Party, which supported the Unionist Government in Punjab in the following years, had to defend itself from the attacks of the Shiromani Akali Dal.

Difference of opinion on religious matters of the Sikhs between these two parties was the reason for these conflicts.

The impression arose during the Jhatka-Halal controversy, in which the Sikhs claimed their right to the jhatka meat, justified in their religion by the Unionist Government. The Muslims, on the other hand, favoured the halal meat.

Jhatka means, that hams and goat are to be killed with a definite method i.e. with one strike on the head. Only boars and rabbits killed during hunting can be eaten without the jhatka-rule.³⁵² The Sikhs demanded opening of jhatka-meat shops, or the jhatka meat to be cooked in the kitchens of the government offices.³⁵³

The Muslims prepared their meet with the halal method i.e. cutting the throat of the animal very slowly.³⁵⁴

In this controversy the Khalsa National Party stood by the side of the Unionist Government.³⁵⁵

The resulting conflicts and the hostile attitude of the Shiromani Akali Dal was assessed by a British report about the political situation in Punjab in July 1937 as follows:

“The present agitation appears to be based on political differences. The Akali Party is seeking to embarrass the Khalsa Nationalist Party which supports the present Government and to create disunity in the Cabinet.”³⁵⁶

The protection of the religious values of the Sikh community was considered by the Britishers as a political tool of the Shiromani Akali Dal against the Khalsa Nationalist Party.

The aim of the Shiromani Akali Dal was to prevent the Khalsa National Party from attaining a political power status.

This appeared to be the case after the election of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan³⁵⁷ in 1937, when he expressed his opinion on Kot Bhai Than Singh affair to Sunder Singh Majithia = "As regards Kot Bhai Than Singh affair, I am afraid there are other forces and motives which are working behind the scenes The attitude of Master Tara Singh in not coming to see you also indicates that it is not the merits of the case itself but other motives which are actuating the Akalis to this agitation..... But, as I have said there may be other reasons for which this agitation is being carried on".³⁵⁸

The so-called Kot Bhai Than Singh affair occurred near Rawalpindi and had the following reason:

Muslims were troubled and disturbed during a Sikh gathering in a gurdwara, as these Sikhs sang louder than usual. The police had to intervene and use fire-prevention measures. Many Sikhs were wounded and one was killed.³⁵⁹

How open was the hostility between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Khalsa National Party is shown by an announcement in the Tribune: "The Sikhs leader unequivocally condemned the policy of the Khalsa National Party in the Punjab Assembly".³⁶⁰

The Khalsa National Party knew already in the middle of 1936, that the Shiromani Akali Dal was not interested in a combined effort.³⁶¹ "The Akali Party of Tara Singh is not working with us".

In contrast to that was the Central Akali Dal, splitted from the Shiromani Akali Dal.³⁶²

For the purpose of the 1937 elections, a wheel of the Central Akali Dal under the leadership of Gyani Sher Singh joined hands with the loyalist Chief Khalsa Dewan to form the Khalsa National Party.

This decision of the Central Akali Dal also had the original reason of rivalry with the Shiromani Akali Dal.

How sure was the leader of the Khalsa National Party, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, of the support of the Central Akali Dal, is shown by his letter of 3.9.1936 to Shiv Dev Singh:

"Gyani Sher Singh is working with us. I don't think there will be any question of opposition on his behalf".³⁶³

The Central Akali Dal wheel of the Congress-oriented Baba Kharak Singh sought the co-operation of the Congress Party.^{363a}

The chief features of the attitudes of the Khalsa National Party/ The Central Akali Dal and the Shiromani Akali Dal let themselves to be characterised as rivalry on inconstantly.

The reason lies in the claim of power of the Sikh parties. Every Sikh Party wanted to be the lone representative of the Sikh community and to have an own power status.

This could not occur without the help of the other political parties, as shown by the results of the 1937 elections in Punjab.

The Khalsa National Party jointed hands with the Unionist Party, the Shiromani Akali Dal with the Congress Party.

How did it happen?

2. The 1937 Elections and their Results

The "Government of India Act" of 1935 was decided by a federation of the Indian provinces and princely states with two "Houses of Parliament in the Centre":

The Central Legislative Assembly and the Council of States. Six of the provinces were to have two legislatures, the others, including Punjab, only one.³⁶⁴

The elections of the Punjab Legislative Assembly began in Punjab on 18 January, 1937.³⁶⁵

The decisive results came out in the middle of February, 1937³⁶⁶ and were as follows:

"Unionists (comprising 77 Muslims, 7 Hindus, 1 European, 1 Anglo-Indian and 2 Indian Christians)	88
Congress (comprising 9 Hindus, 4 Sikhs and 2 Muslims)	15
Khalsa National Party	12
Hindu Election Board	11
Akali Party	10
Ahrars	2
Ittihad-i-Millat	2
Muslim League	2
Congress Nationalist	1
Independents (comprising 8 caste Hindus, 7 scheduled caste Hindus, 5 Muslims and 5 Sikhs)	25

The results of the elections brought once again two seats for the Unionist Party, as well as ten seats of the "Independents", which were by the side of the Unionist Party.³⁶⁸

The Unionist Party, friendly to the Britishers, was purely a Punjab institution.

The Unionist Party was founded in December 1923 by Fazi-i-Husain,³⁶⁹ as a counter pole to the interests of the Hindus. The party got a strong support from a greater part of the Muslim population in Punjab. Many urban Muslims however went against the Unionist Party because of its not enough communal character.

The farmers from Haryana, Hindu Jats, supported the Unionist Party under the leadership of Chotu Ram.

The Unionist Party did not succeed in the beginning years, to include the Sikh community, for the reason of the Gurdwara conflicts in the 20's,³⁷⁰ which led to an open retreat of the Sikhs from the Britishers and an agreement with the Congress Party.³⁷¹

After the death of Fazi-i-Husain in 1936, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan overtook the leadership of the Unionist Party.

The Unionist Party had a good success with the results of the 1937 elections. It possessed 100 seats out of 175 seats of the the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

A British report of August 1936 shows how sure were the Britishers of the winning of the Unionist Party in the elections:

"The Party is expected to capture a majority of seats in the elections."³⁷²

The Congress Party went without success in the elections with only 15 seats.

The weakened influence and the declining popularity of the Congress Party were the reasons for this failure. Besides, the Congress groups in the Punjab were also not united.

Noteworthy is that the Congress candidates had no success in the rural areas of Eastern Punjab, whereas they succeeded in the urban areas.

Sikhs were successful candidates in the rural areas of Central Punjab.

According to statement of the fortnightly reports of the Britishers for February 1937, the successful candidates were the local Sikhs who were supported by the popular extremist organisations.³⁷³ Their support was to prevent the moderate Sikhs from becoming the candi-

dates for the elections.

The Khalsa National Party won against the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party with twelve seats.

It was therefore no wonder that the Shiromani Akali Dal was apparently disturbed at the success of the Khalsa National Party, as ascertained by the Fortnightly Report of the Britishers for the second half of February 1937.³⁷⁴

The Shiromani Akali Dal, which had thought itself till now to be the only political representation of the Sikhs, was now forced to consider its position weakened within the Sikh community with only ten seats.³⁷⁵

Added to this weakened position was the fear of losing the control over the S.G.P.C., as the elections to this and other Gurdwara Committees were imminent.

The leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Master Tara Singh,³⁷⁶ called therefore his supporters from the whole of Punjab for a well-aimed retaliation, so as to win back the lost position.

A further weakening of the Akali position was caused by the Desh Bhagat Pariwar Sahaik Committee.

There were extremist Sikhs in this committee, who looked after the family members of the political prisoners. These Sikhs forced the Sikh community to dissociate itself from the Akalis, as the Akalis had committed the mistake of not considering the agreement planned by Baba Wasakha Singh for the Gurdwara Committee elections as well as not entering in contact with the Maharaja of Patiala³⁷⁷

The Akalis consciously ignored the new regulation of the gurdwara committee elections, prepared by this agreement, as they feared to lose their control over the S.G.P.C.

A contact of the Akalis with the Maharaja of Patiala, Bhupinder Singh, would have been very advantageous to the Akalis, as the Maharaja tried to weaken the dominant role of the Akalis within the S.G.P.C. and to strengthen the position of the Chief Khalsa Dewan and the Central Akali Dal wheel of Gynai Sher Singh for the S.G.P.C. elections.³⁷⁸

Contrary the Shiromani Akali Dal sought after more co-operation with the Congress Party, inspite of having criticised it for letting Congress candidates contest and the use of the gurdwara money in the elections for the Punjab Legislative Assembly.³⁷⁹

The Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party contested the elections together.³⁸⁰

This co-operation explains itself for the Congress Party, with its little influence and validity in Punjab.³⁸¹

The weak position of the Congress in Punjab was partly due to the insufficient spread of the Congress organisations in every part of the province.³⁸²

The propaganda Secretary of the Punjab Nationalist Party, Lahore therefore informed Jawaharlal Nehru. "Congress in this province cannot expect to form a separate block in legislature. It shall have to cooperate with other groups to create a strong opposition bench. . ." ³⁸³

The Congress Party left no doubts in its election speeches as to its hostility towards the British government.³⁸⁴

A co-operation with the Shiromani Akali Dal during the elections was expected, as it had clearly stated its opinion about the Unionist Party as well as the Britishers in a warning letter to J. Nehru.³⁸⁵ Moreover, the Khalsa National Party had failed to set up a joint election board with the Shiromani Akali Dal and to become united the Shiromani Akali Dal prevented itself from joining hands with the Khalsa National Party.³⁸⁶

Thus, both the big political representatives of the Sikh community, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Khalsa National Party, contested the elections as opponents. Khalsa National Party however succeeded in collaborating with the Central Akali Dal wheel of Gyani Sher Singh³⁸⁷ for the elections.³⁸⁸

The Unionist Party, the unanimous winner of the elections, made the new government in Punjab.

In the newly formed Punjab cabinet, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, leader of the Unionist Party, became the Chief Minister.

The leader of the rural Hindu-group of the Unionist Party, Chowdhary Chotu Ram, became the Development Minister.

Mian Abdul Hayee represented the Urban Muslims as the Education Minister in the Punjab Cabinet, and Captain Malik Khizzar Hayat Khan represented the rural Muslims as the Public Works Minister. The other two seats were given to the representatives of the minorities in Punjab. Mr. Manohar, who had been the Education Minister from 1927 to 1930, became the Finance Minister representing the Hindus, and the leader of the Khalsa National Party. Sir Sunder Singh Majithia became the Revenue Minister, representing the Sikhs.³⁸⁹

Noteworthy is the fact that the Unionist Party included a Sikh and a Hindu in its cabinet inspite of its large win in the elections. This

meant a political uplift for the Sikh upper class, represented by Sir Sunder Singh Majithia.

The opposition parties had first of all to overcome the difficulty of forming a united front against the Unionist government.

The Congress organisation in Punjab could not decide upon a single person to be sent to the Punjab Legislative Assembly because of internal party jealousies.

The Shiromani Akali Dal chose Sardar Sampuran Singh as the leader. He decided not to co-operate with any party, which welcomed the Communal Award.³⁹⁰

The Shiromani Akali Dal condemned the take-over of ministership by Sir Sunder Singh Majithia and thereby the participation of the Khalsa National Party in the Unionist Government. The condemnation was explained by stating that this ministry was no 'real' coalition, as an alignment of the political programmes of both the parties had not taken place.³⁹¹

With this, the Shiromani Akali Dal tried to nail down the Khalsa National Party on the political line of the Unionist Party. Whether this underlying "political line" of the Khalsa National Party kept off the leadership of the Shiromani Akali Dal, is still questionable.

Noteworthy in this context is the fact that the personal enmity between the leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Master Tara Singh, and the leader of the Khalsa National Party, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, became public.³⁹²

In the 22nd meeting of the Punjab Provincial Political conference in Gardhiwala from 9-11 October, 1937, brought by the Congress, the results and the winners of the provincial elections of Punjab 1937 were commented upon:

"The Assembly elections have brought out in bold relief the weakness of progressive forces in the Punjab where the reactionaries have been returned in an over-whelming majority... The ballot-box has for the time being taken the Unionists and their allies a definite and unassailable ascendancy over the Nationalists."³⁹³

3. The Unionist Government

The Chief Minister of Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, spoke about the aims of the Unionist Government in the Bombay Muslim League Conference on 6 March, 1939.

“. . . . the success of the Punjab experiment indicates that much of the present communal bitterness and tension which unfortunately prevail in certain other parts of India could have been avoided if they had adopted a similar attitude towards the minorities. Incidentally, the balanced constructive achievement of the Punjab, during the short span of two years, in the economic and other spheres can be mainly attributed in the Cabinet.”³⁹⁴

The Unionist Government therefore, strived to avoid communal bitterness and to achieve communal unity.

a. Religious Disturbances between Sikhs and Muslims

A communal unity was first of all important between the Muslim and Sikh population, as the religious demands of the Sikhs, above all Shaheedganj, the Kirpan - and Jhatka³⁹⁵ and Jhatka controversies, opposing the Muslim ideas, led to disturbances and shattered Punjab.

The Kirpan problem was related to the Shaheedganj problem. During the Shaheedganj agitation, the Punjab Government prohibited the Sikhs to wear kirpans or swords, because of heavy violence.

This disturbed the Sikh community very much, as the wearing of kirpans belonged to the five K's³⁹⁶ and thereby to their identity as a community.

The so-called Shaheedganj affair occurred during 1935-1939 and led to heavy bloodshed between the Sikhs and the Muslims.

Shaheedganj was a Sikh monument built in memory of Sikh men, women, and children, who had sacrificed their lives to defend their religion in the first half of the 18th century. The S.G.P.C. restored the Shaheedganj monument in 1935 Muslims prevented this restoration and tried to capture the building, as they similarly laid claim on it. It led to a quarrel between the Muslims and the Sikhs, which took up a bloody course by the end of November 1937 with the killing of 18 Sikhs.³⁹⁷ The Britishers called upon Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, to initiate unity between the Sikhs and the Muslims over the Shaheedganj affair.³⁹⁸

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan tried to solve this dispute with the so called “dinner diplomacy”. He invited the representatives of both the concerned groups and tried to unite them, but failed.³⁹⁹

In the Punjab Legislative Assembly, other Muslim unionists had spoken in favour of Muslims in the Shaheedganj affair and had also presented the Muslim Mosques Protection Bill, which was to guarantee a better protection to the Muslim Masjids.⁴⁰⁰

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan went against this bill as the Chief Minister, as he feared more communal problems.⁴⁰¹ Added to this was the order of the Britishers to Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, to achieve a unity between the Sikhs and the Muslims which would have been impossible had he supported the Muslim Mosque Protection Bill.

A unity over the Shaheedganj affair between Sikhs and Muslims also failed because of the resistance of Master Tara Singh, leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, on whom, according to Britishers, "at present a settlement depended more than on anyone else."⁴⁰²

Master Tara Singh refused to favour a unity in this matter, as he hoped to bring the existing ministry to a fall with his intransigence. Added to this was the personal enmity of Master Tara Singh with Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, the only Sikh-representative in the unionist Government. Because of this tense relationship, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia held his steps towards a reconciliation with the Shiromani Akali Dal in check, in spite of the pressure of the Britishers.⁴⁰³

Once again as so often in the political development of the Sikhs' personal feelings (rivalry in this case) won over sensibility and prevented a unity. A further reason, which stood against the unity of the Muslims and the Sikhs over the Shaheedganj affair, became clear by a secret meeting between Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and Master Tara Singh on 3 April, 1938. Master Tara Singh was ready for a unity, but feared, that his opponent, above all Sardar Mangal Singh, member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) would use this step against him and drag him out of his leadership position of the Akali Circle. This personal conflict and the conflict of the party interests among the Sikhs stood in the way of a compromise.

A correct solution to the Shaheedganj affair could not be achieved, although the Sikhs even went to the courts for a decision.

The outbreak of the 2nd World War in 1939 and the Pakistan agitation in 1940 deviated the Sikhs and the Muslims from the Shaheedganj affair. The dangerous communal fights and outbreaks disappeared.⁴⁰⁴ The new political situation in Punjab shifted the political interests of the Sikhs as well as the Muslims.

b. "Unity Conference" and Sikander - Jinnah Pact

Sir Sikander Hyat Khan called the leaders of various religious communities to a Unity Conference in July 1937.⁴⁰⁵

This call was to serve as a forward thrust to a communal unity of the

various communities in Punjab with the aim of achieving a unity of the Punjabis.

The Shiromani Akali Dal stood decisively against this conference.

In his letter of 10 September 1937 to Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Master Tara Singh explained this decision.

According to it, Master Tara Singh and her colleagues believed that Sikander's efforts were to strengthen the Muslim position and to build a Muslim rule in Punjab "you understand very well that Sikhs will not submit to personal or communal inequalities or recognise the social and political supremacy of the Muslims in the Province.. While you profess that you are making efforts for establishing Unity in the province through Unity Committees, we apprehend as stated above that all this is to consolidate the Muslim position and to establish Muslim domination in the Punjab."⁴⁰⁶

The executive committee of the S.G.P.C. also shared the opinion of Master Tara Singh and gave following as a reason for the underlying intention of Sir Sikander, to consolidate the Muslim position in Punjab. "The Sub-Committee set up by the Premier for promoting Communal Unity in the Province are almost packed with declared supporters of the Unionist Party and lack in representative character."⁴⁰⁷

In spite of the separation of prominent Sikhs and other representatives from the Unity Conference, the working committee of the Congress Party made itself strong for a participation, although the success of the conference was moved further away by a retreat. The main argument of the Working Committee for its participation in the Unity Conference referred to a solution of the communal problems. "Nevertheless the Working Committee is of the opinion that the Congress should not withheld its cooperation from any effort to solve the communal problems. Such cooperation should, however, be offered on the basis of Congress principles and an agreement should be sought in accordance with those basic principles."⁴⁰⁸

In a letter to J. Nehru on 21 October, 1937, Satyapal, President of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee Lahore, informed him of the non-participation of the Akali leadership in the Unity Conference. Further he tried to force the Working Committee to take its earlier statement of participating in the conference, as "all the Congress Committees of our province have condemned this Conference and have passed resolutions to this effect".

This followed, because "he (Sikander) had identified himself with Muslim League a reactionary and communalist organisation which is actively antagonistic to the Congress and its ideals and objective and which supports separate electorates and Communal Award".⁴⁰⁹ What had happened? On 15 October 1937, Sir Sikander Hayat Khan made the Sikander-Jinnah Pact with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League.⁴¹⁰

Satyapal therefore tried to come in the way of the Akalis, by ordering all the non-unionists to withdraw from this conference, as he feared that "our co-operation with Sir Sikander undermines our prestige and creates an unfavourable impression against the Congress".⁴¹¹

The internal opponent of Satypal in Punjab, Dr. Gopi Chand, president of the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee Amritsar, spoke for a participation of the Congress Party in the Unity Conference and gave Sir Siaknder Hyat Khan his full support. The working committee of the Congress Party also resolved to let the Congress representation in the unity conference remain, and not to take it back, although "almost all Congress and Sikh MLAs are opposed to it."⁴¹²

In the question of participation in the Unity Conference, the Congress Party had openly placed itself against the Akali Party. This disturbed the Shiromani Akali Dal very much, because it saw itself much strongly threatened by the Muslims by the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. A clear separation of the Congress Party from the unity conference after the signing of the Sikander -Jinnah Pact was considered as Party takeover for the Sikh community by the Shiromani Akali Dal.

What did the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact signify?

The 1937 elections in Punjab meant a clear defeat for the Muslim league.⁴¹³

Before the elections, the leader of the Muslim League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah⁴¹⁴ tried for a collective election ticket with the leader of the Unionist Party, Fazl-i-Hussain.⁴¹⁵ Fazl-i-Hussain declined this however with the reason, to preserve the uncommunal character of his party.⁴¹⁶

The Muslim League had no important place at this time. This however, changed, because the Congress Party refused to admit the members of the Muslim League to the Cabinet and took appropriate measures for that, which led to a revival of the Muslim League.

In Punjab Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, the new leader of the Unionist Party after the death of Fazl-i-Hussain in 1936, reached an agreement with Jinnah. This was the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact on 15 October, 1937 which said, that all the Muslim members of the Unionist Party would join the Muslim League and would follow it in all "All India" matters. On the province-scale however, in Punjab, the Unionist Party would remain independent of the Muslim League.⁴¹⁷

This Pact saw a division of Labour between the Muslim League and the Unionist Party in offing.

The Muslim League was to decide in all-Indian, the Unionist Party only in Punjab matters.⁴¹⁸

Sir Sikander Hayat Khan expressed his views on this pact in a press-release. In that he said, that the Muslim members of the Unionist Party who were not the members of the Muslim League, would be called upon to join that party, if they wanted to the position of the parties in Punjab remained untouched by the Pact. In case, mid-term or the next general elections took place, following would be the policy laid down by the Pact: Muslims, who would contest the elections with a League ticket, would have as an obligation to join the Unionist Party after their success and would be given full support of the Party. The aim of the pact was to strengthen the All-India body and so to protect its position in the All-India sphere and to give to it the feature of representing the Muslim thought in India.⁴¹⁹

The "Tribune" considered the pact as a counterpole in Punjab to the growing Congress-Akali friendship as well as a break to the increasing influence of the Congress in Punjab.⁴²⁰

According to the "Civil and Military Gazette",⁴²¹ the Sikander-Jinnah Pact was signed to change the Punjab politics, because it effected a great shock to the Hindus and the Sikhs of Punjab, who considered Sir Sikander Hyat Khan as "first a Punjabi and then as Muslim". The Hindu and Sikh circles now believed, that the retreat of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan from a non-communal politics left little room for all of them, who had entered his non-communal party with a hope of a better understanding among the communities.

Sir Chotu Ram, leader of the Hindu Jats within the Unionist Party, even warned Sir Sikander of complications that could arise out of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, but did not separate himself from the leader of the Unionist Party, much to the chagrin of the Hindu Mahasabha. This had tried to bring Chotu Ram on its side after the signing of the

Sikander - Jinnah Pact with the explanation, that the pact destroyed the non-communal character of the party.⁴²²

The aforesaid unity conference was considered as a useless matter by the Hindus and the Sikhs after the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.

With the signing of this pact, the Congress Party saw a chance of winning more and more Hindus and Sikhs, who were till now by the side of Sir Sikander.

The retreat of the Sikhs from the Unity Conference, mentioned in the Civil and Military Gazette, referred to the Sikhs of the Khalsa National Party and a part of the Central Akali Dal. The Shiromani Akali Dal clearly expressed its non-participation in the Unity Conference on 15 October, 1937, before the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact.⁴²³

The signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact resulted in an agreement of views among the political Sikh groups, loyal and moderate Sikhs now shared the view of the Shiromani Akali Dal, that Sir Sikander was not practising any more non-communal politics.⁴²⁴

As a reaction to the pact, Dr. Satyapal, representative of the Punjab Congress, Sir Gokul Chand Narang, representative of the Punjab Hindu Sabha and Master Tara Singh, representative of the Akali Dal reached an alliance with the aim of building a strong opposition to the rule of Sikander. The alliance however, did not contain the transfer of the Punjab Hindu Sabha and the Shiromani Akali Dal to the Congress Party.⁴²⁵

The signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, led moreover in a Sikh meeting on 27 October 1937, to the Shiromani Akali Dal calling upon all the Sikh members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, to separate themselves from the Unionist Government and to join the Congress Party. The Shiromani Akali Dal also encouraged nationalist Muslims to join with the Sikhs and the Hindus.⁴²⁶

4. The Opposition

The Congress representation in Punjab formed the opposition party with other political groups.⁴²⁷

The opposition to the Unionist-Government was made up of progressive Sikh-members, Akalis, Congress members and the Socialists of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, who decided to collaborate with other progressive groups.

The aim of this alliance was a strengthening of the opposition party in the Punjab Legislative Assembly and a further co-operation with the Congress Party.⁴²⁸

a. Shiromani Akali Dal

In the 22nd meeting of the Punjab Provincial Political Conference in Gardhiwala, district Hoshiarpur, from 10-11 October, 1937, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party gave their collective political ideas as the opposition groups. These were concerned with the Unionist Party as the ruling government in Punjab and were considered as counter attack. "The immediate and urgent task to which we Punjabis should address ourselves wholeheartedly is now to bring our province into line with the progressive provinces where the Congress holds sway. The reactionary forces have acquired a position of dominance in this province. The problem before us is to consolidate the national forces, unify the anti-imperialist elements, intensify and accelerate the mass contact work and galvanise the Congress Organisation into new life."⁴²⁹

The Congress Party was dependent on the support of the other opposition groups.

The view of the Congress to co-operate with the other political groups looked to be very dismal before the 1937 elections. This is shown by a letter of the Propaganda Secretary of the Punjab Nationalist Party in 1936 to J. Nehru: "Please excuse me the expression that the present Congress authorities do not inspire the confidence of either the Hindus, the Muslims or the Sikhs. No Muslim or Sikh is expected to stand on the Congress ticket in the forthcoming election. Congress in this province cannot expect to form a separate block in the legislature. It shall have to co-operate with other groups to create a strong opposition branch and this is the only realistic logical view of Punjab politics."⁴³⁰

Duni Chand tried to explain in his report of 31.3.1937 the reasons, why the Congress Party did not meet with general acclaim in Punjab as in other provinces, and named external and internal reasons for that:

"The external causes are the existence of highly re-actionary and intensely communal elements among all the three communities, communal organisations in each community, the communal and re-actionary press and the predominance of vested and capitalist interests.... As to the internal causes they are varied and I propose to enumerate them briefly:

1. The Congress has not approached the rural areas as much as it has done in other provinces. The communal out-look of people has prevented Congress acquiring a hold even in those cases in which the rural areas have been approached such as in cases of Sikhs.
2. There has always existed in the Congress a body of men including both leaders and workers with a Hindu Sabha mentality and having a leaning towards re-actionaries. This legacy has come down from the times of L. Lajpat Rai and Pt. Madan Mohan Malviya has fostered and encouraged this mentality, by interfering in the Punjab affairs on important occasions. Neither the working committee nor any of the All India leaders have ever seriously tried to undo the mischief. On the occasion of elections in 1923, 1926, 1934 and even in 1936, this factor has worked to the detriment of the Congress.
3. What I have stated (in No.2) has been responsible for dividing the Congress men in the Punjab into two groups now called Dr. Satyapal's Group and Dr. Gopichand's Group. The distinguishing characteristic of the two groups has been that the former has always stood by and loyal to the Congress while this cannot be said of the latter. Elections are the best illustration of this. Dr. Satyapal and his friends have always set their face against communalists and re-actionaries while Dr. Gopi Chand and his friends have compromised the Congress at times by making compromises and parleys with them. The communalist press in the Punjab has taken advantage of this and worked against the Congress on this basis. The recent selection of candidates for the Punjab Legislative Assembly, the putting forward of no Congress candidate against Dr. Gokul Chand Narang and his own coming forward at the eleventh hour are proofs of the conduct of Dr. Gopichand in this respect.
4. Dr. Gopichand and his group have left no stones unturned in discrediting and even abusing Dr. Satyapal. The Punjab does not furnish another instance of his sacrifice and service, even assuming that he has his own shortcomings. He has been prosecuted eleven times and undergone long sentences nine times and I have seen personally that at no time their hearts have softened towards him.
5. For many years and particularly since 1934 whatever Congress work has been done in the Punjab it has been done by Dr. Satyapal's party and inspite of the best efforts to secure the co-operation of Dr. Gopichand's party, not only it has been denied on the other hand every obstruction has been practised.

6. Speaking generally all the Congress committees in the Punjab are either supporters of Dr. Satyapal's party or are neutral and the general feeling of the Congressmen in the Punjab is against Dr. Gopichand and his party, as they are believed to hinder the Congress work...".⁴³¹

Duni Chand's report about the reasons for the unpopularity of the Congress named the rivalry between the Congress groups of Dr. Satyapal and Dr. Gopichand as the most important (Pts. 3, 4, 6, 8).

Moreover, it pointed out the political activities of the Congress Party in Punjab in the beginning of the 20th century, that had damaged her instead of being useful (Pt.2).

This was certainly aimed at the relations between the Congress Party and the Arya Samaj.

Till 1899 the Congress Party got no attention in Punjab. It got only the support of the few Bengalis and Punjabi Brahma Samajis, who controlled the Lahore Indian Association and published the Lahore Tribune.

The Arya Samaj, a Hindu Reform movement in Punjab,⁴³² showed its interest in the politics of Punjab between 1894 and 1900. It succeeded in attracting the leadership of the Punjab Congress.⁴³³

The Arya Samaj also displeased the Britishers with its anti-British political activities. This displeasure also stood against the Congress Party allied with the Arya Samaj.

The Britishers considered the programme of the Arya Samaj as "anti-government", "anti-British" and "anti-Christian".⁴³⁴

The retaliatory measure, of the Britishers e.g. deportation of the unfavourable leaders, reduced the influence of the Arya Samaj as well as the Congress and made a strengthening of their position difficult.

This unfavourable position of the Congress carried on till the 1937 elections.

After the elections of 1937, which the Shiromani Akali Dal contested as a separate political group, even if joined together with the Congress for the purpose of contesting the elections in a better way, the Shiromani Akali Dal gave its increasing support to the Congress Party.⁴³⁵ It called upon its members, to join the Congress Party. This readiness of the Shiromani Akali Dal to collaborate with the Congress lay originally at the participation of the Khalsa National Party in the government to support the Unionist Party.

The Unionist Party was fought by the Shiromani Akali Dal, as according to the Shiromani Akali Dal, it represented Muslim interests

under the cover of an economic programme, that was against the rural districts.⁴³⁶

Another reason for the readiness of the Shiromani Akali Dal to collaborate with the Congress Party and to support it was the efforts of the Congress Party itself. Thus, Sardul Singh Caveeshar, former member of the Congress Party and associated with it also afterwards, informed Nehru on 23 October, 1937 that, "Some of us have been persuading the Akalis to merge their political activities into those of the Congress. They have been wavering so far, but recently a great majority of them has decided to completely identify themselves in matters political with the Congress."⁴³⁷

The support of the Shiromani Akali Dal did not become inconvenient for the Congress Party, as it was not merely a Hindu representation.

The Hindus in Punjab were divided in various political groups.

The Hindu-Unionists, followers of Chaudri Chhotu Ram who was the member of the Unionist Party and Minister in the Punjab Government; the Congress members, who stood in opposition to the Punjab government and, the Hindu Communists, who had further two groups: one group was of Gokul Chand Narang, the other of Narendra Nath.⁴³⁸

There are more calling on the Sikhs to support the Congress Party.⁴³⁹

A further support of the Congress Party by the Sikhs came from the establishment of the Sikh Congress Party in 1936.⁴⁴⁰

The Sikh Congress Party, a group of the Congress that had only Sikh members, stood in very dependent relations to the Congress, as also its name suggests.

The Congress however did not wish, that the Sikh Congress Party stood as an independent Party e.g. during the Gurdwara elections, as "it would create further discussions among the Sikhs in the Congress who are not controlling the Sikh Party."⁴⁴¹

The Congress Party however intended to avoid quarrels among the Sikhs. Above all, it tried not to destroy the relations of the Sikhs, who were Congress members, to the Congress Party.

Before the 1937 elections, the Congress Party carried itself in Punjab with the hope of considering the Shiromani Akali Dal as a potential ally to reckon with its help.⁴⁴² Attacks made by the Shiromani Akali Dal leaders in their speeches on the Congress candidates during the elections however showed the opposite.

After the elections the intentions of the Shiromani Akali Dal to collaborate with the Congress were further strengthened by the signing of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact and were sealed by the alliance made by Master Tara Singh, Dr. Satyapal and Gokul Chand Narang.

A lasting success of the co-operation between the Congress Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal was not assumed.

The relations between the Congress Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal showed signs of tension in 1939, because the Congress Party was unsatisfied with the political views of the Akalis, as "even their great leaders are in on sense Congressmen. To say the least they are Akalis and Sikhs first and Congressites after it at all."⁴⁴³

It blamed the Congress "that the Congress had ignored the claims of the Sikhs in regard to communal settlement, inspite of the sacrifices made by the Sikhs in the national struggle."⁴⁴⁴

The demands of the Shiromani Akali Dal to the Congress Party were as follows:

"Demands of Sikhs

1. As a result of the British policy the proportion of Sikhs in the Indian Army has been reduced from about 40% in 1875-80 to about 14% today. It is apprehended that after the present war it may be further reduced, particularly, if the Sikhs join the Congress movement and refuse to enlist themselves, supposing Congress decides upon such a course. The Sikhs, therefore, want that their present proportion at least in the army should be guaranteed for the future. They would also like to be informed whether they should enlist themselves in the army at present war or not.
2. Their community has been ignored by the Congress on occasions of communal settlement, although they have made sacrifices in the cause of the national struggle. Talks are about to take place with the Muslim League. Whehter that results in some sort of a settlement or not, they desire that the Congress should discuss with them and arrive at a settlement with them so that in any talks with other communities, the Congress may keep this settlement with the Sikhs in mind and may not do anything which may be prejudicial to their interests.
3. To enable Sikhs to take due interest in the political movement, their representatives should have a place in the Congress organisations so that not only in communal matters but also in the

general political movement of the country through the Congress they may have a voice. It is therefore suggested that one of them should be on the Working Committee of the Congress accused to be the case some years ago. He should ordinarily be a person who commands largest influence among Sikh Congressmen. This should be borne in mind in selecting Sikh candidates on behalf of the Congress for legislature etc.”⁴⁴⁵

According to it the Shiromani Akali Dal demanded a definite share of the Sikhs in the army from the Congress Party (Pt.I), favour of the community (Pt.2) and more influence in the politics by the acceptance of a Sikh in the Working Committee of the Congress Party (Pt.3).

Besides that was the urgent desire of the Shiromani Akali Dal to have separate votes for the Constituent Assembly, as Mahatma Gandhi had incurred the anger of the Sikhs by his article “The only way” which appeared in “Harijan” on 25 November, 1939.

“Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has compelled me to study, among other things, the implications of a Constituent Assembly. When he first introduced it in the Congress resolution, I reconciled myself to it because of my belief in his superior knowledge of the technicalities of democracy. But I was not free from scepticism. Hard facts have, however, made me a convert and, for that reason perhaps, more enthusiastic than Jawaharlal himself. For I seem to see in it a remedy, which Jawaharlal may not, for our communal and other distempers, besides being a vehicle for mass political and other education.

The more criticism I see of the scheme, the more enamoured I become of it. It will be the surest index to the popular feeling. It will bring out the best and women, i.e. I would put them all on the register of voters. It is open to them not to exercise it if they do not wish to. I would give separate vote to the Muslims; but, without giving separate vote, I would, though reluctantly, give reservation, if required, to every real minority according to its numerical reservation, if required, to every real minority according to its numerical strength.

Thus the Constituent Assembly provides the easiest method of arriving at a just solution of the communal problem. Today we are unable to say with mathematical precision who represents whom. Though the Congress is admittedly the oldest representative organisation on the widest scale, it is open to political and semi-political organisations to question, as they do question, its overwhelmingly representative character. The Muslim League is undoubtedly the

largest organisation representing Muslims, but several Muslim bodies - by no means all insignificant - deny its claim to represent them. But the Constituent Assembly will represent all communities in their exact proportions. Except it there is no other way of doing full justice to rival claims. Without it there can be no finality to communal and other claims.

Again the Constituent Assembly alone can produce a constitution indigenous to the country and truly and fully representing the will of the people. Undoubtedly such a constitution will not be ideal, but it will be real, however imperfect it may be in the estimation of the theorists or legal luminaries..... Therefore the success of the experiment at the present stage of India's history depends upon the intention of the British statesmen to part with power without engaging India in a deadly unorganised rebellion, for I know that India has become impatient. I am painfully conscious of the fact that India is not yet ready for non-violent civil disobedience on a mass scale. If, therefore, I cannot persuade the Congress to await the time when non-violent action is possible, I have no desire to live to see a dog-fight between the two communities. I know for certain that, if I cannot discover a method of non-violent action and there is no communal adjustment, nothing on earth can prevent an outbreak of violence resulting for the time being in anarchy and red ruin. I hold that it is the duty of all communities and Englishmen to prevent such a catastrophe.

The only way out is a Constituent Assembly..... if once the proposition that all communities desire a charter of independence framed by a Constituent Assembly, and that they will not be satisfied with anything else, is accepted, the setting of details surely becomes easy, and other method must lead to an imposed constitution mostly undemocratic. It would mean an indefinite prolongation of imperialistic rule sustained by the help of those who will not accept the fully democratic method of a Constituent Assembly.

The principal hindrance is undoubtedly the British Government, if they can summon a Round Table Conference as they propose to do after the war, they can surely summon a Constituent Assembly subject to safeguard to the satisfaction of minorities. The expression "satisfaction of minorities" may be regarded as vague. It can be defined beforehand by agreement. The question thus resolves itself into whether the British Government desires to part with power and open a new chapter in their own history.... Look at the question from any stand point you like, it will be found that the way to democratic Swaraj

lies only through a properly Constituent Assembly, call it by whatever name you like.....”⁴⁴⁶

In this article Mahatma Gandhi expressed himself to the Constituent Assembly, whose institution appeared to him to be the easiest way to a solution for the communal problem, because he feared a civil war, if a peaceful solution could not be worked out for the communal problem in this way with the support of the Congress Party.

The quintessence of this article for the communities is expressed by Kartar Singh in his letter to Rajinder Prasad. “He will give separate votes to the Muslims but for other minorities he will reluctantly agree to reservation of seats on population seats.”⁴⁴⁷

This assertion did not correspond with the Communal Award⁴⁴⁸ set up by the Britishers, against which the Akalis always fought. Communal Award granted separate electorates to⁴⁴⁹ all the minorities,⁴⁵⁰ with the exception of the untouchables and was also allowed by the Congress Party.

The Sikhs had always willingly criticised the “Communal Award”, as the separate electorates granted by it to the majorities established politically the majority of Muslims in Punjab.

It was therefore no wonder, that the Sikh became angered at the demand of Mahatma Gandhi, to give separate electorates only to the Muslims. They felt themselves once again dragged to the sides as a community, whereas the position of the Muslim was always emphasised. They believed to be threatened as an independent community, as the statements made by Gandhi in this article went against the so-called Allahabad Pact of 1934.

Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya, Congress member, established with other Congressmen the Congress Nationalist Party and protested strongly against the Communal Award,⁴⁵¹ in contrast to the Congress Party. In course of his Anti-Communal Award Campaign, he arranged a unity conference with the participation of Hindu, Sikh, Muslim and Christian representation in Allahabad, during which the Congress Party, the Hindus and Muslims recognised the separate unity of the Sikhs and granted them a small share in the legislature and administration of the country.⁴⁵² In contrast to that were the statements of Gandhi in the “Harijan Article”, which did not conceive of the separate unity of the Sikhs. Therefore, the Sikhs now demanded more vigorously the rights granted to them by the Congress Party in the Allahabad Pact. They strived for their reward and saw this in the

confirmation of their independence as an important community, participation in the Constituent Assembly and a big recruitment share in the Army.⁴⁵³

The Shiromani Akali Dal felt itself transferred in the situation "to throw... full weight in the struggle for independence of the country", when these demands were met by the Congress Party".⁴⁵⁴

The Sikhs made these demands adamantly again and again as they constantly blamed the Congress Party for ignoring the interests of the Sikhs.⁴⁵⁵

The Shiromani Akali Dal hoped to justify these demands by its achievements with the Congress Party.

"What the Sikhs have done for India"

- (i) It can be said with perfect certainty that of all the Indians who have been hanged in the Punjab, Burma, Bengal, Malaya and Canada etc., for their patriotic activities the number of the Sikhs is the largest.
- (ii) Amongst those who have been sentenced to transportation for life for political offences the Sikhs form a prominent majority and this courting of life sentences by the Sikhs is not a recent affair. It dates as far back as year 1872, when Baba Ram Singh along with so many Subahs was transported to Burma.
- (iii) It were the Sikh Districts of Punjab which were made prey to the atrocities of Martial Law and in Jalianwala Bagh tragedy also the maximum number of casualties took place from amongst the Sikhs who had come to Amritsar that day for attending the Baisakhi Fair.
- (iv) I leave out convictions of the Sikhs during the Akali Movement which numbered thousands because it was their own affair. But it is an admitted fact that even that movement gave the greatest impetus to the National Movement which was going on at that time in the country side by side. During the Non-Cooperation and the Civil Disobedience Movements which were going on at that time in the country, the Sikhs record of sufferings and sacrifices was the brightest.

Again when police opened fire on the non-violent and peaceful red shirt volunteers at Peshawar and when no Congressmen from outside the N.W.F. Province was allowed by the Government to visit Peshawar to sympathise with them, it were the Sikhs under their leader Master

Tara Singh who at that time marched towards Peshawar in large numbers holding National Flags in their hands and courted arrests at the hands of the police.

- (v) During the days of Civil Disobedience Movement of 1933-34 when the holding of the annual session of the National Congress at Delhi had been forbidden by authorities it were the Sikh Jathas who boldly offered their bodies to be shot down by the machine guns and thus made the holding of the session possible.
 - (vi) The heroic deed of the handful of Sikhs who faced ruthless lathi charges of the police at Bombay in connection with the Civil Disobedience Movement shall ever remain green in the history of political struggle.
 - (vii) In the Punjab it is the Sikh Community alone the majority of whose representatives in the Provincial Assembly adorn the Congress benches.
 - (viii) Out of all the martial classes of India, it is only the Sikhs amongst whom the Congress can claim substantial influence. The rest of the martial races of India are all inclined towards the foreign rulers. The Sikhs no doubt, have done this all as a part of their duty and not in any bargaining spirit. But it is after all only human, however, to wish to know the extent of appreciation that one's task and labour has received at the hands of his countrymen. During the past the Congress appreciated the work of the Sikhs only in one respect i.e., by including one Sikh in the Working Committee of the All India National Congress. That Sikh member could keep Mahatmaji, the Rashtrapati and other leaders acquainted with the Sikh views, and this I must say was consolation for the Sikhs no doubt. But also even that consolation is gone. It is said that as now the members of the Working Committee are not taken on communal basis so a Sikh cannot be taken in that Committee. It is curious enough, however, that here in India if a Hindu thinks on non-communal lines the result is different; when a Mohammedan thinks on similar lines, the outcome is not the same also when a Sikh or a Christian so thinks, the result is entirely different. It is of course difficult to say where the fault lies and why this difference."⁴⁵⁶
- This "performance catalogue" of the Sikhs shows that these demands were based on their demonstrated patriotism (points (i), (ii), (iii), (iv)) their participation in the political activities of the Congress Party against the Britishers (points (v), (vi), (vii)), and their co-

operation with the Congress in Punjab (points (vii), (viii)). Moreover, these demands also hinted at the problem ridden course of relations between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party partly.⁴⁵⁷

It was already clear, that the political co-operation with the Shiromani Akali Dal would not be an easy venture for the Congress and would certainly bring problems.

Thus stated a note by Lala Duni Chand on 15.6.1938, the Shiromani Akali Dal is responsible for communal tension and atmosphere in Punjab.

Through its day to day activities it contributed to a further weakening of the position of the Congress in Punjab and not enough, supported Gopi Chand's group in opposition to Satyapal.⁴⁵⁸

It was suspected that the Shiromani Akali Dal used its relations with the Congress as a means for the purpose of putting through the demands of the Sikh community with the support of the Congress.

Therefore the relation between Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party became problematic, as both the parties could not fulfil the expectations set unto them because of their own motivations.

b. Kisan Sabha

The Kisan Sabha also worked with the Congress Party during this time in opposing the unionist government in Punjab and with that indirectly also against the Britishers. In the Lucknow National Congress in 1936, it was decided to form an alliance between the Indian National Congress and the All India Kisan Sabha, in order to come near to the request of the farmers and the socialists, to show a functional representation in the Congress.⁴⁵⁹

The Kisan Party was not represented in any of the legislatures, because it considered itself to be a part of the Congress and had avoided its own candidates. However "Peasants Groups", who followed the political line of the Kisan Sabha, possessed seats in the Central Assemblies of Bengal, M.P., Madras and Punjab.⁴⁶⁰ The Kirti Kisan Party Punjab also belonged to the Peasants groups in Punjab, which got a very important role. It acted as an extended arm of the Congress Party, as the unpopularity of the Congress Party in Punjab,⁴⁶¹ made it possible for the Kirti Kisan Party to gain influence in Punjab.⁴⁶²

After the Manipur Session in 1938, difference of opinion arose between the Congress Party and the Kisan Sabha.

These differences lay partly in the endeavour of the Kisans, to

acquire Congress Committees, because the Kisan Sabha felt itself to be "betrayed and sold" by the right wheel of the Congress in many provinces.⁴⁶³

Added to this were the agitations carried out by the Kisans against the Unionist Government of Punjab and the Britishers. These agitations led to the arrest of many Kisan-leaders and transformed in major disturbances. They served the purpose of improving the economic condition of the farmers.⁴⁶⁴

As the relationship between the Congress Party and the Kisans did not remain untouched, the Congress Party decided to avoid further difficulties and to terminate all relations with the Kisan Sabha.⁴⁶⁵

The Congress Party maintained relations to Shiromani Akali Dal, Kirti Kisan Party and the Sikh Congress Party in Punjab.

This co-operation became problematic, with the exception of the Sikh Congress Party.

The Congress Party could depend neither on the Shiromani Akali Dal nor the Kirti Kisan Party, as these two parties strived to follow their own political aims. They therefore acted against the directions of the Congress Party very often.

The Congress Party also tried contacts with the Khalsa National Party, which had formed Government in Punjab with the Unionist Party.

A letter of the General Secretary Jawahar Lal Nehru to Sher Singh Giani on 14.4.1937 mentions a meeting between Nehru and representatives of the Khalsa National Party, which was however cancelled because of Nehru's illness.⁴⁶⁶

How far was Nehru interested for such a meeting could not be explained.

Noteworthy in this context is the observation made by Congress members during the 1st session of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, that neither the Unionist members nor the representatives of the Khalsa National Party were Gandhi caps, considered to be a symbol of freedom.⁴⁶⁷

A serious approach of the Congress to the Khalsa National Party did not come in picture, but only as a try, since, except for ideological view points, the Congress Party strived for an agreement with the Shiromani Akali Dal, whose leader Master Tara Singh saw a personal enemy in the leader of the Khalsa National Party, Sir Sunder Singh Majithia.

As already mentioned,⁴⁶⁸ the Congress Party was dependent on the

help of the Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab in order to bring the masses on the side of the Congress Party.⁴⁶⁹

The collaboration of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Kisan Sabha with the opposition party in Punjab, the Congress, led to a withdrawal and a disappointment from the Congress Party, as it did not consider itself to be in the situation, to fulfil the expectation of these two parties.

The break-down of the relations to the Kisan Sabha lay in sense of the Congress Party, as the actions of the Kisans had damaged their reputation. The collaboration with the Shiromani Akali Dal also served to strengthen the position of the Congress in Punjab against the Unionist Government. However, with the outbreak of the Second World War, the political needs of the parties were postponed.

Footnotes:

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A.H. Bingley, *Sikhs*. Reproduction of 2nd edition. Languages Department Punjab, Patiala, 1970 S. 132.

353. M.S. Sahni, *Sikh Politics...*, a.a.O., Diss., S. 219.

354. *Constitutional Proposals of The Sapru Committee*. Report compiled by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, M.R. Jayakar, Sir N. Gopaldaswami Ayyanagar, Kunwar Sir Jagdish Prasad. Bombay 1945. S. iv, Appendix.

355. For party-strength, position etc. see pages 59-68 under point 3 "Reaction of the Sikhs to the results of the amendment of Constitution" of this book.

356. Home Political Files 18/7/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of July 1937, in National Archives of India, Delhi.

357. Born 1892. died 1943, see Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule*, Vol.III, New Delhi, 1974, S. 153.

358. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 102, Letter of Sikander Hayat Khan to Sunder Singh Majithia, 9 August, 1937, in Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, Delhi.

359. M.S. Sahni, *Sikh Politics*, Diss., a.a.O., S. 222.

360. *The Tribune*, June 22, 1940, in NMM&L, Delhi.

361. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 171, to Sawaran Singh, 19.8.1936, in NMM&L/Delhi

362. See the Chapter IV 3 a. S. 59-61 of this work.

363. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 188, to Shivdev Singh, 3.9.1936, in NMI I&L/Delhi.

363a). For Baba Kharak Singh and his political role see Baba Kharak Singh, Abhinandan Granth. 86th Birthday Commemoration Volume. Publ. by Baba Kharak Singh Abhinandan Committee, New Delhi, no date. Jai Wanti, Baba Kharak Singh's Life and Role in India's Freedom Struggle. (M.A. Diss.), Punjabi University, Patiala, 1971-72. Besides K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S. 26-27, 46-48.

364. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 233.

365. Home Political Files 18/1/37 = Fortnightly Report, Second Half of January 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

366. See Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of February 1937, Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report..., Second Half of February, 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

367. From Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of February 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

368. Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, Second Half of February 1937, as well as reference to the intention of the "independents" in Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of February, 1937.

369. Born 14, June 1877, Died 9. July 1936.

370. See the Chapter III. 3, Gurdwara Reform Movement S. 41-45 of this work.

371. Stephen Oren, The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1933-1945, in Modern Asian Studies, 8, 3 (1974), pp. 397-418. And B.B. Misra, The Indian Political Parties, Delhi 1976, S. 415. For origination and further development of the Unionist Party see Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, Bombay, Calcutta..., 1946.

372. Reform Office Papers 10/36/-G(A) = Review of Political Situation in India, From that Review, No.5 of 1936, Simla the 7 August, 1936, in NAI/Delhi.

373. Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, Second Half of February 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

374. Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report, Second Half of February 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

375. Harcharan Singh Bajwa, Fifty Years of Punjab Politics, Chandigarh, 1979, S. 48.

376. Born in June 1885 in Harial, district Rawalpindi, as son of a Hindu of Malhotra Caste, Died in Nov. 1967. Tara Singh entered Sikhism during his school years. See for Tara Singh following Bibliographies:

Durlab Singh, *The Vallant Fighter. A Biographical Study of Master Tara Singh*. Lahore, Hero Publications 1942. Prithipal Singh Kapoor, *Master Tara Singh; Itihas Pakhton*. Amritsar, Singh Brothers 1968, in Punjabi. Niranjana Singh, *Jeewan Yatra Master Tara Singh*, Amritsar, Singh Brothers 1968, in Punjabi. Jaswant Singh, *Master Tara Singh, Jeewan Sangharsh te Udesh*, Amritsar 1972, in Punjabi.

See also bibliographical remarks in Fauja Singh, *Eminent Freedom Fighters of Punjab*, Punjabi University, Patiala 1972, S. 231-233.

377. Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report. Second Half of February 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

378. Barbara N. Ramusack, *Punjab States. Maharajas and Gurdwaras: Patiala and the Sikh community*, from Robin Jeffrey (Ed.) *People, Princes and Paramount Power*, Delhi 1978. S. 190.

379. Home Political Files 18/2/37 = Fortnightly Report. Second Half of February 1933, in Nai/Delhi.

380. Interview with Sardar Hukam Singh from Mr. Manchanda for the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Transcript, S. 62, in NMM&L, Delhi. Home Political Files 18/1/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of January 1937, in NAI/Delhi. Interview with Shri Bhim Sachar, New Delhi, Dec. 16, 1969, by Dr. Hari Dev Sharma for the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Transcript, S. 139, in NMM&L/Delhi. Harcharan Singh Bajwa, *Fifty Years....*, a.a.O., S. 48. Besides that the statement in Civil and Military Gazette, June 17, 1936.

381. R. Coupland, *The Constitutional Problem in India*, a.a.O., Vol.II, S.41.

382. Interview with Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Transcript, a.a.O., S. 137.

383. J. Nehru Papers, I, Vol.83 = From the Punjab Nationalist Party, Lahore 1936 regarding Congress prospects in the election and about communalism to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in Punjab, from that letter to J. Nehru from Propaganda Secretary, The Punjab Nationalist Party, Lahore, O. Datum.

384. Home Political Files 18/1/37 = Fortnightly Report, First Half of January 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

385. All India Congress Committee Papers, Files E-17 (i) 1936-37 Amritsar Papers, from that letter of Shromani Akal Dal on

11.11.1936 to J.Nehru.

386. Civil and Military Gazette, June 17, 1936. See to the following correspondence regarding the trials of cooperation.

Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 167, letter from Santokh Singh on 20 Oct. 1936 to Sunder Singh Majithia. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 212, letter from Ujjal Singh on 27.10.1936 to Sunder Singh Majithia. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers I, File 171, letter from Sardar Sewaram Singh on 15.8.1936 to Majithia. S.S. Majithia Papers I, File 171, letter from S.S. Majithia on 19.8.1936 to Sardar Sewaram Singh in NMM&L/Delhi.

387. See for that S. 65 of this work.

388. S.S. Majithia Papers II, File 103 = Papers regarding elections petitions submitted to the Governor of Punjab 1937.

389. Home Political Files 18/3/37 = Fortnightly Report. First Half of March 1937, in NAI/Delhi. Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Punjab under the British Rule, Vol.III, New Delhi 1974, S. 159.

390. For Communal Award and Political Situation of the Sikh Groups see S. 53-58 of this work.

391. Home Political Files 18/3/37 = Fortnightly Report. First Half of March 1937, in NAI/Delhi.

392. Linlithgow Collection, M.S.S. Eur F 125, Number 86 = From H. Emerson to Lord Linlithgow, 4 March, 1938, in India Office Library, London.

393. All India Congress Committee Papers, File P-17 (Pt.1) 1937 = Nehru's Correspondence with Punjab P.C.C., for that 22nd Session of the Punjab Provincial Political Conference, Garhdiwala, Dist. Hoshiarpur, dated 9, 10 & 11 Oct., 1939.

394. Indian Annual Register, edited by N.N. Mitra, a.a.O., 1939. Vol.I, S. 378.

395. For Jhatka and further explanations, see page 74 of this book.

396. See for that Appendix 1 and page 10 of this book.

397. M.S. Sahni, Sikh Politics, Diss., a.a.O., S. 224-226.

398. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125 Number 86 = Correspondence with the Governor of the Punjab and his Secretary, Jan. to 14 Aug. 1938. Vol.I. From Herbert Emerson, Governor of the Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, March 4, 1938, in India Office Library, London.

399. M.S. Sahni, Sikh Politics, Diss., a.a.O., S. 228.

400. See for that Punjab Legislative Council Debates, Vol. XXVII, No.9, S. 820-851, Lahore 1931.

401. Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates, March 16, 1938. Statement of Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, Vol.III, No.13, Lahore 1938, S. 808-809.

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403. Linlithgow Collection, MSS Eur F 125, Number 86, letter from Herbert Emerson to Lord Linlithgow, March 4, 1938, Linlithgow Coll. MSS Eur F 125 Number 86, letter from H. Emerson to Lord Linlithgow, March 31, 1938. In India Office Library, London.

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414. Born 1376, Died 1948.

415. Stephen Oren, *The Sikhs, Congress and ...*, a.a.O., S. 400.

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418. J. Vogt, *India in the Second World War*, Stuttgart 1978, S. 224.

419. Explanation in Civil and Military Gazette, 17 Oct. 1937.

420. Tribune, 19 Oct. 1937.

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423. See the letter from Master Tara Singh to Sikander on 10.9.37 in All India Congress Committee Papers, File p-17 (Pt.I) 1937, Nehru's Corresp..., and Resolution of Executive Committee of SGPC on 10.9.1937. in All India Congress Committee Papers, File P-17(Pt.I) 1937. Nehru's Corresp..., a.a.O., in NMM&L/Delhi.

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436. B.R. Nayar, *Minority Politics...*, a.a.O., S.79.

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438. Stephen Oren, *The Sikhs, Congress...*, a.a.O., S.401.

439. See *Tribune*, 5 Jan. 1937 and *Tribune*, 24 Feb. 1937.

440. For closer discussions of the Sikh Congress Party see Pages 61, 62 of this book. It is referred that the source situation like the hints in the Secondary Literature to the Sikh Congress Party was more than modest.

441. All India Congress Committee Papers, File 10, 1938 Punjab Election Disputes, in NMM&L/Delhi.

442. *Civil and Military Gazette*, June 17, 1936.

443. J. Nehru Papers, II, File 117 = Correspondence relating to Jallianwala Bagh Memorial Fund, Nov. 1919, to July 1942, for that Letter to Nehru from Rupar Congress Committee, Rupar District Ambala, dated 29 Dec. 1939, in NMM&L/Delhi.

444. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 98: To Tara Singh, Allahabad 12, Dec. 1939, reporting about his meeting with Kartar Singh about Sikh grievances against Congress, in NMM&L/Delhi.

445. All India Congress Committee Papers, File G-42/1930-40 = Minority Communities, for that Demands of Sikhs from Sardar Kartar Singh, Sardar Udham Singh and Sardar Pratap Singh on 19.11.1939, in NMM&L/Delhi.

446. From *Harijan*, Vol. VII-1939, Article on 25. Nov. 1939, New York & London 1973 S. 352.

447. All India Congress Committee Papers, File G-42/1939-40 = Minorities..., from that letter from Kartar Singh MLA, Amritsar to Rajinder Parshad on 7 Dec. 1939, in NMM&L/Delhi.

448. See S. 53-58 of this work.

449. See S. 54, 55 of this work.

450. With exceptions to the outcastes.

451. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, London 1957. S. 50, 51.

D. Rothermund, *The Formation of Political Will in India...*, a.a.O., S. 168, K. C. Gulati, *The Akali Past and Present*, a.a.O., S. 62.

452. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 94, From SGPC Lyallpur (Punjab) 1939, regarding Congress-Sikh relations..., From that Ik Onkar, Waheguru Ji Ki Fateh, S.4 in NMM&L/Delhi.

453. For details see J. Nehru Papers I, Vol.94, From S.G.P.C...., from that Ik Onkar...., a.a.O., S.17, 18.

454. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol.94, From SGPC...., Ik Onkar..., a.a.O., S.1.

455. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 94, From SGPC...., Ik Onkar..., a.a.O., S. 2.

456. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol.94, From SGPC...., Ik Onkar, a.a.O., S. 10-12, in NMM&L/Delhi.

457. For problems of the cooperation of Sikhs and Congress Party see page 87 of this work.

458. All India Congress Committee Papers, File 10/1938, Punjab election disputes, From that Lala Dunichand's note, 15.6.1938, in NMM&L/Delhi.

459. N.N. Mitra (ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, Vol.II, 1936, S. 283. Alliance also described in All India Congress Committee Papers, File 41/1936-37 = Correspondence with Dr. R.M. Lohia. Newsletters of the Punjab Socialist Party. Nehru's circulars to Secretaries and Presidents and PCCs regarding agrarian problem: Resolution on the Relation of the Kisan Sanghs to the Congress.

460. N.N. Mitra, *The Indian Annual Reg...*, a.a.O., Vol.II, 1937, S.390.

461. See for that S. 86, 87 of this work.

462. S.D. Gajrani, *Some Aspects of Agrarian Problems...*, a.a.O., (Diss.), S.202, 205, 206, 210, 251, 300.

463. N.N. Mitra, *The Indian...*, a.a.O., Vol.I, 1938, S. 357.

464. N.N. Mitra, *The Indian...*, a.a.O., Vol.I, 1938, S. 353.

465. N.N. Mitra, *The Indian...*, a.a.O., Vol.I, 1938, S. 358.

466. All India Congress Committee Papers, File E-17(i) = 1936-37. Amritsar Papers regarding a dispute there in the two groups of the Congress, in NMM&L/Delhi.

467. All India Congress Committee Papers, File PL-10, Correspondence with PCC 1933-39. Statement of Miani Iftikharuddin, Secretary of the Punjab Assembly Congress Party.

468. See for that S. 86, 87 of this work.

469. See for that All India Congress Committee Papers, File 10/1938 = Punjab Election disputes, from that Lala Dunichand's Note, 15.6.1938, in NMMM&L/Delhi.

VI. Reaction of the Political Sikh Parties to the Entry of Britain in the Second World War and the Claim of the Muslims for Pakistan, 1939-1940

The entry of Britain in the 2nd World War and the demand of the Muslims for Pakistan led to a change in the political stand point of the Sikh parties.

1. The Question of Participation in the War

On 3 September, 1939, the entry of Great Britain in the 2nd World War was officially announced on All India Radio by the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow.

He appealed to the princely states and the people of the British-India to support the war without any differences of class, race, faith or party. Britain's classification of war was also made for the dependent part of the British empire and the involvement of India in the war was taken for granted.

Indian Nationalists saw in the war a rise of the British power, as the dominions could themselves decide for their application in the war.

India should have been asked proforma at this stage, which was however considered unnecessary by Lord Linlithgow.

This demonstrated underestimation by Lord Linlithgow of the Indian Nationalists could be interpreted as a belittlement of the importance of India and an inconsiderateness of the views of the Indians.⁴⁷⁰

a. The Congress Party and the Muslim League

As Indian politicians were neither informed nor consulted by the Viceroy before the announcement of the entry of India in the war by the Viceroy, the Congress Party was forced to take a more strict course and to break its relations with the Britishers.

A factful action of the Viceroy could have forced the Congress to maintain this collaboration, because the decision of the Congress, not to cooperate with the Britishers was made only after a lot of thinking.⁴⁷¹ Why did the Congress Party break relations with the Britishers?

The Congress had previously made the decision, to give their fundamental support to the Britishers, and for that to demand a clear explanation of their war aims.⁴⁷²

For co-operation with the Britishers and for the Indian participation in the war, Jawaharlal Nehru set the condition of the announcement of the Indian Independence, which was to be realised as soon as possible.⁴⁷³ A clarification of the British aims of war was not available at this stage.⁴⁷⁴

The British Cabinet decided on 14 October, 1939, to consider the formation of a federation only after the end of the war. Linlithgow's announcement of 18 October, 1939, an answer to the demands of the Congress, therefore had no indications, that Great Britain was ready to break its politics and to pay the price of India's independence for Indian participation in the war.⁴⁷⁵

As a reaction to that, the Congress recalled its leaders from the provinces governed by Congress-Ministries. After that the Congress ministries stopped working between 27 October and 15 November, 1939. The provinces Bengal, Punjab and Sind, not governed by Congress ministers, were not affected by that.⁴⁷⁶

The result was that the Congress provinces were now again governed by British governors without ministers.

The Muslim League of Jinnah considered the retreat of the Congress as an occasion to be merry and celebrate 22 December, 1939 as the "Day of Independence".⁴⁷⁷

Just before the outbreak of war, when the Congress had not yet decided to dissolve its ministries, Jinnah approached the Congress for negotiations. The reasons for this approach were the success of the Congress Ministers in most of the provinces and the danger, that many Muslim politicians wanted to join the successful Congress Party.

In Punjab, Jinnah's influence was still lower.

He was therefore also forced by the poet Iqbal,⁴⁷⁸ to undertake something for the Muslims in Punjab.

On one side a support for the Congress built itself among the Mohammedans and on the other side the Chief Minister Sikander Hayat Khan interpreted the Sikander Jinnah Pact in such a way, that the Unionist Party of Punjab could hold the Muslim League under its control. In this situation Jinnah was dependent upon the majority provinces.

When the Congress Party recalled its ministers, Jinnah lost his interest for negotiations, as he now could withdraw from the politics of the Congress governed province, since by the retreat of the Congress the political development was paralysed in these areas. The governors

now ruled without ministers. The ministers in the Muslim ruled provinces, to which Punjab also belong, remained however in office.⁴⁷⁹

Jinnah followed Iqbal's advice, left the muslim-minority provinces to their destiny and concentrated only on the muslim-majority provinces.

The political situation for the Muslim League was now extremely favourable. The Congress Party had broken its co-operation in the provinces and the Britishers seemed to attach no importance to it. The Muslim provincial governments were still loyal to the Britishers.

Jinnah now saw the opportunity to start the Muslim question through negotiations by the Britishers over the rule of India. In order to act as a representative of the provinces on the national scale, he had to make a common base. He, therefore, stuck to the demand of the various majority provinces, the autonomy and announced his "Two-Nation Theory", which meant "Pakistan".⁴⁸⁰

b. The Political Sikh Parties

The Sikh political parties also saw themselves facing the question of participating in the war and supporting the Britishers.

The Pro-British Unionist Party assured the Britishers of full co-operation during the war.⁴⁸¹

The Chief Minister of Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, gave the classification of Sir Samuel Hoare in response to the argument of the opposition parties, only then to participate in the war, when Great Britain officially published its plans of India's independence.

This classification said that India would get the same dominion status after the war, as enjoyed by many other British colonies with self-governments.⁴⁸²

The leading Sikhs of the loyalist Khalsa National Party appealed to their community on 1 September, 1939:

"to unite and to defend our mother country and the cause of humanity at large at this hour of trial and we solemnly assure His Majesty the King Emperor of our whole-hearted and loyal support".⁴⁸³

This announcement did not surprise the Britishers, but confirmed their view that the loyalist Sikhs were on their side in the question of the participation in the war.⁴⁸⁴

The Sikh-Maharaja of Patiala, a "true Vassal" of the Britishers also called the Sikh community to support the Britishers in this hour of need.⁴⁸⁵

As with every loyalty, these pledges of truthfulness of the Sikhs were also bound with certain demands to the Britishers. This declaration of the loyalist Sikhs "it further wishes to make it clear that their offer to help and support to Government at this critical picture is not coupled with any conditions and is spontaneous and voluntary"⁴⁸⁶ lost its credibility, as in the same resolution the demands of the loyalist Sikhs were also announced:

1. That in any future forward step that may be taken in granting reforms to the country, their separate entity as an important minority community be recognised by Government and their rights, privileges, culture and religious liberty by fully safeguarded.
2. That they be adequately represented in the future federal Government at the centre.
3. That more (adequate) weightage be given to them consistent with their importance as a minority community, the stake they have in the country and the prestige that they enjoy as the immediate predecessors of the British Government in Punjab.
4. Their representation be adequately increased in all the Central and All India Services.
5. Their status and position in the army be kept up on the same basis as it was before the Great War of 1914 and they may have a separate section in the Army territorial services. Their representation in the higher ranks of the army should be in proportion to their number in the lower ranks.
6. They be secured their full share in the provincial services and in order to make up quickly the existing deficiency, their share in fresh recruitment should be proportionately raised in all departments and in no case be less than 25%.
7. They be granted full liberty in the performance of their religious rites and ceremonies in particular the removal of all restriction on the use of Jhatka meat.⁴⁸⁷

As a reward for the announced loyalty, the loyalist group of the Sikhs expected a fulfilment of their demands by the Britishers.

The Chief Khalsa Dewan also joined with the Khalsa National Party, remained loyal to the Britishers and extended its full support to them during the war.⁴⁸⁸

The Dewan therefore called upon the Sikh community, to recruit themselves in large numbers. The aim was to emphasise the position of the Sikhs within the defence services of the country.

In order to make the recruitments a success, the Chief the Khalsa Dewan gave the task of making this call public in the villages to its missionaries, besides their missionary activities.⁴⁸⁹

Once again, as so often in the history of the Sikhs, religion was used as a tool on the Sikh-community for the purpose of achieving a political target.⁴⁹⁰

The apparent loyalty of the Khalsa National Party and the Chief Khalsa Dewan was not based on the "noble view", to favour the Britishers in the war, because "Sikhs are enjoined by their religion to fight not only in order to defend their own hearts and homes, but also to protect others."⁴⁹¹

Sunder Singh Majithia, leader of the Khalsa National Party states the hopes of his party for a political place for the Sikhs in the independent India in his letter of 11 October, 1939, to the private secretary of the Viceroy⁴⁹²:

"I trust and hope that whatever scheme His Excellency is pleased to introduce in the best interests of the country, the recognition of the Sikh rights and consideration for their feelings, sentiments and demands will not be ignored, and that His Excellency will be pleased to give the Sikh community their rightful place in the future administration of this country".

Besides the Khalsa National Party, which was joined by the Central Akali Dal wheel of Gyani Sher Singh,⁴⁹³ the Sikh untouchables like Ramdasis and the Mazhibis also classified their support to the Britishers and showed themselves ready for support.⁴⁹⁴

The Congress-Sikhs and the Sikh Congress Party followed the decision of the Congress Party and gave no support.⁴⁹⁵

Similarly, the Central Akali Dal wheel of Baba Kharak Singh declined support to the Congress Party.⁴⁹⁶ The Communist Party of India and the Kirtis as its members first objected to a participation in the war, as according to them, the war was imperialist and therefore did not concern the Indians.⁴⁹⁷

The Kirti Kisan Sabha even tried to instigate the Sikh soldiers in the Army to desert by anti-war propaganda.⁴⁹⁸ Their anti-war propaganda did not escape the notice of the Sikh soldiers.

For example, a Sikh squadron of the Central India refused to go

overseas. Some Sikhs of the 32nd Punjab regiment deserted and Sikhs of the Royal Indian Army Supply Corps, that served in Africa, refused to obey the orders of the Britishers.

Therefore, the Britishers were forced to impose a temporary ban on Sikh-recruitments.⁴⁹⁹

They thereby struck on the most important power factor of the Sikhs. The Shiromani Akali Dal pledged itself to strengthen the position of the Sikhs in the Army.⁵⁰⁰

Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941 changed the attitude of the Communist Party of India and the Kirtis to the question of participation in the war.

As Russia was with the allies, and thus with Great Britain, the Communist Indians and the Kirtis followed the directions of Russia to favour Great Britain and to support the participation of Indian soldiers in the war:

"There is no longer any question of helping Britain's war. It has now become the bounden duty of every Indian to defend his Motherland against Japanese aggression and to secure all possible help from England, America, China and Russia in organising armed resistance against the enemy... Moreover, we of the Kisan Sabha could not but identify ourselves wholeheartedly with the Soviet Union.⁵⁰¹

The change in the political stance of the Communist Party and the Kirtis, and their support of the war did not go unnoticed by the Britishers. The Britishers therefore lifted the ban imposed on the Communist Party and its organisations on 23 July, 1937, under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act.

With that they gave the stamp of loyalty to the Communist Party of India and the Kirti Kisan Sabha.⁵⁰²

1942 onwards the Britishers could count on the Khalsa National Party and the Kirti Kisan Sabha for support in the war. How did the Shiromani Akali Dal, rich in influence within the Sikh Community, react to the question of participation in the war?

The Shiromani Akali Dal had very disappointing relations with the Congress in 1939, as the Congress had failed to fulfil the demand of the Sikhs.⁵⁰³ This relation to the Congress did not give the Shiromani Akali Dal the required success in the granting of its rights. On the contrary, Mahatma Gandhi had even gone so far as to declare the concessions given by the Congress to the Sikhs in 1929 as null and void.⁵⁰⁴

The Unionist Party had joined the Muslim League through the Sikander-Jinnah Pact. This strengthened the Muslim-influence in Punjab, according to the Sikhs.

1940 onwards Jinnah went on again with his so-called "Two-nation theory" and demanded "Pakistan" for the Muslims, which meant an intrusion for the Sikh community in their sphere of life.⁵⁰⁵

The demand of the Britishers in 1939 for mere recruitment of Indian troops gave Sikhs the chance, to preserve their traditional place in the army and even to consolidate it.

The positive attitude of the Khalsa National Party to the question of recruitments resulted from its loyalty to the Britishers.

The Central Akali Dal wheel of Baba Khrak Singh objected to the recruitment of the Sikhs.

The Britishers knew exactly about the interest of the Shiromani Akali Dal, to preserve and strengthen the Sikh position in the Army.⁵⁰⁶ The reasons of the Shiromani Akali Dal giving full support to the Britishers in the war were also known to them, as shown by a secret report of 1940.⁵⁰⁷

"The Sikhs have now begun to realise that from an economic point of view they depend mainly upon Army Service and if they lose their share of military service they will rapidly become a small and helpless minority to be in due course inevitably merged in the Hinduism from which they originally sprang. They see that even in the event of a Congress triumph they would stand to lose all that has made them what they are; that the "non-violent" Congress has no sympathy whatever for the claims of the martial classes and that in the Indian Army with Congress rule in India, Punjabi Mussalman and Jat Sikh alike would give place, in great measure at any rate, to Hindu classes from other parts of India".

According to it, the Sikhs felt themselves to be an independent community by their participation or non-participation in the Army.

The Sikhs acquired 40% of the British Indian army in 1875 and had supported the Britishers in the 1st World War.⁵⁰⁸ The argument "Tradition" therefore played an important role in the consideration of Sikh recruitment. This argument was used by the Khalsa National Party within the Sikh Community, to explain its loyalty to the Britishers. For that, the Khalsa National Party was supported by the Chief Minister of Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, who declared the position of Sikhs in the Army as important.⁵⁰⁹

Even Master Tara Singh, leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, supported the argument of "Tradition". He knew about his obligatory duty, to assure and strengthen the status of the Sikhs in the Army. On the other hand, the Shiromani Akali Dal was found by the political alignment of the Congress with respect to the question of recruitments, inspite of its loose relations with it. Thus, Master Tara Singh must have requested Jawaharlal Nehru for the views of the Congress, because Nehru refers to this question in a letter dated 12 December, 1939, to Master Tara Singh.

"The question of the proportion of the Sikhs in the Indian Army is one of the undoubted importance to the Sikhs, but it is entirely out of the Congress of present... No one can say what the future of any army is likely to be after this war is over. The result of the war may conceivably abolish large armies and have large scale disarmament. On the other hand it is also conceivably that our general policy in India might not be one of keeping large armed forces. It is also possible that the world situation may compel a free India to develop her defence forces."⁵¹⁰

J. Nehru recognised the importance of the participation of the Sikhs in the army, but refrained from giving Master Tara Singh any directions.

It therefore remained for Master Tara Singh to take the decision, which way to take up after expression of views of J. Nehru with respect to recruitments.

Master Tara Singh who was at crossroads on one side, was the Akali relations with the Congress, which were against the Britishers and spoke against the support of the Britishers in the war. Added to this was the "anti-government" attitude of the Shiromani Akali Dal.⁵¹¹ On the other hand, was the task of protecting and strengthening the Sikh position in the army.

This was also recognised by the Governor of Punjab, Sir Henry Crack.⁵¹²

Two British officers, Moon and Short, who worked with the Sikhs, were therefore commissioned to strive for a better communication between the Akalis and the Unionists.⁵¹³ With the question of recruitments, Master Tara Singh sat symbolically "between two chairs". He took the course expected by the Britishers and announced in the name of Shiromani Akali Dal, full support to the Britishers in the war.⁵¹⁴

Added to this, was the terrible and threatening picture of "Pakistan", unlucky for Sikhs.

Thus the Shiromani Akali Dal might have succeeded in finding a compensation, in that it confirmed the recruitment of the Sikhs. By that only more loyalty was showed by the Shiromani Akali Dal to the Britishers which aimed at favouring the Britishers.⁵¹⁵

With this favourable special attitude the Shiromani Akali Dal hoped to get a favour in the question of minorities as well as a good regulation of the question of Pakistan with respect to Sikhs.

For the Britishers, a further recruitment of Sikh soldiers was made successful by the support of the Shiromani Akali Dal, as the Britishers had imposed a temporary ban on Sikh recruitment by the anti-war propaganda of the Kirtis, which lessened the enthusiasm of the Sikhs⁵¹⁶ and led to a disobeying of the orders and desertions. In protest to this ban, the Khalsa Defence League of India was set up by Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh under the leadership of the Maharaja of Patiala.⁵¹⁷

The Khalsa Defence of India League served the purpose of allowing Sikhs to join the army for supporting the Britishers in the war.⁵¹⁸

In response to that the Britishers lifted off the recruitment ban against the Sikhs.⁵¹⁹

The Khalsa National Party, which similarly supported the Britishers, refused to co-operate with the Khalsa defence of India League, as "they distrusted this League, because they consider that it is too much in the hands of the Akalis... Although there are a certain number of moderate Sikhs on the League's Executive, including the President, these are mere figure-heads".⁵²⁰

In spite of the efforts of the Khalsa Defence of India League, the recruitment of the Sikhs that followed did not satisfy the Britishers.

The "moderate" recruitment was because of non-cooperation of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Khalsa National Party in the Khalsa Defence of India League, according to Sardar Bahadur Ujjal Singh.⁵²¹

It appeared by the start of the 2nd World War, that among the Sikh political parties, the Khalsa National Party with the Central Akali Dal Wheel of Giani Sher Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal supported the recruitment of Sikh soldiers in the army.

Thereby, the decisive political representations of the Sikhs announced their readiness, to cooperate with the Britishers.

Stephen Oren, in his article "The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists in British Punjab, 1937-1945",⁵²² indicates that the Akalis

together with the Congress had opposed the war in 1939.⁵²³

As an example Oren named Kharak Singh, who maintained relations with the anti-British forward block of Subhash Chandra Bose.⁵²⁴

This Kharak Singh is actually Baba Kharak Singh, the leader of a Central Akali Dal Wheel.⁵²⁵

The Central Akali Dal Wheel of Baba Kharak Singh sought for a co-operation with the Congress Party, whereas the Central Akali Dal Wheel of Giani Sher Singh, along with the Khalsa National Party, tried for a co-operation with the Unionist Party.⁵²⁶ Therefore the term "Akalis" used by Oren is ambiguous, since it includes all the Akali groups. The Akalis of the Shiromani Akali Dal are also not meant by this, as the break between Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party did not occur in 1940 as Oren said but came about in 1939, as also said by Baldev Raj Nayar,⁵²⁷ by the decision of Master Tara Singh to resolve the recruitment controversy.⁵²⁸

It is however not to be taken, that this break between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party meant a total break of relations between the two parties. It is to be considered more as a deviation of the Shiromani Akali Dal from the political line of the Congress Party.

2. The Problem of the Sikhs in 1940: Pakistan

A satisfactory solution to the recruitment controversy was important for the Sikh-community, to be able to preserve unchallenged their status as an independent community and to get their rights. They had to emphasise their position and their self-identity against the Muslim Community in order not to be called as unimportant minorities, as the Muslims had succeeded in strengthening their independence and their rights derived from it. The demand of the Muslims for an independent Muslim state, "Pakistan", which would be of great advantage to them also contributed to the efforts of the Sikhs to profile themselves as independent community against the Muslims.

How did the demand for "Pakistan" originate?

The Muslim League announced its demand for an independent Muslim State in its meeting in Lahore in 1940, which was backed up by Jinnah's "two-nation theory".⁵²⁹ Jinnah announced the two-nation theory, as he thought to enter as a representative of the majority provinces on a national scale. The break-up of the co-operation of the Congress with the government led to a rule of the provinces by the

British Governors without their ministers and a paralysation of the political development in these provinces. Jinnah now left the minority provinces to their rule and concentrated only on the majority provinces, as in them the Muslim leaders were still in office.

To act as a representative of the majority provinces on a national scale, Jinnah manoeuvred the provinces by his demand for autonomy in such a position, that offered him a quasi-agitatory base. He joined the demand for autonomy with two national theory, from which the demand for Pakistan was derived.⁵³⁰

The two-nation theory tried to explain the independence of the Hindus and the Muslims as two separate nations.⁵³¹ It based itself on the so-called subjective definition, which stated, that the masses become nation, when they are aware of their own political cultural values and confirm their existence as an independent and concrete unity. The awakening of a self-consciousness and a will plays a very decisive role in it.⁵³²

On the basis of the theory, Jinnah demanded the right of self-rule for the Muslim nation, which was to show itself in autonomous Mohammedan states in West and East India.⁵³³

The assurance of Jinnah, that the Sikhs did not have to fear Pakistan, did not allay their doubts.⁵³⁴

The main problem of the Sikh community was now to demand for a favourable position as an independent community with the formation of new India in spite of the Pakistan threat, so as to be able to represent their rights successfully.

In the United provinces Central Sikh Conference of 15.4.1949 in which 8,000 Sikhs took part under the leadership of Master Tara Singh, a sharp refusal was announced to the Pakistan demand:

“The Conference declares that the Sikhs of this province are strongly opposed to the so-called Pakistan Scheme of the Muslim League. The Sikhs want complete Swaraj and community desiring its rule or wishing to divide India into communal provinces shall meet strong opposition of the Sikh community.”⁵³⁵

The views of the Sikhs against the partition of India are of prime importance in this decision.

This was further emphasised by Master Tara Singh in his speech, in which he informed that the Sikhs had no plans for a Sikh-rule, but would fight against any foreign or communal rule.⁵³⁶

125 Sikh leaders took up the Khalistan scheme, suggested by Dr. V.S.

Bhatti, on 19 May, 1940, in Amritsar as a counter response to the resolution.

Khalistan meant the establishment of a Sikh nation. This Sikh-nation was to act as a buffer state between India and Pakistan.⁵³⁷

Cripps' suggestions in 1942 to solve the Indian problem,⁵³⁸ strongly protested by the political Sikh representations, as according to them, it allowed the establishment of Pakistan, led to a demand of Azad Punjab by the Sikhs.⁵³⁹ The leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal, Master Tara Singh, openly separated himself in the All India Sikh Youth Conference on 31 January, 1943, from the decision taken in the United Provinces Central Sikh Conference on 15.4.1940, to protest against the partition of India and to fight against the communities which wanted a separate province because he now demanded an independent Province for the Sikhs, called "Azad Punjab", with the explanation:

"In view of the fact that the working of the provincial constitution based on the communal award has proved detrimental to the interests of the Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab, that they see no hope of improvement so long as the reins of Government remain in the hands of a permanent statutory Muslim majority, that efforts are being made to make their position still worse by the movement of Pakistan; and that the Sikhs have declared their resolve not to tolerate this attack on their culture and position, this Conference expresses its opinion that the Sikh position can only be re-established by readjusting the boundaries of the Punjab...."⁵⁴⁰

The Azad Punjab scheme included Lahore, Jullundhar, Ambala and a part of the Multan district. In these regions the Sikhs possessed a political balance, as Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were represented here in equal measures.⁵⁴¹

The districts of Rawalpindi and the Multan district Attock, Mianwali, Shahpur, Jhelum, Gujrat, Multan, Dera Gazhi Khan, Muzaffargarh and Jhang were to build a Muslim province,⁵⁴² in which the "North-West frontier" province, showing a 90% Muslim majority could also be included.

According to this the Azad Punjab scheme also meant the granting of an independent Muslim state in North-West India.

A large portion of the Shiromani Akali Dal supported the demand of Master Tara Singh for "Azad Punjab",⁵⁴³ and considered it to be the most important point in its political programme.⁵⁴⁴

The Shiromani Akali Dal therefore let itself to be blamed by the

Hindu Sabha - "Master Tara Singh has deputed one of his lieutenants to come into an alliance with Jinnah on the basis of an acceptance of the Pakistani scheme...."⁵⁴⁵

The Azad Punjab movement aimed at the agreement of the Muslims to a new Sikh state in central -- and east districts of Punjab on the reason of their getting a concession for Pakistan. This accusation was taken up by the Hindu Sabha as a reason to deny the Sikh community its Sikh-identity and to classify it as a member of the Hindu community.⁵⁴⁶

The Shiromani Akali Dal, Wheel of Master Tara Singh protested against this action of the Hindu Sabha in that it tried to prove that Amery⁵⁴⁷ was the originator of the Azad Punjab Scheme and that too long before the Pakistan-Demand:

"The scheme was first framed in 1931 when Sikhs of all shades of opinion assembled to frame the Sikh demands to be presented to Gandhi on the occasion of the Gandh-Irwin Pact."⁵⁴⁸

This statement indicated to the Memorandum of Sikh representatives at the Second Round Table Conference, which suggested a territorial rearrangement of Punjab.⁵⁴⁹ This memorandum was therefore to prove that the idea of an independent Sikh area did not come along with the demand of Pakistan by the Muslims.

The Azad Punjab Scheme was not supported by all the political Sikh-groups.

Sardar Kharak Singh, leader of one of the Akali Dal groups, clarified in the Akhand Hindustan Conference on 6 June, 1943. "I can make absolutely no distinction between Pakistan and Azad Punjab. Both are schemes for the vivesection of India and both cut at the roots of its unity and integrity."⁵⁵⁰

Sardar Kharak Singh did not believe the previous statement given by the Shiromani Akali Dal leader, Master Tara Singh, in Statesman on 2 March, 1943 to the Azad Punjab scheme: "Azad Punjab would help promote nationalism for under this scheme the domination of one community over another would be ended and they would learn to live in harmony... they wanted to live within the jurisdiction of the Central Government but the Pakistan plan was to vivisection the country".⁵⁵¹ Moreover he assumed that "Mr. Jinnah and Master Tara Singh were sailing in the same boat as agents of British Imperialism".⁵⁵²

The Sikhs of the Rawalpindi district protested against the Azad Punjab scheme, because they feared to belong to the Muslim Province in case of partition. They demanded an Akhand Hindustan i.e. a United

India in many anti-Azad Punjab Conferences.

Even members of the Shiromani Akali Dal belonging to the Rawalpindi district, supported this demand for an Akhand Hindustan. As they protested thereby against the policy of the Shiromani Akali Dal and went in the opposition, their membership to the Shiromani Akali Dal was cancelled.⁵⁵³ The Namdharis similarly participated in the agitation for Akhand Hindustan by the Sikhs of the Rawalpindi district.⁵⁵⁴ These Sikh groups thereby came very near to the Central Akali Dal of Baba Kharak Singh, which also wanted an Akhand Hindustan.⁵⁵⁵

Instead of the Azad-Punjab solution, this Central Akali Dal aimed at a co-operation between the Hindus and the Sikhs "to prevent the establishment of Muslim communal raj in Punjab".⁵⁵⁶

The Kisan Sabha remained neutral to the Pakistan scheme and the demand of Akhand Hindustan, as made clear by the report of the "Eight Session in Bezwada of 14 March, 1944 of Kisan conference. The President of the Kisan Sabha, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, stated in his speech the political decision of the Kisan Sabha, to remain neutral towards the Pakistan-question.⁵⁵⁷ Their neutrality towards Azad Punjab scheme is to be understood from that. The Khalsa National Party condemned very sharply the Pakistan-Plan.⁵⁵⁸

The Unionist-leader and the Chief Minister of Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan spoke against Pakistan as well as Khalistan.⁵⁵⁹

It is clear from that, that the Khalsa National Party, as an ally of the Unionist Party, had to protest against an independent state for the Sikhs.

How did the Britishers now judge the Azad Punjab Plan of the Shiromani Akali Dal?

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, considered the plan of the Sikhs as unfounded, as "it is worth remembering that there is not one single district in which the Sikhs command a majority."⁵⁶⁰

Amery wrote to the Viceroy Linlithgow on 20 August, 1942: "I should judge that a separate Sikhdom is really unworkable without extensive transfers of population in order to mitigate the fresh minority problems that it would raise"⁵⁶¹

Interesting is the statement of the Viceroy Linlithgow towards the Sikhistan problem made to Amery on 5 September, 1942:

"My judgement is, quite frankly, that the Sikhs, though a nuisance well worth locating, are a relatively small nuisance. But there are no

circumstances I can think of in which it would be practical politics to consider any sort of "Sikhistan"; and I would not think it wise even to mention it to Glancy. The Hindus have made the mistake of taking Jinnah seriously about Pakistan, and as a result they have given substance to a shadow. Let us be warned by their example and avoid doing the same to a far more preposterous claim! For I am certain that if we did show the very slightest sign of taking "Sikhistan" seriously in the last degree, not only we should aggravate communal tension gravely in Punjab, but we should never hear the end of it; and the Sikhs, as the Communal Award discussions in 1931 showed, find themselves occasionally in a position to wreck a scheme which would have gone down perfectly well with the major communities."⁵⁶²

Viceroy Linlithgow pleaded to not to take Sikhs with their "foolish" Sikhistan plan seriously and to ignore the whole matter. He did not foresee heavy communal tensions resulting from the establishment of Sikhistan.

The reason for this attitude of the Britishers is stated by M.S. Sahni in his dissertation "the Sikh politics, 1927-1947":

"The British were not in a position to pay more attention to this problem as they were fully engaged in the war."⁵⁶³

Unfortunately, M.S. Sahni did not discuss this reason in more details for the attitude of the Britishers, so that the reason "fully engaged in war" does not give any satisfactory explanation.

The Shiromani Akali Dal supported the Azad Punjab plan, which it had put forth. Some members of the Shiromani Akali Dal, living in the areas covered by the plan, were however against this plan.

The Khalsa National Party and the Central Akali Dal similarly spoke against the plan.

The reason for refusal by the Khalsa National Party was their co-operation and alliance with the Unionist Party and their truthfulness to the Britishers.

The Central Akali Dal refused the Azad Punjab plan partly because of its opposition to the Shiromani Akali Dal and partly because of its efforts to achieve a united India.

The Pakistan plan was refused by all political Sikh groups, with the exception of Kirtis Kisans. The Kirtis remained neutral.

Footnotes:

470. See J. Vagt, *India in Second World War....*, a.a.O., S. 38, See also V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement in India*, New Delhi, Bangalore, Jullundur 1979, 2. Aufl., S. 446.

471. D. Rothermund, *The Formation of Political Will in India 1900-1960*. Wiesbaden 1965.S.182. Also see J. Vogt, *India in Second World War*, Stuttgart 1978,§.39.

472. D. Rothermund, *The Formation of....*, a.a.O., S.182.

473. J. Vogt, *India in Second....*, a.a.O., S.42.

474. D. Rothermund, *The Formation of Political Will in India*, a.a.O., S.182. J. Vogt, *India in Second World War*, a.a.O., S.44.

475. J. Vogt *India in ...*, a.a.O., S.44.

476. D. Rothermund, *The Formation of Political Will in India*, a.a.O., S.182, 183. J. Vogt, *India in....*, a.a.O., S.45-48. V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement in India*, New Delhi..., 1979, 2. Aufl., S.446. B.B. Misra, *Indian Political Parties*, a,a.O., S. 350, 354. Misra States the influence of the party organisation, that was strongly criticised by Congress Ministries, as a further reason for the withdrawal of Congress Ministries.

477. J. Vogt., *India in....*, a.a.O., S.48. D. Rothermund, *The Formation....*, a.a.O., S.483.

478. 1873-1938.

479. D. Rothermund, *The Formation....*, a.a.O., S. 181, 183, 184.

480. D. Rothermund, *The Formation....*, a.a.O., S. 183-184, J. Vogt., *India in....*, a.a.O. S.53.

481. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, a.a.O., Vol.II, S.239, K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis Past and Present*, a.a.O., S.79.

482. N.N. Mitra (Ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, a.a.O., Vol.II, 1939, S.186, 187.

483. *The Tribune*, September 3, 1939, So also in *The Civil and Military Gazette*, September 2, 1939.

484. Linlithgow Collection, MSS Eur F125, Number 88: Letter by Punjab Governor, H. Craik, to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow dated 13 October, 1939. India Office Library, London.

485. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers, II, File 151, Copy of the Appeal issued by His Highness the Maharaja of Patialia to the Sikh Panth in connection with the present international causes, in NMM&L/Delhi. *Civil and Military Gazette*, 11.11.1941.

486. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers II, File 151, Copy of the Appeal issued by His Highness..., from that Resolution, in NMM&L/Delhi.

487. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers II, File 151, Copy of the Appeal issued by His Highness..., from that Resolution, in NMM&L/Delhi.

488. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 239.

489. The Tribune, August 2, 1940.

490. See also the article by Sardar Pratap Singh, Sikhs and the War, in the Civil and Military Gazette, Oct. 1, 1939, which sought to support the participation of the Sikhs in the war with the motivation of the Khalsa "to fight the aggressive and defend the oppressed".

491. Sunder Singh Majithia Papers II, File 152 "Joint Statement of the Khalsa National Party urging their community to assist the British in the war, 1939, in NMM&L/Delhi.

492. Sunder Singh Majithia, Papers II, File 147 = Corresp, and Notes on the Rights and Claims of Sikh Community, from that letter of J.G. Laithwaite to S.S. Majithia, 11.10.1939, in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library/New Delhi.

493. See S. 65 of this work.

494. Stephen Oren, The Sikhs Congress, and the Unionist in British Punjab, a.a.O., S. 404.

495. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 239

Stephen Oren, The Sikhs, Congress..., a.a.O., S.408.

496. S. Oren, The Sikhs, Congress..., a.a.O., S.404.

Jai Wanti, Baba Kharak Singh's Life and Role in India's Freedom Struggle, M.A. Diss., Punjabi University Patiala, 1971-72, S. 74, 75.

497. All India Congress Committee Papers, File 36/1945 = Communists. From that C.V. Rao, History of the Indian Communist Party, in NMM&L/Delhi.

498. Home Political Files 41/3/41 = Proposed representation to the Govts..., see also Home Political Files 161/40 = Interrogation of Sadhu Singh..., from that Kirti Activity in the Army, in National Archives of India/Delhi.

499. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S.240.

500. See S. 94, 95 of this work.

501. Speech from Mr. Indulal Yagnik, Sixth Session of the All India Kisan Conference at Bihta on the 30 May, 1942, also Indian Annual Register (N.N. Mitra Ed.), Vol.I, 1942, S.300. Besides see Home Political Files 161/40-Poll = Interrogation of..., from that Kirti Activity in the Army, in NAI/Delhi.

502. Information Department L/I/1116 File 462/103 = Communism: removal of ban on Communist Party in India 1942, from that Communique in India Office Library/London.

503. Relation between Shiromani Akali Dal, Congress Party see S. 86-99 of this work.

504. See S. 92 of this work.

505. See S. 117, 118 of this work.

506. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 89, Correspondence with the Governor of the Punjab and his Secretary 1940. From Henry Craik, Governor of the Punjab to Lord Linlithgow, August 27, 1940, in IOL/London.

507. Home Political Files 232/40 = Survey of the Sikh Situation as it affects the Army, S.2, in NAI/Delhi.

508. See S.91 of this work, Demands of Sikhs.

509. Stephen Oren, The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists..., a.a.O., S.405.

510. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol.98 = To Tara Singh, Allahabad, 12 Dec. 1939, regarding about his meeting with Kartar Singh about Sikh grievances against Congress, in NMM&L/Delhi.

511. See for that Home Political Files 232/40 = Survey of the Sikh Situation as affecting the Army, S. 2, in National Archives of India/ New Delhi.

512. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 88, From Henry Craik to Linlithgow, 15 Nov. 1939, in IOL/London.

513. Stephen Oren, The Sikhs, Congress..., a.a.O., S. 405.

514. All India Congress Committee Papers, File G-42/1939-40 = Minority Communities, from that Note on the Shiromani Akali Dal, in NMM&L/Delhi. Home Political Files 232/40 = Survey of the Sikh Situation as affecting the Army, S. 2, in NAI/Delhi.

515. Home Political Files 232/40, Survey of the Sikh Situation as affecting the Army, S.2, in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library/New Delhi.

516. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.240.

517. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 90, From Craik to Linlithgow, Febr. 10, 1941, in IOL/London.

518. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 90, From Sir Bertrand Glancy, Governor, to Linlithgow, June 23, 1941, in IOL/London.

519. Khushwant Singh, A History..., Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 240.

520. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 90, From Sir Henry Craik, Governor of the Punjab, to Linlithgow, March 17, 1941, in IOL/London.

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526. See S. 79 of this work.

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530. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S.183, 184.

531. J. Mittelsten-Scheid, *the Partition of India...*, a.a.O., S. 55, Rama Nand Aggarwala, *National Movement and Constitutional Development of India*, Delhi 1959. 2 Aufl., S. 261-262. K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan*, London 1967, S. 163-195.

532. For Definition of the Nation see J. Mittelsten-Scheid, *The Partition of India*, a.a.O., S. 55-57.

533. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S.184.

534. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.241.

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538. See S. 139-143 of this work.

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551. *Statesman*, 2 March, 1943.
552. N.N. Mitra, *Indian Annual Reg.*, Vol.II, 1943, S.300.
553. K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis...*, a.a.O., S. 97.
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558. N.N. Mitra (ed.), *The Indian Annual Reg.*, Vol.I, 1940, S.357.
559. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, a.a.O., S.259, 260.
560. Sir B. Glancy to the Marquess of Linlithgow, Extract, Lahore. 1 May, 1942, from *Transfer of Power*, Vol.II, 30. Aug-21, Sept. 1942, Document Number 7, Ed. by Nicholoas Mansergh, London 1971.
561. From Mr. Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow, India Office, 20 Aug, 1942. From *Transfer of Power*, Vol.II, 1942, a.a.O., Document Number 597.

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VII. The End Phase and the Struggle for the Indian Independence

1. The Relations between the Congress Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal.

1939 onwards Master Tara Singh faced the recruitment controversy, as already mentioned.⁵⁶⁴ Idiomatically speaking, he sat "between two chairs".

On one hand were his relations to the Congress Party and on the other hand were his efforts to approach and communicate with the Britishers. How was he to behave?

In a conference on 10 and 11 February, 1940, organised by the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Sikhs assured the Congress of "the whole-hearted support of the Sikhs in any active struggle for the attainment of complete independence" with the demand "in any machinery which may be devised for constitution-making Sikhs should get adequate representation..... to set up a stating Committee for minorities.... the minorities may be granted, by conviction, adequate representation in the Congress Organisations and that a Sikh Congressman always be taken on the working committee of the Congress...".

The demand for the nomination of a Sikh Congress member in the All India Congress Working Committee was, according to the Secretary of Shiromani Akali Dal, Balwant Singh, not "communal" because "if you (Nehru) take one patriotic Sikh in your cabinet at this juncture, when we are at the threshold of the Sikhs they will take it as the recognition of their past sacrifices in the country's house; daring as the Sikhs were, they may come out in thousands to court hardships for the emancipation of India".⁵⁶⁵

The political action of the Congress Party in 1940 stood in the background of this demand.

The Shiromani Akali Dal had based itself on the resolution passed by the Congress Party in Lahore in 1929; "assuring the Sikhs and other minorities that the Congress will not agree to any Constitution which does not satisfy the Sikhs and other minorities".⁵⁶⁶

This resolution of the Congress led to a much stronger alliance of the Shiromani Akali Dal with the Congress after 1937. Therefore, the Shiromani Akali Dal was enraged by the statement of Maulana Azad

on 19 April, 1940 in Wardha, "to leave the Pakistan scheme solemnly in the hands of the Muslims". The Shiromani Akali Dal now felt deceived by the Congress Party. These new demands of the Shiromani Akali Dal was unnoticed by the Congress Party,⁵⁶⁷ as in earlier times.

In September 1940, Master Tara Singh announced his withdrawal from the Punjab Provincial Congress Committee and the All India Working Committee.

Other Akali leaders did not follow Master Tara Singh and the Britishers raised the doubts, whether they would carry on although "all agreed that everything possible must be done to maintain and encourage Sikh recruitment." In this context the Britishers also reckoned with a sharp break-up with the Congress Party.⁵⁶⁸ However, this sharp break-up by the Shiromani Akali Dal did not come completely. Instead, two groups formed "officially" inside the Shiromani Akali Dal because of its diverse political views: the group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh and the group of Udham Singh Nagoke with Ishar Singh Majhail and Mangal Singh.

The Group Nagoke was the nationalist pact of the Shiromani Akali Dal because of its loyalty to the Congress.⁵⁶⁹ The actual reason for this "official" division was the controversy about the participation of the Shiromani Akali Dal in the Quit India Movement of the Congress.⁵⁷⁰

The group of Giani Kartar Singh/Master Tara Singh supported an alliance with the Britishers because of the recruitment controversy⁵⁷¹ and spoke against the support of the Quit-India Movement. In contrast to that the group Nagoke considered a further political co-operation with the Congress and its support as important in their policy.⁵⁷²

In this context it is to be indicated, that Master Tara Singh was not considered as the lone leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal in this period. The constant struggle of power between Giani Kartar Singh and Udham Singh Nagoke made it possible for Master Tara Singh, the only important leader of the party, to emerge publically as the official leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal.

Within the party itself, Giani Kartar Singh and Udham Singh Nagoke fought with each other for the Presidency and then decided on Master Tara Singh for this office. Only 1952 onwards did Master Tara Singh independently lead the Shiromani Akali Dal.⁵⁷³

2. The Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact

The Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact was signed before the "official" division of the Shiromani Akali Dal in two groups. This Pact was signed between Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, leader of the Unionist Party and the Chief Minister of Punjab, and Sardar Baldev Singh and was published on 15 June, 1942.

Sardar Baldev Singh, 1902-1961, a jat from the lower caste of the chokar, village Dumana, district Ambala, was the son of a rich Steel-magnet. He supported the Akalis financially, whom he represented in the Punjab Legislative Assembly 1937 onwards.⁵⁷⁴ Baldev Singh also supported the Khalsa Defence of India League⁵⁷⁵ under the leadership of Master Tara Singh. This brought him further political influence.⁵⁷⁶

He was a Congress-oriented Akali supporter. The death of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia in 1940 led to a severe crisis in the leadership of the Khalsa National Party. This led to a disappearance of the political importance and influence of the Khalsa National Party in Punjab.

Therefore, the Unionist Party, which had built the government in Punjab with the Khalsa National Party, had to look for another partner.

This situation was used by Baldev Singh to establish a new Sikh party, called the Sikh Punjab United Party, in March 1942.⁵⁷⁷

Members of this party of Sardar Baldev Singh were some members of the Khalsa National Party, Independent Sikhs and Akalis.⁵⁷⁸

Thus, Baldev Singh created a political power for himself. The signing of the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact shows, how important he had become politically.

This Pact gave the following concessions to the Sikh community from the Unionist government, "facilities for Jhatka, teaching of Gurmukhi, legislation regarding religious matters, service under the Punjab Government and Sikh representation at the Centre".

The Pact was to bring mere Sikh-support for the Unionist Party, as stated by Sardar Baldev Singh:

"to cooperate with the Punjab Government at this critical juncture in establishing communal harmony, so that the peace of the province may be secured and a united front be created for winning the war."⁵⁷⁹

According to this, the aim of the Pact was above all to establish a communal harmony between the Muslims and the Sikhs and to

remove communal bitterness from Punjab”,⁵⁸⁰ because since the beginning of the Unionist Government in 1937, there had been a conflict between the Sikhs and the Muslims with respect to Jhatka-meat, Gurmukhi and the demand of the Sikhs for a greater portion in government posts.⁵⁸¹

Sardar Baldev Singh got the portfolio of the “Minister of Development” in Punjab on 26 June, 1942 as a result of this pact.⁵⁸² He therefore took the place of the deceased Sir Sunder Singh Majithia in the Punjab Cabinet.

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, explained the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact as follows:

It is open to doubt how long the alliance between the Unionist Party and the Akalis will continue”.⁵⁸³

The aim of Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact was to bring Sikhs and Unionists closer, in order to check its influence on the Congress Party of the Sikhs.

The Britishers supported the signing of this Pact with the involvement of Major Billy Short.

Major Billy Short levelled off the negotiations and built a communication between the Akalis and the Unionists.⁵⁸⁵

The unsatisfaction of the group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh of the Shiromani Akali Dal with the policies of the Congress Party towards the Sikhs was advantageous to the Britishers in this intention. This group supported the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact and appeared to have severed its ties completely with the Congress.

In spite of that, Master Tara Singh along with the Congress Party for the Civil Disobedience Campaign planned that “not a single Akali would be found opposing the Congress Movement for India’s freedom”.

Moreover, he did not consider the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact as a retreat from the Congress, but “he wished to serve the Hindus as much today as ever before, and retain their confidence as well as that of the Muslims in order to help in preserving the peace of the provinces”.⁵⁸⁶ How is this behaviour to be explained?

This stance of Master Tara Singh, apparently to remain openly available to both the sides, indicates towards the usefulness of “sailing in two boats.... divides himself between veering towards Congress ideas and passively encouraging Sikh enlistment in the Army”.⁵⁸⁷

According to a report in the “Statesman”, Master Tara Singh lost

his interest very quickly to help the Congress Party. In this report on 22 August, 1942, it was made public that "Master Tara Singh and others had broken away from the Congress as they no longer believed in the creed of non-violence to the length, that Mahatma Gandhi went and recruitment of Sikhs should not be affected."⁵⁸⁸

The statement that "Master Tara Singh had openly doubted the efficacy of non-violence in the presence of the deadly foe or the tyrant aggressor"⁵⁸⁹ was interesting in this report. With that, Master Tara Singh recognised himself openly with the Britishers.

The Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact can also be explained against this background, which, against the protests of Master Tara Singh, was signed between the Unionists and the Shiromani Akali Dal group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh.

Efforts of the Congress Party for India, put up against the "direct enemy" of India, Great Britain, were taken back to support this enemy against its war-enemies. This attitude of the Shiromani Akali Dal group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh made itself apparent with the decision to support the recruitments.⁵⁹⁰

An approach to the Britisher was tried previously in May 1942, in the talks held between the Unionist Government and the Akalis. In these talks it was tried to reach an agreement that was to solve the communal conflicts e.g. about Jhatkia-meat and the Punjabi language.⁵⁹¹

This shows a clear swing, when one considers, that already in August 1941, an "Anti-Unionist-Ministry-Day" took place under the leadership of the Shiromani Akali Dal.⁵⁹²

Master Tara Singh interpreted the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact as "one having a purely communal nature". Therefore, the Akali Dal was not involved in the pact, but "persists in opposing the Unionists or any other party on political issues".⁵⁹³ How much Master Tara Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal, however, co-operated with Sardar Baldev Singh, is shown by the following depiction of Sardar Baldev Singh by the Governor of Punjab, Sir B.L. Glancy:

"He has a fair measure of natural sagacity combined with the experience of a successful business. But it cannot be said that he has yet found his feet as a Minister. Though not a professed Akali himself, he owes his seat on the cabinet to the support of the Akali Party and he is seldom able to stand up against the dictation of Master Tara Singh and his henchmen, even when he knows that the

injunctions are ill-advised. In consequence he is in effect the most communal-minded of all the Ministers".⁵⁹⁴

According to a statement by Master Tara Singh in the Tribune dated 15 July, 1942, Hindus like Raja Narendra Nath, Sir Gokul Chand Narang, Mahashe Khushad Chand of "Milap", Mahashe Krishan of "Pratap", Goswami Ganesh Dutt and Bhai Parma Nand, had been important tools in the plan to sign the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact and had not protested against it. The instructions about this plan were given, "to avoid any misunderstanding with the Hindus in the interest of the peace of the province."⁵⁹⁵ This statement was to support the expressed intention of the Sikhs of a "Communal Harmony". The Congress President Maulana Azad ruled out decisively a support from his side to the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact in a press conference.⁵⁹⁶ This response showed that he was convinced that the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact meant a strengthening of the Unionist Government through the Sikhs and thereby a weakening of the Congress position in Punjab. What game was Master Tara Singh playing? The Sikander Baldev Singh Pact released him from Congress, would he swing rigorously to the Unionists?

Now, Master Tara Singh maintained his tactics of "sailing in two boats", and consequently did not sever his ties with the Congress Party.⁵⁹⁷

To what impression did this attitude lead on the British side, is shown by the following excerpt from the report of the Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy to the Viceroy Linlithgow on 21 August, 1942:

"There is a general consensus of opinion, however, that Akalis are less liable today to be led into anti-Government demonstrations than they were a little while ago, and for this credit is mainly due to the Premier for his wisdom and perseverance in carrying through the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact. There is no doubt that this move has gratified the Sikhs in general, but the Akalis are still a notoriously unstable section of the population. One might suppose that having recently achieved two or the main objects for which they had been clamouring - the inclusion of a Sikh member in the Governor-General's Council and the appointment of Baldev Singh as a Minister in the Punjab--the Akalis would now be content to rest on their laurels and be careful to refrain from any active participation in Congress vagaries. But Master Tara Singh has come

out with a statement that he will not oppose any adventures on which Congress may embark. We have taken steps to point out to him and his friends that any continuance of this form of response to the favours which the Sikhs have lately received from the Government must make it increasingly difficult for those who sympathise with the community to espouse their cause. Tara Singh and his confederates, however, are habitually loath to commit themselves. These and their conception of the role of a leader -- are a resolute refusal to give a lead in any definite direction".⁵⁹⁸

The dissatisfaction of Master Tara Singh with the results of the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact, especially with respect to the Jhatka meat, was evident in the first four months of 1943. Tara Singh wrote to Sir Sikander Hyat Khan and asked him to dissolve this pact.

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, did not believe in a serious intention of Master Tara Singh to dissolve the pact, but he believed the real purpose to be "the obtrusion of communal considerations in matters in which they should be left in the background".⁵⁹⁹

How did the other political groups of Sikhs react to the signing of the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact?

The Central Akali Dal, in its Punjab Provincial Akali Dal Conference in Rode, District Ferozepur, on 10th August, protested against this pact, as the Sikhs had not got anything from it "except the change of Ministers."⁶⁰⁰

The Khalsa National Party reacted very skilfully to the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact in a statement by S. Mangal Singh with the assertion: "The Khalsa National Party was opposed to the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact. But a few days ago, a reliable friend told me that politically the Sikhs stood where they were before the Pact. It is only a communal⁶⁰¹ which may finally lead to a lasting political settlement in the Punjab... Both Sir Sikander and Sardar Baldev Singh are entitled to full co-operation from all fair-minded and patriotic Punjabis in their noble efforts to create communal harmony in the Punjab."⁶⁰²

It would have been very odd, if Khalsa National Party as a part of the Unionist Government had protested against this Pact. But still, this attitude indicated towards a conscious alliance between Khalsa National Party and Shiromani Akali Dal.

Hardly as both the parties emphasised very much the aim of the Pact "communal harmony" nevertheless the sudden understanding between the loyalist Khalsa National Party and Shiromani Akali Dal

was, "sailing in two boats". The reaction of the Central Akali Dal was no wonder, as it had come to no agreement with the Shiromani Akali Dal. Its rival attitude towards the Shiromani Akali Dal continued further.

For the Britishers, the Sikander Baldev Singh Pact symbolised a readiness of at least the Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh group of the Shiromani Akali Dal, to co-operate with them on a common basis and to collectively find out a solution to the Pakistan problem.

The controversial attitude of the Shiromani Akali Dal towards the Congress, sometimes on their side, sometimes against them is to be explained by the diverse political views of the two groups within the Shiromani Akali Dal.⁶⁰³

An open break of ties with the Congress Party with a transfer over to the loyalist could not be afforded by the group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh because of their nationalist policies. Conflicts, therefore within the Shiromani Akali Dal could not be avoided.

The moving away of the Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh group from the Congress with respect to the recruitment -- controversy and Sikander Baldev Singh Pact⁶⁰⁴ does not mean a total break of ties between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress, but it is to be considered more as a deviation of a part of the Shiromani Akali Dal from the policies of the Congress.

Master Tara Singh earned more respect to the Sikh community with the support of recruitments, as he strengthened the Sikh position in the army.

Moreover, he made by that a better contact with the Britishers for holding talks, which he considered of utmost importance and urgency to the Sikh community because of the imminent Pakistan danger.

The sudden death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan in 1942 and with that a rearrangement of the leadership of the Unionist Party and the offices of the Chief Minister of Punjab, changed anew the political situation in Punjab.⁶⁰⁵

The group of Giani Kartar Singh/Master Tara Singh of the Shiromani Akali Dal did not see a solution to the problems of the Sikhs in the Unionist party, as the influence of Jinnah and the Muslim League became stronger in Punjab and that of the Unionist Party weaker, but returned again to the Congress Party.

This tendency strengthened, as in the middle of 1943 a hope for a "settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League on the basis of Muslim self-determination" became apparent.⁶⁰⁶

Even the relations of the Kisan Sabha, which had many Sikh members,⁶⁰⁷ with the Congress did not go unaffected.⁶⁰⁸ These relations suffered a hit below the belt through a later participation in the recruitments,⁶⁰⁹ with an alliance with the Britishers. This went against the policies of the Congress.⁶¹⁰

3. The "Indian National Army"

A third form of the struggle for India's Independence was shown by the members of the Indian National Army abroad, abbreviated as I.N.A.⁶¹¹

The illegal Indian National Army was built during the Second World War with the initiative and support of the Japanese. The aim of this army was the freedom of India from the Britishers by violence.⁶¹²

The Japanese had used their connections with Das Bihari Bose to build this army who was also involved⁶¹³ in the Ghadar-Movement.⁶¹⁴

Ras Bihari Bose, 1886-1945, had waited for twenty years in Tokyo for this war of Japan against the British rule. His name is also closely associated with the Panasiatic Movement in Japan, which drew strong inspirations from the Central Reform Movements in India, above all from Bengal, as well as the political impulse from the Indian National Movement against the Britishers.⁶¹⁵

In his political ideas, Ras Bihari Bose had manifested his aim as freeing India from the Britishers.⁶¹⁶

The Indian National army contained a large portion of the extremist Sikhs,⁶¹⁷ many of them from the British-Jinnah Army, who let themselves recruited as soldiers of the Indian National Army for the freedom struggle by the I.N.A. officers.⁶¹⁸ Their battle cry was, "on to Delhi".⁶¹⁹

This freedom struggle however did not continue for long. In 1945, the INA was completely destroyed by the Britishers.⁶²⁰ The Britishers considered the prisoners of the INA as traitors and carried out legal proceedings against them. This disturbed the Indian population and led to an "INA enthusiasm wave" as it considered the action of the Indian National Army as a struggle for India's freedom.⁶²¹

The Congress Party showed no sympathy towards the members of the INA. The reason for this was their relation with Subhas Chandra Bose, 1897-1945, a cousin of Ras Bihari Bose, who took up the

leadership of the INA. Subhash Chandra Bose belonged to the Congress Party and was its President from 1938-1939. The conflict between Subhas Chandra Bose and Mahatma Gandhi as to the question, whether an international crisis should be used for getting India's freedom, led to a power struggle between them for the leadership of the Congress. Bose lost this struggle, his Presidentship of the Congress and two days later, on 3 May, 1939, established a new party "Forward Block".⁶²²

Because of this fight with Subhash Chandra Bose, there developed no communication between the Congress and the I.N.A., although the Congress had sympathy for the I.N.A. itself.⁶²³

This attitude was all the more unfortunate for the freedom struggle, as the Congress Party and the I.N.A. had the same aim, even though they tried to achieve it through different means:

The freedom of India from British Rule.

As the I.N.A. enthusiasm wave built itself within India, the political parties began giving support to the I.N.A. The Congress Party, the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the All India Women's Conference and the Unionist Party of Punjab defended the I.N.A. and demanded that the charged officials and soldiers of the I.N.A. be considered as prisoners-of-war, and let go free after the end of the war.⁶²⁴

The political Sikh groups participated in the Indian Independence Movement in various ways after the outbreak of the 2nd World War.

The Indian National Army, in which the Sikhs were recruited in large numbers, achieved, if the definition is to be followed, that the I.N.A. an army to free India, strived for national independence, the most emphasised part of the Indian Freedom Struggle. Its "not-continuing" further did not lie in the change of its political conceptions, but based itself on its military defeat, that made it unfit for fighting.

The Shiromani Akali Dal participated similarly in the Indian Freedom Struggle through its alliance with the Congress Party. This alliance was hampered by the communalism of the Sikh.

"Communalism" in India means the policy, which restricts itself only to a particular public or religious group and not to the whole population. Every kind of communalism was considered as a rival or an opponent to the Indian nationalism, as understood by the Congress.⁶²⁵

The Pakistan problem compelled the Shiromani Akali Dal to give

priority to the minority problems of the Sikhs and correspondingly to make its rights as minorities strongly valid, instead of keeping its efforts for the Indian Independence in the foreground.

This led to unharmonious relations between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party and the temporary withdrawing attitude of the Shiromani Akali Dal from the Congress.

The Central Akali Dal group of Baba Kharak Singh and the Sikh Congress Party followed their political Congress line and supported further India's struggle for freedom.

The different attitude of the political Sikh parties in the Indian freedom struggle shows the problem of Communalism versus Nationalism.

On one side were the efforts of the Shiromani Akali Dal, to protect the rights of the Sikhs and to place its political activities in the foreground, same as communalism, and on the other hand were the efforts of a Sikh group, to give its political activities a nationalist character.

4. Measures Taken by the Britishers to Prepare for India's Independence

a. Cripps Mission

In the beginning of the year 1942, the political situation had become very tense for the Britishers with the penetration of the Japanese in India without that the Viceroy of India could provoke Indians for a defence of the country in any way.⁶²⁶

The fear of the Britishers of a Japanese invasion of India⁶²⁷ led to various steps to get the support of the Indian parties.

The British war cabinet in London gave the task of designing an India-classification to a "Committee on India" called India committee. With this classification the aim could be achieved, to find a political solution of the Indian question in accordance with the Indian parties.

In its third meeting the committee decided on a design for a classification, that was taken as a base for the final version.⁶²⁸

The classified aim of the British politics in this design was an establishment of an Indian union, which was to become a full-fledged member of the Commonwealth as Dominion and possessed the right, to separate itself from it. The High Commissioners of the Dominion protested against that. Therefore the India Committee changed the referred formulation to: "The British government would not restrict

the right of the Indian Union, to decide its relations to the other member nations of the Commonwealth.”⁶²⁹

A gathering was to be made to frame the constitution after the end of the war, whereby the British Government would be given the task to make practical the so arising constitution. Every province would be granted the right, to preserve its status, if it was to refuse the constitution; it could also then decide to join the Indian Union, or to demand a separate political status, i.e. the independence. The British Government preserves the right to change the contract with the princely States, which would not want to join the Union. In the last clause of the plan was Great Britain given the decision, to keep the full responsibility of defending India till the framing of the new constitution, though the leader of the important Indian groups would be called for working together in the defence.⁶³⁰

The British Committee decided not to publish the India-declaration before discovering the opinions and views in India.

Therefore, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India on 23 March, 1942,⁶³¹ in order to discuss himself all the matters with the leaders of the Indian parties.

Cripps was to move Indians to co-operate with his suggestions for the formation of a future Indian Independence, so as to fight the external enemies.⁶³² For his mission he had got only a limited room for negotiations. The India-declaration was an offer of the Britishers to the Indians, which could be accepted or refused.⁶³³

The Indian parties had the impression, that Cripps came for negotiations, whereas he carried a “finished” programme with him. Correspondingly great was their disappointment.

The Congress Party refused to accept Cripps’ suggestions. Their refusal was based on above all the controlled distribution of the defence ministry, assumed by them.⁶³⁴ The leader of the Muslim League, also declined Cripps’ suggestions, as he implied, that Pakistan would not be allowed.⁶³⁵ In the negotiations with Cripps, the Sikh community was represented by Master Tara Singh, Baldev Singh, who shortly afterwards became a minister in Punjab Cabinet following the Sikander-Baldev Singh Pact, and Ujjal Singh, who supported the Unionist Party.⁶³⁶

All represented political Sikh groups did not accept Cripps’ suggestions, as they were of the opinion, the granting of Pakistan was allowed in Cripps’ suggestions.⁶³⁷

Giani Sher Singh, leader of one of the Central Akali Dal reacted as follows to the suggestions of Cripps:

"...the greatest difficulty of this scheme was that of Pakistan, entailing the vivisection of the country. According to this scheme, the so-called Muslim provinces, on becoming independent states, could link themselves with Afghanistan or, Iran and could be governed by the Shariat law.... Sikhs would be placed in a position of subjugation".⁶³⁸

The Khalsa National Party also spoke openly against the suggestions of Cripps. It demanded:

"... that all portfolios including that of defence be transferred to Indians, that representative Government owing allegiance to the Crown and including at least one Sikh representative be, established at the Centre, that secession of provinces should not be allowed, that the country be granted Dominion Status on the cessation of hostilities and that there should be joint electorates with reservation of seats for minorities including the Sikhs".⁶³⁹

According to the Britishers, the party and communal interests made themselves prominent after the public announcement of Cripps' suggestions.⁶⁴⁰

The British gave the following reason for refusal:

"Hindus and Sikhs are bitter because they hold that Pakistan has conceded the Muslim League because it is sure that the supposed concession is unreal. Not a single political organisation, except perhaps the Sapru group, is now supporting the proposals."⁶⁴¹

Interesting is the reaction of Master Tara Singh to Cripps' suggestions. The Britishers G. Ogilvie of Defence Department described in a letter dated 30 March, 1942, that Master Tara Singh offered the division of Punjab after the publication of Cripps' suggestions.

"Tara Singh was extremely upset at the scheme propounded by Sir Stafford Cripps and gave it as his opinion that, so far as the Sikhs were concerned, it was more likely to cause a complete cessation of the war efforts than to encourage them to do more. He said that he considered that it was a great mistake to publish the announcement, that it would cause communal trouble all over India, and that the ultimate result might be a combination between the Congress, Hindu Mahasabha and Sikhs to oppose the war efforts. He said that the only thing that would satisfy the Sikhs, if this scheme were to be implemented, was that the Punjab should be divided and that the whole area South of Sutlej plus the districts of Lahore (less Lahore city), Amritsar, Gurdasur,

Jullundhur, Hoshiarpur and Kangra should be made into a separate province. He was, of course, convinced that the Punjab would never come into a general union and he was equally convinced that the Sikhs would never tolerate Muhammadan rule, open or disguised. He expressed grave doubts as to be the practical value of any treaty and said that the whole question of the treatment of minorities was much too vague and would not satisfy the Sikhs".⁶⁴²

The so-called Cripps proposals gave Master Tara Singh the opportunity, to consider the Pakistan and thereby a Muslim rule as the most important dangers threatening the Sikh community. The only solution that he saw for it was an independent province.

This demand of Master Tara Singh for an independent province became famous as the Azad Punjab"⁶⁴³ plan.

It cannot however be proved, whether Master Tara Singh meant "Khalistan" with his demand for "Azad Punjab" in this time.

Not only Sikhs, but also the Punjabi Hindus above all would be represented in the areas claimed by "Azad Punjab".⁶⁴⁴

The idea of Master Tara Singh for a new province within the Punjab is not new. Lala Lajpat Rai, who was the Congress Leader and member of the Hindu-Reform Movement Arya Samaj in Punjab in the beginning of the 20th century,⁶⁴⁵ suggested the following in 1924 to solve the Hindu-Muslim problem:

"My suggestion is that the Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority, to be Muslim-governed province; and the Eastern Punjab, with a large Hindu-Sikh majority, to be a non-Muslim-governed province".⁶⁴⁶

According to that Lala Lajpat Rai demanded, as Master Tara Singh with "Azad Punjab Plan", a part of the Punjab as an independent Hindu-Sikh province.

The Hindus of Punjab however declined the Azad Punjab Plan of Master Tara Singh.

A secret report of the Britishers in the first half of May 1943 describes a conference of "the Provincial Hindu Mahasabha" in Lyallpur, which took place between 30 April and 2 May, 1943. In this conference, the Provincial Hindu Mahasabha spoke vehemently against the Pakistan and Azad Punjab Plan, "to resist both the Pakistan and Azad Punjab Schemes".⁶⁴⁷

The All India Nationalist League expressed itself in its conference in Poona, "Second Session" from 31 July till 1 April, 1942 as follows:

"This conference of the All India Nationalist League strongly and emphatically condemns all proposals that are being made by the Muslim League, British Imperialists and others to divide India into Pakistan and other "Stans" as this vivisection is destructive of India's Nationhood and is bound effectively to kill all efforts on the part of the Indian Nationalists to achieve independence now or in future."⁶⁴⁸

All the Sikh political parties, with the exception of the Shiromani Akali Dal, declined the Azad Punjab suggestion.⁶⁴⁹

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, similarly on the Azad Punjab scheme, against which he protested strongly wrote the following to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on 1 May, 1942:

"Master Tara Singh and his Lieutenants have found it an easy matter to stir up communal feelings at the alleged danger of the Sikhs being subjected to Muhammadan rule in the Punjab, and they are loath to cease from exploiting this opportunity.... As you are well aware, the practical objections to "Khalistan" are even greater than those which lie in the path of Pakistan. Apart from the upheaval that would be caused by tearing out a large section of territory from the vitals of the provincial body politics, it is worth remembering, that there is not one single district in which the Sikhs command a majority. Another illustration of the complexity of the problem is to be found in the Punjab States Agency. Little reliance can be placed on the results of the last census owing to the determination of all communities to inflate their own figures but it is time that a few years ago, though there are half a dozen Sikh--states in the Agency, there was only one State, the Muslim State of Malerkotla, where the majority of the population were Sikhs."⁶⁵⁰

According to this letter, the Sikhs had very bleak chances of getting an independent province in May 1942, as they did not have a majority.

"Cripps Mission" meant for the Sikhs that the Muslim got Pakistan from the Britishers. The result of the Pakistan concession for the Britishers was not to give the Sikhs a "Second Pakistan". This decision was not known to the Sikhs in that time.

b. Reactions of the Indian Side after the India-Declaration of the Britishers

Quit-India Movement

The failure of Cripps Mission forced the Congress, to take further

steps on the way of the Indian freedom struggle and to go again in the agitation.

Aim was the national independence and the protection of India from the results of the Second World War.

The Congress Party decided on a new solution and a new campaign. The solution was now called "Quit-India". Gandhi's call to the Britishers to go back, as long as there was time, was announced by the Congress as its main programme. The new campaign was begun with a big resolution, that concerned the Britishers and the Allies.⁶⁵¹ The resolution analysed the war-aims of the Allies and demanded the freedom of India.⁶⁵²

Totally unexpected, the British Government arrested Gandhi and all the leading politicians of the Congress, so as to bring the agitation under control.

After Gandhi's arrest on 9 August, 1942, the so-called left radical groups of the Congress began the "August Movement", that was full of violent incidents like the capture of police stations, exploding the bridges etc. Military and the police got however an upper hand and suppressed the "August Revolution".⁶⁵³ The Congress Party was declared illegal by the Britishers.⁶⁵⁴ The Shiromani Akali Dal did not support the Congress in the Quit-India Movement, which served the purpose of freeing India from the Britishers, although the group Nagoke of the Shiromani Akali Dal pledged itself for a political co-operation and support to the Congress.

In contrast to that, the Master Tara Singh group of the Shiromani Akali Dal co-operated further with the Britishers, as it expected further concessions from them.

The conflict over the participation in the Quit-India Movement brought to daylight a division of the Shiromani Akali Dal in two groups, the group Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh and the group Nagoke.⁶⁵⁵

According to a statement of Baldev Raj Nayar in his study, *Minority Politics in Punjab*,⁶⁵⁶ Master Tara Singh made it no obligation for the members of the Nagoke group to participate in the Quit-India Movement. Whether the Nagoke group participated is unfortunately not described by Baldev Raj Nayar, nor are there any points to that in the source materials or in any other study.

The communists and the allied Kirtis similarly did not participate in the Quit-India Movement of the Congress, as a friendly relation to

the Britishers was now considered important after the entry of the Russia in the war.⁶⁵⁷

Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, used the Quit-India Movement and the tense relations between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress, to make the Pakistan proposal "tasty" for the Sikhs through political, religious and economic guarantees.⁶⁵⁸

Kailash Chander Gulati indicates in his study, *The Akalis Past and Present*,⁶⁵⁹ that a part of the Sikh leadership considered the suggestions of Jinnah for the acceptance of Pakistan. Unfortunately, he does not name part of the Sikh leadership.

The aimed co-operation of the Shiromani Akali Dal group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh with the Britishers as well as the reaction of Master Tara Singh to the Cripps Mission⁶⁶⁰ leads to the conclusion what this Part of the Sikh leadership meant.

The letter of the Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Gancy to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow on 12 October, 1943, also hints at this conclusion: "... Giani Kartar Singh is reported to be about to make a further contact with Jinnah in order to extort terms from him with a view to a possible Muslim League and Akali coalition and incidentally to ascertain the full implications of Pakistan."⁶⁶¹

It is to be assumed that the Congress oriented Central Akali Dal group of Baba Kharak Singh⁶⁶² supported the Quit-India Movement. Unfortunately, neither the sources nor the literature gives information about that. Because of the source situation it is to be assumed that the Sikh Congress Party carried the Quit India Movement as a "foster child" of the Congress Party.⁶⁶³

According to it, the Congress Party, in its efforts to drive the freedom of India with the Quit India Movement knew only the support of the relatively unimportant Central Akali Dal group of Baba Kharak Singh⁶⁶⁴ and the Sikh Congress Party.

Rajagopalacharia Plan

The so-called Rajagopalacharia Plan was published on 10 July, 1944, by C. Rajagopalacharia, that promised the Muslims a separate Nation Pakistan and aimed at achieving a compromise with the Muslim League.⁶⁶⁵

This plan was passed by the members of the Madras Legislative Assembly, who belonged to the Congress Party and whose leader C. Rajagopalacharia enjoyed the trust of Gandhi.⁶⁶⁶

Almost all the political Sikh groups protested against this plan because of the allowance of Pakistan and criticised Gandhi's positive attitude to this plan. The Nagoke group of the Shiromani Akali Dal made however no protests.⁶⁶⁷

The protests by the political Sikh groups did not come together, but separate parts of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Central Akali Dal protested against this plan independent of each other.⁶⁶⁸

Baba Kharak Singh, leader of one of the Central Akali Dal groups, protested in name of the Central Akali Dal in "Tribune" against the "accusation", to have taken part in a protest meeting of the Shiromani Akali Dal against the Raja Plan:

"The so-called All Parties Sikh Conference which is being held at Amritsar today on the invitation of Master Tara Singh is a misnomer, because in fact it is only a meeting of the Akali Party to which some others who are expected to say yes to the Akalis, have also been invited. The Central Akali Dal decided yesterday not to participate in the said meeting."⁶⁶⁹

Even in this time, during which the Pakistan danger was becoming slowly realistic, there were no efforts for a co-operation between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Central Akali Dal.

As a result of this protest storm by the Sikhs, the Congress Party disapproved of the Rajagopalacharia Plan and forced him to take his plan back.

As a reaction to the Raja Plan, the official demand by Master Tara Singh for an independent Sikh state followed. This demand was explained by Master Tara Singh with the Pakistan danger and also, that the Sikhs were an independent nation.⁶⁷⁰ This demand for an independent Sikh state, called Khalistan or Sikhistan, was proposed by Dr. V.S. Bhatti in 1940.⁶⁷¹ The Khalistan Plan, however, could not be explained convincingly at this time, so that the demand for an independent Sikh nation was put aside by the Sikhs in favour of the demand for an independent province, Azad Punjab.

The publication of the Raja Plan however offered Master Tara Singh the best opportunity, to put forward the demand for an independent Sikh nation with the support of a large part of the Sikh community and its political representation.

According to the Raja Plan, the home land of the Sikh community was to be divided in two equal parts. One part was to belong to Pakistan, and the other to India.⁶⁷² This view made compulsory for all the

political Sikh groups, to support the Khalistan Plan.

The Congress Sikhs however supported the Raja Plan, in that they recognised the right of the Muslims to self-rule and spoke against the Azad-Punjab Plan.⁶⁷³

The attitude of the Nagoke group, not to join the protests of the other political Sikh groups against the Raja-Plan, shows further the efforts of this group to remain on a friendly note with the Congress.

The political Sikh-groups tried to encounter the "Pakistan" danger with demand for an independent Sikh nation.

As a further reason for the necessity of an independent Sikh nation, a threat to the Sikh religion, Sikh culture and Sikh language by the Hindu and Muslim communities was named by Master Tara Singh, leader of one group of the Shiromani Akali Dal.⁶⁷⁴

Not only the Sikhs tried to object to the "Pakistan" problem. In the end of 1944, the so-called Sapru Committee called upon the Indian political representations, to express their views on "fundamental rights, representation of communities in the services, Pakistan issue, territorial equipments and alternatives to Pakistan".⁶⁷⁵ This committee was to build new ways for a constitution. The prescribed suggestions of Teg Bahadur Sapru laid down in this Committee contained a denial of Pakistan.

"The whole Committee stand for a single Union of India including the whole of British India and all the Indian States, the claim for secession of non-accession, by which individual Provinces or States can keep out of the Union is not accepted."^{676,677}

c. The Solution of the Indian Problem

Simla

After the failure of the Cripps Mission the Britishers took new steps for their contribution to the struggle for independence by the Indians.

The "new steps" of the Britishers were influenced by the strong political influence of Jinnah, because since August 1942 till summer of 1944 Jinnah had succeeded, in strengthening his position and also the demand for Pakistan conspicuously. This becomes very clear by that, that the unruly ministers were thrown out partly with the help of the British Governors and were replaced by the true followers of the Muslim League.⁶⁷⁸

The increase in the influence of Jinnah was further supported by

the sudden death of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, Chief Minister of Punjab and leader of the Unionist Party in December 1942. With the death of Sikander, the Unionist Party in Punjab lost its second leader after Fazal-i-Hussain and Sir Khizr Hyat Khan Tiwana, who was the follower of Sikander, was too weak a politician to put himself up against Jinnah.

Thus the Muslim League succeeded in strengthening its position in British-India, after these changes in the important power positions.

The Muslim League thus achieved in 1943, by this conquest of power, to get a number of the members of the Parliament interested in it and to join it. Thus it was able to create a basis for itself for a national party and was considered neither by the Britishers nor by the Congress to be insignificant. In the beginning of 1941, Gandhi, member of the Congress Party, talked to Jinnah, leader of the Muslim League and started the held up talks again in 1944. In these talks, called as "Jinnah-Gandhi Talks" it was discussed, whether Jinnah thought about a collective Central Government for India and Pakistan, as was earlier supposed, or not.⁶⁷⁹ These talks of Jinnah with Gandhi finally failed because of the suggestion of India's partition.⁶⁸⁰

In October 1943, the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow was relieved of his duties by Lord Wavell, an old officer, former Commander of the British-Indian army.

As the new Viceroy, Lord Wavell now tried for an "early" solution to the problem.

He therefore, talked to the war cabinet in London about the summoning of a conference of the Indian Party leaders.⁶⁸¹ On 14 June, 1945, Viceroy Wavell made public the so-called "Wavell proposal" on All India Radio, which was to serve as a basis for the proposed conference. Wavell's proposal foresaw amongst other things a formation of an "executive council".⁶⁸²

The conference in Simla that was to finalise a formula for bringing together the fifteen heads of the executive committees, lasted from 25 June till 14 July, 1945.⁶⁸³

The Congress Party was ready for co-operation in this Simla Conference. It even brought out a list for the proposed "Executive Council" and sent it to Lord Wavell. The list contained the following names:

1. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
2. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Sardar Vailabhbhai Patel
4. Dr. Rajendra Prasad
5. Mr. M.A. Jinnah
6. Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan
7. Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan
8. Mr. M. Asaf Ali
9. Dr. Shvazana Prasad Mukerji
10. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur
11. Shri Munswami Pillay
12. Shri Radhanath Das
13. Shri Gaganvehari L. Mehta
14. Sir Ardeshir Dalal
15. A Sikh member (name to be submitted later)⁶⁸⁴

Even Master Tara Singh, invited as the representative of the Shiromani Akali Dal to the Simla Conference, announced the co-operation of the Sikhs and accepted the Wavell proposals.⁶⁸⁵

The Congress Party honoured the readiness of Master Tara Singh to co-operate and placed him afterwards on the list of the members of the Executive Council sent to Lord Wavell.⁶⁸⁶

During the talks in the Simla Conference, Master Tara Singh signalled his readiness to support Pakistan, when Jinnah on his side would agree to a separate Sikh nation.⁶⁸⁷

In spite of the announced support of the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal the Conference failed, as Jinnah demanded that the Muslim League nominate all the Muslim members of the interim government.⁶⁸⁸

This demand of Jinnah was emphasised by Viceroy Wavell in his diary note on 24 June, 1945:

“He then went into the matter of nomination of members of the Executive Council and claimed that the Muslim League had the right to nominate all Muslim members. I said that I could not accept this proposition. He then began a long history of all the bye-elections of the last two years, claiming that the Muslim League candidate had always been successful and that therefore the Muslim League represented the whole of the Muslims of India. He seemed to think that I was thinking of nomination of Muslims by the Congress. I said that I had also in mind the nomination by the Unionist Party of the Punjab of a Muslim. This led to a long diatribe to the effect that the Unionist Party were traitors to the interests of the Muslims, and that the fact that they had been able

to run a coalition Ministry in the Punjab for so long was solely due to the sufferance of Mr. Jinnah. I merely maintained that I would not give a pledge beforehand that all the Muslims on the Executive Council should be nominated by the Muslim League.

He asked whether Mr. Gandhi was coming to the Conference. I told him that Mr. Gandhi had said that he represented nobody and had advised me that it would be better that he should not attend the Conference. Mr. Jinnah seemed rather upset at this and said it was another trick of Gandhi; he pretended not to belong to the Congress when it suited his book, but when necessary, appeared as the Dictator of Congress which everyone knew he was.

Mr. Jinnah said at the end that he would have to consult the Working Committee, but gave no indication that the Muslims would not attend the Conference; in fact he seemed to assume that they would... would be ructions inside the Conference.”⁶⁸⁹

This diary note by Lord Wavell shows, that he also wanted to consider the Muslims of the Unionist Party in the proposed “Executive Council”. The reason for that is named by Viceroy Wavell in his diary note on 27 June, 1945:

“I therefore considered it essential that there should be a Punjab Muslim in the new Executive Council, as indeed there always had been for some time past-- and I hoped that he agreed to the necessity for this. What I had in mind was someone who would represent the interests of the Punjab but without strong party affiliation, either to the League or to the Unionist Party.”⁶⁹⁰

These thoughts of Viceroy Wavell show that he wanted to have a special consideration for Punjab. Certainly Wavell had anticipated communal tensions, if he kept Muslims in the Executive Council, who were not particularly close to their parties.

The failure of the Simla Conference consolidated the position of the Muslim League and weakened the position of all the Muslims, above all that of the Muslims of the Unionist Party in Punjab, who had worked against the Muslim League.⁶⁹¹

Master Tara Singh had accepted the Wavell proposal in the Simla Conference.⁶⁹² This happened only because the Shiromani Akali Dal wanted to co-operate further with the Congress.

For this extended co-operation, an alliance in the proposed Executive Council would have been necessary. This alliance was supported by the Shiromani Akali Dal, although it refused the Wavell proposals,

as they contained the "Cripps Proposals",⁶⁹³ according to it.⁶⁹⁴

The leader of the Indian National Army,⁶⁹⁵ Subhas Chandra Bose, also spoke against the offer of Lord Wavell in the Simla conference, who now headed the provisional government of Azad Hind in Singapore as:

"a. It is void of Independence.

b. It is contrary to our Principle and August decision of the All India Congress of 1942 for complete Independence

"Quit India"

"Do or die" and "Azadi ya Mot".

c. It is an insult to those martyrs who sacrificed their lives on those decisions for the cause of Freedom or Independence.

d. It is not in any way much different from Sir Stafford Cripps's offer, though on the paper it provides more seats for Indians in the Executive. But this Executive is not responsible to Legislative Assembly, but it is responsible to Viceroy. He appoints them. He has the power of "Veto". He has his military Commander on the Executive. It is a Swaraj for Viceroy and not for people.

e. It encourages communal and party spirit and it will bring about more acute dissension amongst Congress and Muslim League; Congress and Minority parties; Congress and Hindus".⁶⁹⁶

The Indian National Army therefore did not stand by the side of the Congress, who had decided to support Lord Wavell's proposals.

Elections of 1946

After the failure of the Simla Conference, the question now arose for Viceroy Wavell, whether the proposed Executive Council should be formed without the Muslim League, who had refused to co-operate. In this context the time for the elections in India was also announced by the Britishers.⁶⁹⁷ From the diary note of Viceroy Wavell on 2 August, 1945, it is to follow, that almost all the British Governors spoke against an Executive Council without the Muslim League in the summoned "Governors Conference" and supported early provincial elections:

"The Governors Conference went well on the whole. No one produced any original ideas as to the solution of the problem, but there was almost unanimity of recommendation as to the next moves. Only one Governor (Colville) advocated by-passing the league and forming a political Executive Council without it. On the other hand, only one favoured reconstruction on an "efficiency" basis; the other all thought

I should carry on with my present Council with any changes. I could make in the ordinary course, unless and until I could get a political Council. All, except Glancy, favoured elections as soon as possible to the Central Assembly; and all, again except Glancy wanted Provincial elections this winter".⁶⁹⁸

Bertrand Glancy the Governor of Punjab spoke against early Provincial elections for the reason that he wished a clarification on the Pakistani issue

"He must repeat that the hollowness of Pakistan in its crude form should be exposed before provincial elections were held", as otherwise "if Jinnah won the elections, the Muslims would regard themselves as committed to Pakistan though none of them knew what it meant". Denn Glancy was of the opinion that "he doubted if the Muslims really expected an entirely Muslim plebiscite. He thought the Cripps Offer required clarification. The use of the term "provinces" was not clear, and it ought to be made clear that no considerable area would be separated from the rest of India without the consent of the majority of all its inhabitants. The formula should refer to "contiguous areas" or something of that kind".⁶⁹⁹

This problem, stated by Bertrand Glancy as the Governor of Punjab was also recognised by Lord Wavell. In his letter to the Secretary of State, Mr. Pethick Lawrence dated 5 August, 1945, he ascertained that Jinnah had not clearly defined the area meant by Pakistan. Because of the successful Jinnah-Gandhi talks in the summer of 1944, Lord Wavell concluded that "he (Jinnah) seemed to be thinking of Pakistan as comprising all the Muslim majority Provinces (Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, the Baluchistan in the North-West and Assam and Bengal in the North-East) and he certainly insisted that the right of these provinces to secede was to be determined by the vote of the Muslim alone. For obvious reasons the Muslims in these areas have a good deal to lose by Pakistan. They are politically dominant now, and though they have minority problems, they can keep them under control. If Pakistan became a reality in the form in which Jinnah professes to want it, the Punjab would have minority problems which might be uncontrollable. The Sikhs who form a more or less solid block in the middle of Punjab, would never acquiesce in their inclusion in a Muslim Sovereign State; and the Punjab Hindus who are widely scattered but are in a majority in the Eastern districts, would also have a great deal to say".⁷⁰⁰

Viceroy Wavell also saw the dangers for the Sikhs and Hindus of Punjab, that would come along with "Pakistan," however, did not want to carry out the clarification "what does Pakistan mean", but announced the provincial elections, although he assumed, "there seems little doubt that the League will win most of the Muslim seats at the elections, since the question for the average Muslim voter will be put in the form of whether he prefers Islam to Hinduism. I do not see how a Committee of Indian politicians, an impartial committee of foreigners, or a mixed body including both British and foreign members, could demolish Pakistan. Jinnah would undoubtedly boycott the proceedings...." 701

Wavell's attitude appeared to be of "let's see, what happens" type. This impression is also shown by his letter dated 4 December, 1945 to Mr. Pethick-Lawrence, "we shall therefore, I think, have to hold the elections for the Central Assembly and the Legislatures in the Section 93 Provinces, and see what happens" 702

Why Viceroy Wavell arranged for immediate provincial elections, although they were not advised by the Punjab-Governor, is explained by Lord Wavell to Mr. Pethick Lawrence as follows:

"It is important to remember that we cannot disregard the Muslim League. Jinnah and his colleagues are most exasperating, but they command Muslim support all over India, and Jinnah's attitude is based on a genuine fear of Congress methods and Congress propaganda. I saw for myself in Simla that this fear is not by any means unjustifiable" 702

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, again warned Viceroy Wavell against the provincial elections in a letter dated 16 August, 1945 because these elections meant a strengthening of "Pakistan-demand" in Punjab, the "Pakistan-demand" itself was not clear in its meaning, and the non-Muslims, above all the Sikhs in Punjab would protest vehemently against a Muslim rule:

"....Jinnah and his supporters are loudly clamouring for general elections, a matter about which Congress appears to be comparatively lukewarm. Since Jinnah succeeded by his intransigence in wrecking the Simla Conference his stock has been standing very high with his followers and with a large section of the Muslim population. He has been hailed as the champion of Islam. He has openly given out that the elections will show an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan. I must confess that I am gravely perturbed about the situation, because

there is a very serious danger of elections being fought, so far as Muslims are concerned, in an entirely false issue. Crude Pakistan may be quite illogical, undefinable and ruinous to India and in particular to Muslims, but this does not detract from its potency as a political slogan. The uninformed Muslim will be told that the question he is called on to answer at the polls is -- Are you a true believer or infidel and a traitor? Against this slogan the Unionists have no spectacular battle-cry; they can point no doubt to their considered consistent support of the War effort, to the various reforms they have introduced, such as the vast reduction of agricultural indebtedness, and to their extensive post-war programme for the benefit of the province. But all this may carry little weight against the false and fanatical scream that Islam is in danger. If Jinnah contrives by his campaign to consolidate his position still further, it seems to me that the difficulty of finding any satisfactory solution of the Indian problem will be greatly enhanced.... the consensus of opinion is that, if Pakistan becomes an imminent reality, we shall be heading straight for blood-shed on a wide scale; non-Muslims, especially Sikhs are not bluffing, they will not submit peacefully to a Government that is labelled "Muhammadan Raj". Hence, it appears to me to be of vital importance to take action, before it is too late, to deflate the theory of Pakistan".

B. Glancy suggests then as a solution, in order to defuse Pakistan clearly, amongst other things "... that some kind of clarifying announcement with respect to the partitioning of India should be given out by, or with the approval of "High Approval". Possibly this could take the form of a question and answer in the House. The Cripps' offer speaks of the right of a "Province" to remain aloof from the "Indian Union". Is the word "Province" to be rigidly interpreted to signify a Province as now defined, does it mean that, if in an existing province there is a large contiguous area (of the size say of a Division) in which the majority are against separation, the inhabitants must be liable to severance from the Indian Union regardless of their wishes. If the reply to this question is in the negative, it will give the people in this Province very seriously to think. For in the Punjab there are two neighbouring divisions (Ambala and Jullundur) out of our total of five, in which there is not one single district with a Muslim majority, and to this extensive area be added the adjoining and very important district of Amritsar. The citation of this as a practical illustration might be of great help. Action on these lines would at least provide the Unionist Party

with a rallying cry against Pakistan --something on which the elector could definitely bite.

No Punjabi, however uninformed, would contemplate with equanimity so shattering a dismemberment of the Province involving in effect the disappearance of the word "Punjab", which has been held in honour for the last two thousand years".⁷⁰³

The Governor of Punjab, Sir Bertrand Glancy, was therefore of the opinion, that if the Punjabis were confronted with the alternative of an Indian Union, that gave separate rights to the Muslims, or of Pakistan with the division of Punjab, they would invariably decide for an Indian Union under these conditions.⁷⁰⁴ Lord Wavell concerned himself with these suggestions of Sir Bertrand Glancy and had a good look at them, as shown by his letters and diary notes, and tended thereby to stop the early elections.⁷⁰⁵ Two important political happenings, which also concerned India, influenced the further actions of the Britishers on the way of granting India's Independence.

The Labour Party came to power in Great Britain and the Japanese were forced to retreat from the Second World War by the Americans dropping the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August, 1945.

Clemens Atlee replaced Winston Churchill as the Prime Minister in Great Britain.⁷⁰⁶

The new British Government supported Lord Wavell's views of arranging the elections as soon as possible.⁷⁰⁷ When the Viceroy officially announced in India, that the elections would be held in winter 1945, the Indian parties concentrated themselves on contesting the elections. Now Jinnah's obstinacy and the fact that Lord Wavell was not in a position to influence him, paid off, because independent Mohemmadan politicians, who had their lion parties or stood by the side of Congress, now made an effort to join the Muslim League.

The Congress Party however believed that the Muslim League would not be having a sensational win in the elections. Nehru assumed that Jinnah would not be winding up Unionist Party in Punjab.⁷⁰⁸ Even Jinnah was not sure of himself in Punjab, as he approached Master Tara Singh, leader of one of the Shiromani Akali Dal groups. In order "to break the Sikhs from the Congress and the appeal is to the portion of Sikhs whom Mr. Jinnah thinks he has the best chance to win over... there is still a section among Akalis not friendly towards Congress and eager to catch any opportunity to achieve its aim; and this section has a fair amount of influence over Master Tara Singh".⁷⁰⁹

The Shromani Akali Dal independently contested the 1945 elections as "Akali leaders appear to have decided that they will contest the elections in their own ticket and will stand out against absorption by Congress".⁷¹⁰

It was the only political Sikh representation, that participated in the elections to the Punjab Legislative Assembly.

The loyal Khalsa National Party of the Sikhs had become meaningless after the death of Sir Sunder Singh Majithia.⁷¹¹ The Central Akali Dal group of Baba Kharak Singh also did not play any more political role for the Sikhs.

The Sikh Congress Party, formed specially for the 1937 elections, did not contest the 1945 elections. Whether the Sikh Congress Party existed at all as an independent party at this time, is doubtful. Unfortunately, neither the Sources nor the Literature gives any information about that.

Perhaps the members of the Sikh Congress Party were again considered as "Congress-oriented" Sikhs at this time.⁷¹²

The results of the elections in Punjab gave the following picture: From 86 Muslim seats, the Muslim League won 75; the Congress won 51 seats, the Akalis 22, the Unionist Party 20 and the Independents 7.⁷¹³

The Muslim League got no clear win in these elections after the publication of election results. Maulana Azad succeeded in building a coalition of Congress Party, Unionist Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab with Sir Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana as the Chief Minister.⁷¹⁴

In this way, Tiwana could remain Chief Minister in Punjab, against which the Muslim League protested. The Muslim League went to the streets and put Tiwana from all sides under pressure, so that the coalition government could not stay for long, as the British Governor supported the Muslim League. Thus Punjab, which was to play a decisive role in the independence of India in the next few months, proved to be delicate and divided from inside.⁷¹⁵

Cabinet Mission and the Appointment of Interim Government

In March 1946, the British Cabinet sent for the second time a delegation with Sir Stafford Cripps to India, in order to finally solve the problem of power transfer.⁷¹⁶

The Congress Party and the Britishers wanted a transfer of power,

free of friction, as India had made good economic progress during the Second World War and had become a believer of Great Britain.⁷¹⁷ Purpose of this Cabinet delegation was:

"... to discuss with the leaders of India and her elected representatives, how best to speed the fulfilment of your aspirations to full control of your own affairs, and thus enable us to complete the transfer of responsibility with pride and honour to ourselves... The issue of freedom and self-determination is therefore settled in principle. We have now to work out in co-operation the means by which Indian can themselves decide the form for their new institutions with the minimum of disturbance and the maximum of speed."⁷¹⁸

The "Cabinet Mission" was the last try by Great Britain, to solve peacefully the Pakistan problem.⁷¹⁹ The delegation sent from London spoke first of all to the Indian leaders in order to know their reaction to the Pakistan problem. On 5 April, 1946, talks were held between the Cabinet delegation and Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh and Baldev Singh as invited representatives of the Sikh community.⁷²⁰

The Cabinet delegation wanted to know from the Sikh representatives:

"(i) whether if the choice were given the Sikh community would prefer the transfer of power to be a single body, or to more than one body.

(ii) if it were found to be practical and would be arranged, as to which the Secretary of State had formed no opinion, would the Sikhs wish to have a separate autonomous State of their own".⁷²¹

Thus, Master Tara Singh ascertained for the Sikh community, that they were against Pakistan, and in case Pakistan was established, the Sikhs would also want to have an independent nation. In order to strengthen this statement, the Sikh representatives gave the Cabinet delegation a memorandum of the Sikhs, in which Pakistan was refused and reasons were given, why Sikhs deserved an independent nation in case Pakistan was established.⁷²²

The Central Akali Dal group of Baba Kharak Singh similarly spoke against Pakistan, as shown by his memorandum to the British Cabinet Delegation. In contrast to Shiromani Akali Dal, the Central Akali Dal however did not demand an independent Sikh nation in case of "Pakistan".⁷²³

Even the Communist Party of India commented on the Pakistan

question in context of the Cabinet Delegation:

“The question of India unity is an internal question to be settled by the people themselves”.⁷²⁴

In this meeting on 5 April, 1946, between the Britishers and the Sikh representatives, the question was also discussed, which area was to be considered for an eventual Sikh nation. Giani Kartar Singh from Shiromani Akali Dal explained “that the Sikhs considered that the whole of the Jullundur and Lahore Divisions should be included together with Hissar, Karnal, Ambala and Simla Districts of the Ambala Division, and the Montgomery and Lyallpur Districts.”⁷²⁵

As an argument to the suggested area for a Sikh nation, the Britishers put forward the transfer of population. This necessary transfer of population was to be achieved in five to ten years with the help of the government according to Giani Kartar Singh, so that the greatest part of the Sikh-population would be settled in that area.⁷²⁶

In contrast to that the Britishers judged the idea of the Sikhs about the named area for the Sikh nation as follows:

“The Sikhs did not know what they wanted and had not defined the boundaries of Sikhistan. The difficulty was that in very few areas did Sikhs constitute the majority; for instance in the districts of Amritsar and Ferozepur there were in each case five divisions, but in each case Sikhs were in the majority in only one out of the five. At present the Sikhs were demanding a State consisting of eight of the existing districts but in such a state, though there would be a non-Muslim majority of fifty to fifty-three per cent, the Muslims would outnumber the Sikhs.”⁷²⁷

The result of the talks with the Sikh representatives was that the Sikhs would not be supporting Pakistan, if they did not get an independent Sikh nation.

The Labour government had tried with the sent Cabinet Delegation to find a constitutional reform, that would appear acceptable to all the parties, especially the Congress and the Muslim League. The delegation placed before Jinnah the alternative, either to take a Pakistan with the six provinces Sind, North-West border province in West, Bengal and Assam in East, Punjab and Baluchistan, that would be joined to Hindustan through a previously signed State-agreement and a Central government without a parliament; or to take into consideration a separation of the Hindu majority districts in the six districts mentioned. Thereby Jinnah was also clearly told that in the last case, Calcutta would also be given to Hindustan, a fact which Jinnah

did not want to accept in any case.⁷²⁸ Finally, a complicated plan was developed by the Cabinet Delegation, which foresaw, that India was to be divided in a number of regions or zones, which included a group of provinces. It was made free for the individual provinces, whether they wanted to remain in their zone or wanted to separate out.⁷²⁹

The zone plan of 1946 by the Cabinet Delegation stated three subdivisions, which factually bordered the West and East Pakistan and India. The first zone included all Hindu majority provinces, and the third Bengal and Assam.⁷³⁰ The question was whether Assam, which had no Mohemmadan majority was to remain in the third zone and whether the Hindu districts of Bengal and Punjab were to be separated. The latter possibility was actually impossible because of the plan of the Cabinet Delegation.

The Cabinet Delegation believed to have wound up the provincial, regional and the Central Government, the Muslim separatism with its three-region-plan together with the three-planes-plan.⁷³¹

With the official comment of the Cabinet Delegation on 16 May, 1946, the first step was taken in reality, to proceed with the partition of India through the decision of the British government.

The Cabinet Delegation similarly recommended the formation of an interim-government and the summoning of a gathering for framing the Constitution. The British Government oriented itself according to these recommendations.⁷³²

The plan of the Cabinet Delegation was taken up differently by the Indian representatives.

Jinnah did not aim at a trial over the setting up of an interim government with the Britishers, because he demanded that the Congress Party may not nominate any Muslim to Ministership. Jinnah's stubbornness was incomprehensible, since the division⁷³³ of the gathering for framing the constitution in three province groups by the Britishers meant the areas he demanded for a future Pakistan. The Congress Party accepted the plan of the Cabinet Delegation.⁷³⁴ Therefore, Nehru, as representative of the Congress was commissioned by the Britishers on 12 August, 1946 to form the government without the involvement of the Muslim League, who had refused to co-operate.⁷³⁵

The Muslim League reacted to this readiness of the Congress by calling a "Direct Action Day" on 16 August, 1946, with which the dark chapter of the partition, the bloodshed, began.⁷³⁶

As the Britishers had foreseen, the Sikhs reacted very disappointingly to the plan of the Cabinet Delegation.⁷³⁷ Master Tara Singh showed his disappointment to the classification of the Sikhs as a minority in group B by the Delegation and to the acquisition of only four out of thirty six seats in the Constituent Assembly by the Sikhs.

Moreover, it angered him as the representative of the Sikh Community in the name of Shiromani Akali Dal that the Sikhs were made quasi-defenceless by these proposals which granted Jinnah, Pakistan and thereby the Muslims an independent nation.⁷³⁸

In the All Parties Sikh Conference in Amritsar on 9 and 10 June, 1946, the Sikh leaders objected to the "newest measures" of the Britishers. They rejected the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation. Master Tara Singh called for boycott and protest against the Britishers, as for example, "to settle disputes themselves, without going to courts".⁷³⁹

Udham Singh Nagoke, leader of one of the Shiromani Akali Dal groups encouraged the Sikhs to take up a military protest against the Britishers:

"He asked the Sikhs to take up the gauntlet, like heroes, thrown to them by the British. If the late S. Shani Singh had sacrificed his life on the battle field of Sabroan and the sun of their rule had set in 1849, the Sikhs should take a vow to end British rule in 1849".

Udham Singh Nagoke did not appear to mean this encouragement seriously, since his following statement "Sikhs did not possess arms but in case the Britishers were self-respecting, they should supply Sikhs with arms and then have a fight with them", showed the myth of his call. This encouragement call by Udham Singh Nagoke indicates clearly the helplessness of the Sikhs, who now foresaw an ostracism. All their hopes had been demolished, the promises of the Britishers that the case of Sikhs would be kept in view, which the Sikhs had interpreted as a granting of many of their demands, turned out to be lies.

It was now clear to the Sikhs that now they had no chance for an independent Sikh nation, the Sikhistan, that was considered as an alternative to Pakistan. Instead of that, Pakistan and a division of Punjab announced itself clearly from the plan of the Cabinet Delegation. Moreover, the Sikhs had been classified as a minority by the Cabinet Delegation.

Therefore, Congress-oriented Udham Singh Nagoke called upon the Congress Party, to reject these British proposals, that were based

on communalism, and to fight with him against the Britishers. As a countermove, the Sikhs would be ready "keeping aside all their objections", to co-operate with the Congress Party and to support its policies in India's struggle for freedom.⁷⁴⁰

As further measures to protest against the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation, different political Sikh organisations tried to unite internally, as the British "Intelligence Bureau" ascertained as a reaction to the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation. The Shiromani Akali Dal however had difficulties in uniting with the Central Akali Dal and the Congress Sikhs, which, however failed because of continuing rivalry.⁷⁴¹

In the All Parties Sikh Conference on 9 and 10 June, 1946, the so-called "Council of Action" was summoned, which in case of no-change in the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation, was to become active for the Sikh community. Interesting is that as President of this Council of Action, neither Master Tara Singh nor Sardar Baldev Singh, minister in the Punjab Legislative Assembly were named, but a former officer of the Indian National Army,⁷⁴² Naranjan Singh Gill.⁷⁴³ According to Britishers, Naranjan Singh Gill became President of the Council of Action, because he was "neutral".⁷⁴⁴ It can only be guessed, to what did his neutrality refer to, as the Britishers said. Perhaps it was meant that Naranjan Singh Gill did not belong to any party. Politically, Naranjan Singh Gill stood nearer to the Congress-oriented Sikhs and supported a further co-operation with the Congress, as British reports show.⁷⁴⁵ He succeeded within the Shiromani Akali Dal, to enter in close contact with Udham Singh Nagoke, similarly Congress-oriented, and with this group to enter against the other Shiromani Akali Dal group Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh, so that the old rivalry was again revived between the two Akali Dal groups and a break-up of the party was feared.⁷⁴⁶

Naranjan Singh Gill talked with the Congress Party and supported an amalgamation of its policies and affairs. In a long letter dated 18 July, 1946, to Nehru, Naranjan Singh Gill informed about his intentions:

a. "To help the Congress Sikhs openly against the Akalis. This would be correct in every way but there were no prospects of success over the main body of Sikhs in the near future.

b. To unite the Sikhs and bring them all to nationalist platform⁷⁴⁷

The Congress Party wanted that the Sikhs, who wanted to boycott

the elections because of their disappointment over the Cabinet proposals, take active part in the elections to the Constituent Assembly and support the interim government.⁷⁴⁸

The Shiromani Akali Dal group of Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh was particularly interested for a boycott of the elections, whereas the Congress Sikhs were dragged to the elections and nomination of the candidates was made under pressure by the Congress.

An involvement of the Communists in struggle against the Cabinet Delegation's proposals was rejected by the Akalis as well as the Sikhs.

Finally, the Akalis also announced their readiness to participate in the elections and the interim-government.⁷⁴⁹ This lay certainly on the role of Naranjan Singh Gill, who had tried through the Udham Singh Nagoke group to move the Akalis to a better understanding with the Congress Party. Moreover the Shiromani Akali Dal could make better use of the status of the Sikh Community as a minority through the relations with the Congress after the failure of an independent Sikh-nation. The Sikhs certainly foresaw the future important political role of the Congress in independent India and hoped, to achieve better chances for their community as minority with these relations.

The sudden political meaning of Naranjan Singh Gill in this context may be perhaps so explained, that Gill acted as a political broker between the Congress-oriented Akalis, the Congress Sikhs and the Congress Party. This political role of Gill is also indicated by his later political career under the protection of the ruling Congress Party in independent India, as Ambassador to Ethiopia from 1955-1960, in Thailand 1960-1964, and as Ambassador in Mexico, Cuba, Panama.⁷⁵⁰

It is also important to note in this context that men of the I.N.A. and Sikhs like Naranjan Singh Gill, tried to participate in the Freedom Movement from within the country in its last phase.

"General" Mohan Singh from the India National Army thus took part in a meeting of the Sikhs in Sultaminid near Amritsar on 7th July and the following days. In this meeting, the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation and the participation of the Sikhs in the elections and the interim-government were discussed again. These discussions however did not take place without the protest action of the Sikhs.⁷⁵¹

The participation of the men from the I.N.A. in this protest action of the Sikhs was judged as the only danger to the Punjab by the Punjab-Governor, because according to him, these protest actions of the Sikhs

would lead to a revaluation of the position of the I.N.A. men and to the following:

“I believe that the Sikh members of the INA will give us more trouble than the INA men of other communities. It is only the Sikhs that the INA men expect a great welcome from a martial class”.⁷⁵²

From the side of the political Sikh groups, the Britishers did not fear their agreement,⁷⁵³ to involve themselves in the interim-government and the elections, in the realisation of India's independence according to the proposals of the Cabinet Delegation.

Moreover, the Britishers considered the Sikhs not to be serious partners, who could enter in massive numbers, because their leaders had shown their political weaknesses because of their rivalry and appeared to the Britishers as unworthy of belief:

“The inherent weakness amongst the Sikhs lies in their failure as has been proved often in the past, to come to an agreement even on major matters due to personal jealousies amongst their leaders.”⁷⁵⁴

The Shiromani Akali Dal was represented⁷⁵⁵ in the Interim Government by Baldev Singh.⁷⁵⁶

After long talks with the Viceroy, the Muslim League finally also joined the interim government.⁷⁵⁷

The Sikhs did not want to join Pakistan in any case. Master Tara Singh activated himself as an agitator in the struggle against Pakistan and called upon the Sikh community, to defend its home-land against the Muslims. It led to disturbances between the Sikhs and the Muslims, who broke out on 14 July 1946 in the North-West border province and had spread themselves in whole of the Punjab till winter 1946.⁷⁵⁸

Previously, there had occurred mass murder between the Muslims and the Hindus on the “direct action day” on 16 August, 1946,⁷⁵⁹ and the initiator was the Muslim League in Calcutta. These bloody riots claimed 47,000 dead, 15,000 wounded and 150,000 refugees⁷⁶⁰ and led to further riots between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in other parts of India. The Civil War, threatened by Jinnah in case Pakistan was rejected by the Hindus, thus became a bitter reality.⁷⁶¹

The Government in Punjab with the Chief Minister Sikander Hyat Khan, through restriction of political freedom till the beginning of 1947, had the riots so long under control, that till this time only a religious civil war could be prevented.

In March 1947, the British Governor took over the rule in Punjab and with that began the civil war between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs,

unsurpassable in atrocities.⁷⁶²

Viceroy Wavell was called back to London. He surrendered his office to Lord Mountbatten, who took the oath of office as the 34th and the last Viceroy of India.⁷⁶³ Almost at the same time, the British Government released the date for the dissolution of the British rule in India, which was to be in June 1948. Because of the tense situation in India and the constantly increasing disturbances, the British Government then decided, to bring forward the date from June 1948 to 15 August, 1947, one hoped to put an early break to the Civil War by a partition of India.⁷⁶⁴

Conclusion

The Indian independence on 15 August, 1947, did not bring for the Sikhs, as for the Muslims, an independent nation.⁷⁶⁵ The Sikhs saw themselves threatened as a minority by the establishment of Pakistan because many Sikhs lived in the areas of the "new nation". It therefore led to a mass exodus of the Sikhs, and also of Hindus, from West-Pakistan to India and as a countermove, of Muslims from East-Punjab to Pakistan.⁷⁶⁶

This exodus, including about twelve million humans, together with the bloody riots, is comparable with the exodus of the East-German population after the end of the Second World War.

The exodus of many Sikhs from West-Pakistan led to a majority of the Sikh community in the north eastern districts of Punjab, as the incoming Sikhs settled in these districts. Previously, the Sikh community had a majority only in Mā'erkotla.

Because of their majority in the north east Punjab, the Sikhs, under the leadership of the Shiromani Akali Dal, now called the Akali Dal, demanded a Punjabi Suba, an independent province within the Indian union, where they could maintain their culture and tradition unhindered.⁷⁶⁷

However, only on 15 November, 1966, the Sikhs got a concession to a Punjabi Suba, under the first rule of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The previous state of Punjab, according to a decision of the Congress Party and the Central Government, was divided on 9 May, 1966, in two separate states: In Punjab Suba whose half population was made up of Sikhs, got only an indirect self-rule in this way, and in Haryana, which had a Hindu majority.⁷⁶⁸

However, the Punjabi Suba remained a dream, with which the Sikhs have not been able to come to terms even today. Since 1981, the Sikhs are again claiming for an independent Sikh-nation, Khalistan, and are demanding more autonomy.

Footnotes:

564. See for that S. 110-117 of this work.

565. The letter from Balwant Singh, General Secretary, Shiromani Akali Dal to J. Nehru dated 20 Feb. 1940, in J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 94, in NMM & L/Delhi.

So also communicated in another letter from Ajit Singh Ambalvi, General Secretary, Shromani Akali Dal, Amritsar, to J.B. Kriplani, General Secretary, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, of 27 Feb., 1940, in All India Congress Committee Papers File G-42/1939-40 Minorities Communities, in NMM & L/Delhi. Demand Catalogue also in N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Reg.I, 1940, S. 356, 357.

566. All India Congress Committee Papers File G-42/1939-40 = Minority Communities, letter from Master Tara Singh to Maulana Azad dated 26.4.1940, in NMM&L/Delhi.

567. All India Congress Committee Papers File G-42/1939-40 = Minority Communities, letter from Master Tara Singh to Maulana Azad on 26.4.1940, in NMM&L/Delhi.

568. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125 Number 89 = From Sir Henry Craik to Lord Linlithgow, 24 Sept. 1940, in IOL/London.

569. Paul Wallace, The Political Party System of Punjab State (India) A Study of Factionalism. (Diss.) University of Missouri, Columbia 1966, S. 342.

570. See S. 144, 145 of this work.

571. See S. 116 of this work.

572. Hukam Singh, Interview, Transcript, S. 65-67. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, a.a.O., S. 81. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S. 91, 105. P. Wallace, The Political Party System..., a.a.O., S.342. Naranjin Gill, Interview, Transcript, S. 18, R/3/176 = Collection of Papers of the Governor of the Punjab..., March 1947-August 1947, From that Secret, S. 179-184. R/3/132 = 592 (63) GG, 43 Coll. I = Corresp. with the leaders of the Sikhs..., from that Extract from Report No. 609, dated the 15.6.1946 from His Excellency the Governor of Punjab to H.E. the Viceroy, in IOL/London. So also

in Report of Prof. Dr. Fauja Singh, Akalis and the India National Congress, 1920-1947.

573. Hukum Singh, Interview, Transcript, with Mr. Manchanda for Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, Delhi.

574. Khushwant Singh, A History..., a.a.O., Vol.II, S. 249, footnote 13, N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Reg., Vol.I, 1937, S.154. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S.83.

575. In addition to Khalsa Defence of India League see S. 116 of this work.

576. Harcharan Singh Bajwa, Fifty Years of Punjab Politics, 1920-1970. Chandigarh 1979, S. 31.

577. N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Reg., Vol.I, 1943, S.3., K. C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S. 82, 83.

578. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S. 83.

579. N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Reg., Vol.I, 1942, S.344-346, See also Tribune, 24 Sept. 1942, Minister's Speech. Also K. C. Gulati, The Akalis..., a.a.O., S. 83.

580. Information Department L/P&J/8/662-1942-45 = Punjab Ministry Affairs, from that The Punjab Controversy, in IOL/London.

581. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F. 125 Number 91. From B. Glancy to Lord Linlithgow, 26. May 1942. For jhatka see S. 74 of this work.

582. Statesman, 3 June, 1942. Stephen Oren, The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists..., a.a.O., S.411.

583. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125 Number 91. From Glancy to Linlithgow, 10 June, 1942, in IOL/London.

584. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present, a.a.O., S.85.

585. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past..., a.a.O., S. 82, 83.

586. Statesman, 2 August, 1942.

587. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 91 = Letter from B. Glancy to Lord Linlithgow, 5 Feb., 1942, in IOL/London.

588. Statesman, 22 August, 1942.

589. Statesman, 22 August, 1942.

590. Questions asked during recruitment. See S. 113 of this work.

591. Statesman, 31 May, 1942.

592. Tribune, 5 August, 1941.

593. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F. 125, Number 91 = From Glancy to Linlithgow, 30, June 1942, in IOL/London. Also in Statesman, 26 June, 1942. Master Tara Singh comments in this article.

594. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur. F. 125, Number 92 = "Enclosure" by B.J. Glancy on 21 July, 1943 in the letter by G.M. Brander dated 21st July, 1943 to the secretary to the Punjab Governor in IOL/London.
595. Tribune, 15 July, 1942.
596. Tribune, 27 July, 1942.
597. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 91 = From Glancy to Linlithgow, 18 July, 1942.
598. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 91 = From Glancy to Linlithgow, 21 August, 1942, in India Office Library/London.
599. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125, Number 92 = From Glancy to Linlithgow, 29 May, 1943, in IOL/London.
600. Tribune 12, August 1942.
601. Missing word could not be traced in the source!
602. Tribune, 22 July, 1942.
603. See S. 130 of this work.
604. See S. 113, 132 of this work.
605. Stephen Oren, *The Sikhs, Congress and the Unionists...*, a.a.O., S. 397-418.
606. Information Department L/I/1/777 File No. 462/22 = Political situation in India since the outbreak of war 1939-47, from that Confidential Appreciation of the Political Situation in India, 25 June, 1943, issued on the authority of the Secretary of State for India, in IOL/London.
607. See S. 97-99 of this work.
608. All India Congress Committee Papers File G-16/1940 = *Groups in the Congress...*, From that letter of 9.5.1940 from M. Desai. In NAI/New Delhi.
609. See S. 113 of this work.
610. J. Nehru Papers II, File 31 = AICC and Working Committee's Resolutions ..., from that All India Congress Committee, in NMM&L/Delhi.
611. Besides that, there were the so called foreign Indians, among them many Sikhs, who had left India in 1900 because of poor economic and political situation. They settled above all in the USA, Singapore and Great Britain. They made contacts with the Congress, which ran through the organisations set by the non-resident Indians. See for that: All India Congress Committee Papers, File OS-28/1939-40 = Indian Overseas USA. All India Congress Committee Papers, File OS-30/

1939-40 = Indian Overseas, Great Britain. All India Congress Committee Papers, File OS-3/1946 = Correspondence with J.J. Singh, President, India League, New York, J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 97 = From Surat Alley, London 19 July 1945, in NMM&L/Delhi.

612. For complete portrayal, origination, aims and actions of the Indian National Army see the article "Indian Independence movements organised by Indians in the Far East", published in the Free Press Journal of Bombay, published in N.N. Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Reg. 1945, Vol.II..., S. 194-298. Besides K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army, Meerut 1969, AsKhushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 190, S. 244, details S. 244-249 and J. Voigt, India in Second World War, a.a.O., S. 100.

613. See S. 40-42 of this work.

614. See for that Khushwant Singh. Sikhs and the Indian National Army, in The Missionary, Jan-March 1963, S. 25.

615. J. Voigt, India in Second World War, a.a.O., S. 100.

616. See for that Kirpal Singh, Sikh contribution in the INA Freedom Movement, in The Missionary, June 1960, S. 114. K.K. Ghosh, The Indian National Army, Meerut, 1969, S.2.

617. Also see the first General of the INA, Mohan Singh, was a Sikh, see Khushwant Singh, Sikhs and the Indian National Army, a.a.O., S. 18.

618. Khushwant Singh, Sikhs and the Indian..., a.a.O., S.27. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II, a.a.O., S.245.

619. D. Rothermund, The Formation of Political Will in India, a.a.O., S.200.

620. See Khushwant Singh's, Sikhs and the Indian National Army, a.a.O., S. 32, 33, for the struggle see Voigt, India in Second World War, a.a.O., S. 255-257.

621. Further see J. Voigt's India in Second World War, a.a.O., S. 300, 301.

622. D. Rothermund, The Formation of..., a.a.O., S. 176-178, J. Voigt, India in..., a.a.O., S.33-36. B.B. Misra, The Indian Political..., a.a.O., S.472-473.

623. Subhash Chandra Bose President of the Congress Party, 1938-39 leader of the Indian Movement in Europe, 1941-1943 in South East and East Asia. 1943-1945 also J. Voigt India in..., a.a.O., S. 408.

624. J. Nehru Papers III, File 348 = Trial of I.N.A. 1946, in NMM&L/Delhi

Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army*, Berkeley, 1971, S.160. K.K. Ghosh, *The Indian....*, a.a.O., S. 198-251.

625. Jurgen Lutt, *Religion and Politics in India*. Pandit Malaviyas role of a broker in political Hinduism in the beginning of the 20th century Unpublished. Habilitations script 1976, S. 2. See for that Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India. The Development of a Multi-Party System*. Princeton, New Jersey 1957, S. 164.

626. D. Rothermund, *The Formation....*, a.a.O., S. 190.

627. Bhim Sen Singh, *The Cripps Mission*, New Delhi 1942, S. 30.

628. See for that Appendix No. 6: Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders published on 30 March, 1942.

629. J. Voigt, *India in....*, a.a.O., S. 136.

630. J. Voigt, *India in....*, a.a.O., S. 135, 136 see R.J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-1945*. Oxford 1979, particularly S. 55-76, See further V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, Calcutta 1957, S. 115-124.

631. 1889-1952. Closer to Stafford Cripps see J. Voigt, *India in....*, a.a.O., S. 132, 133.

632. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 249.

633. J. Voigt, *India in....*, a.a.O., S.137.

634. See for that Appendix No. 6: Draft Declaration, Clause (e). Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 250 R.J. Moore, *Churchill, Cripps and India 1939-1945*. Oxford 1979, S. 87-96.

635. See for that Appendix No. 8: Muslim League Resolution, passed by the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League.

636. See for that S. 131-137 of this work.

637. Khushwant Singh, *A History....*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 250. Also see Appendix No.7: Sikhs Reject Proposals.

638. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 16, 1942.

639. *Civil and Military Gazette*, April 7, 1942.

640. Home Political Files 221/42 = Reaction by Stafford Cripps Mission, from that Extract from the Punjab Fortnightly Report for the second half of March 1942, received from the Intelligence Officer, Lahore, in NAI/Delhi.

641. Home Political Files 221/42 = Reaction by Stafford Cripps Mission, from that Secret Report dated 6.4.1942, in NAI/Delhi.

642. Linlithgow Collection, MSS Eur F 125, Number 141 = Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission...., from that letter of G. Ogilvie dated 30. March 1942, to Pinnell, in India Office Library/London.

643. See for that S. 119 of this work.

644. See for that S. 119 of this work.

645. For Lajpat Rai and his relations with the Arya Samaj see Norman G. Barrier, *The Arya Samaj and Congress Politics in the Punjab, 1894-1908*, in *Journal of Asian Studies*, 1966-67, No. 26, S. 363-379.

646. See for that Appendix No. 9: Removal of "The Hindu-Muslim Problem" from Lala Lajpat Rai.

647. Home Political Files 18/5/43-Poll = Fortnightly Report on the First Half of May 1943. Home Political Files 18/12/43-Poll = Fortnightly..., on the Second Half of Dec. 1943, in NAI/Delhi.

648. N.N. Mitra (ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, Vol. II, 1942, a.a.O., S.306.

649. See for that S. 120, 121 of this work.

650. Linlithgow Collection, MSS Eur F 125 Number 91 = Correspondence with the Governor of the Punjab and his Secretary 1942, from that letter of B. Glancy to Lord Linlithgow on 1 May, 1942, in IOL/London.

651. J. Voigt, *India in...*, a.a.O., S. 163.

652. See for that Appendix No. 10: The Quit India Demand. Resolution of the All India Congress Committee, Bombay, 8 August, 1942.

653. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 192-195. See also for that B.B. Misra, *The Indian Political Parties*, Delhi 1976. S. 386-395. V.D. Mahajan, *The Nationalist Movement in India*, New Delhi, Bangalore..., 2. Aufl. 1979. S. 475-501.

654. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, Vol. II, a.a.O., S. 251.

655. See for that S. 130 of this work.

656. Princeton, New Jersey, 1966. S.81.

657. See S. 112, 113 of this work.

658. K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis...*, a.a.O., S. 92.

659. Delhi 1974.

660. See S. 141 of this work.

661. Linlithgow Collection MSS Eur F 125 Number 92 = Corresp... Jan-Oct. 1943. From Sir B. Glancy to Linlithgow, Oct. 12, 1943, in India Office Library/London.

662. See S. 75 of this work.

663. The Sikh Congress Party see S.61, 62 of this work.

664. K.C. Gulati *The Akalis...*, a.a.O., S.86.

665. B.B. Misra, *The Indian Political Parties*, a.a.O., S. 503. see for details Appendix No.11: Mr. C. Rajagopalachari's formula, 10 July, 1944.
666. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics* a.a.O., S. 275-279. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 252.
667. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, a.a.O., S. 274. K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis Past and Present*, a.a.O., S. 105-106.
668. *Tribune*, 21 August, 1944.
669. *Tribine*, 21 August, 1944.
670. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, a.a.O., Vol.II, S. 252, 253. Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics...*, a.a.O., S. 86-87. See also *Tribune* 1 August, 1944.
671. See S. 118, 119 of this work.
672. B.R. Nayar, *Minority Politics...*, a.a.O., S. 86.
673. M.S. Sahni, *The Sikh Politics*, a.a.O., Diss., S. 275.
674. Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*, a.a.O., S. 98. For Sikhistan, see Nayar, *Minority...*, S. 88-97.
675. K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis Past and Present*, a.a.O., S.106. See also D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S.197.
676. N.N. Mitra (ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, Vol.I, 1945, S. 310.
677. N.N. Mitra (ed.), *Indian Annual Register*, Vol.II, 1945, S. 176, *Statement of the Sapru Committee in its last report on 27 December, 1945.*
678. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 195.
679. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 195, 196.
680. See for that also *Jinnah-Gandhi Talks* (September 1944). Text of Corresp. and other documents etc. Central Office, All India Muslim League, Delhi 1944.
681. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 197, 198. See also V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 176
682. See for that Appendix No. 12: Broadcast Speech of the Viceroy Lord Wavell, 14 June, 1945.
683. C. Schreneck-Notzing, *100 Years of India*, a.a.O., S. 119.
684. All India Congress Committee Papers, File G-58/1945-46, letter of 7 July, 1945 from the Congress to Lord Wavell, in NMM&L/Delhi.
685. *Statesman*, 25 June, 1945.
686. All India Congress Committee Papers File G--58/1945-46, letter of the Congress dated 9 July, 1945 to Tara Singh. Also see All

India Congress Committee Papers. File G-58/1945-46, letter of the Congress of 7 July, 1945 on Lord Wavell in NMM&L/Delhi.

687. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 212.

688. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 198, 199.

689. Penderel Moon (Ed.), *Wavell, The Viceroy's Journal*. London 1973, S. 146-147.

690. P. Moon (Ed.), *Wavell*, a.a.O., S. 149.

691. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 215.

692. See S. 149 of this work.

693. See S. 139-143 of this work.

694. K.C. Gulati, *The Akalis Past and Present*, a.a.O., S. 112.

695. See S. 137-139 of this work.

696. All India Congress Committee Papers File G-58/1945-46, Simla Conference, from the Broadcast from Subhas Chandra Bose, 22 June, 1945, in NMM&L/Delhi.

697. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., Vol. VI, Document Number 2, Agenda, Memoranda and Minutes of Governor's Conference, 1-2 August, 1945.

698. P. Moon (Ed), *Moon...*, a.a.O. S. 160, 2 August, 1945.

699. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., Vol. VI, Doc. Number 2 Third Meeting of Governors Conference, 2 August, 1945, S. 22,

700. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., Vol. VI, Document Number 4, letter by Wavell to Mr. Pethick-Lawrence on 5 August, 1945.

701. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., VI, Document Number 4, letter by Wavell to Mr. Pethick-Lawrence on 5 August, 1945.

702. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., VI, Document Number 4, letter by Wavell to Mr. Pethick-Lawrence vom 5 August, 1945.

703. *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., Vol. VI, Document Number 29, cited from letter by Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell (Extract) on 16 August, 1945.

704. See for that also letter by Wavell to Mr. Pethick-Lawrence of 20. August 1945, in *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., VI, Document Number 47.

705. See the letter from Wavell to Mr. Pethick -Lawrence, 10 August 1945, letter from Wavell to Mr. Pethick -Lawrence, 21 August, 1945, as Memorandum in the *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., VI, Document Numbers 47, 51. Besides P. Moon, Wavell., a.a.O. Journal Notice of 27 Aug., 1945, S.165, 166, as journal notice of 29 Aug, 1945, S.167.

706. V.P. Menon, *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 216, 217

707. V.P. Menon, *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 217.
708. L. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 199.
709. J. Nehru Papers I, Vol. 28, letter by Naranjan Singh Gill dated 24.8.1945, in NMM&L/Delhi.
710. Collections of Series of Government of India Records transferred to London R/3/1/105 = 592 (27) GG/43 Coll.16 (1945) = Review of the political situation... from that Extract from a Report No. 579 dated 29.9.2945 from His Excellency the Governor of Punjab to His Excellency the Viceroy, in IOL/London.
711. See S. 131 of this work.
712. See S.61, 62 of this work.
713. V.P. Menon, *Transfer of Power*, a.a.O., S. 230.
714. Information Department L/I/1/777, File No. 462/22 = Political situation in India since the outbreak of war 1939-47, from that Confidential Appreciation of the Political Situation in India No. 3 of 1946, dated 21 March, 1945, issued on the authority of the Secretary of State for India. See also V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, a.a.O., S. 231, who similarly mentions this coalition and D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 200 who names Congress Party and the Unionist Party as the members of this coalition.
715. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 200, S. 201.
716. For the first Cripps Mission see pages 139-143 of this book.
717. D. Rothermund, *The Formation...*, a.a.O., S. 201. See also V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, a.a.O., S. 236.
718. *Transfer of Power*, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 1, Statements by Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Sir S. Cripps on their arrival in India, 23 March, 1946; Document Number 2, Statement made by Lord Pethick-Lawrence at a Press Conference at New Delhi on 25 March, 1946.
719. See for that V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, a.a.O., S. 236-255. Khushwant Singh, *A History of the Sikhs*, Vol.II, a.a.O., S. 257.
720. V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*, a.a.O., S. 242, 243.
721. *Transfer of Power*, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 56 = Record of a Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and Representatives of the Sikh Community on Friday, 5 April, 1946.
722. See for that Appendix No. 13: Sikh Memorandum to the

Cabinet Mission.

723. See for that Appendix Nr. 14: Memorandum of the Central Akali Dal.

724. N.N. Mitra (ed.) Indian Annual Register, Vol.II, 1946, S. 220, Communist Party Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, dated the 15 April, 1946.

725. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 56 = Record of a Meeting between Cabinet Delegation..., 5 April, 1946.

726. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 56 = Record of a Meeting..., 5 April, 1946.

727. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 41 = Note of Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and the Nawab of Mamdot on Tuesday 2 April 1946.

728. D. Rothermund, The Formation..., a.a.O., S. 202, V.P. Menon. The Transfer..., a.a.O., S. 248.

729. For near explanation of Regions and Zones, see D. Rothermund, The Formation..., a.a.O. S.202-203.

730. See Appendix No. 15: Statement of the Cabinet Mission, 16.5.46.

731. D. Rothermund, The Formation..., a.a.O., S. 204. For details V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India a.a.O., S. 476, Appendix V, Broadcast of the Secretary of States, 16.5.1946.

732. D. Rothermund, The Formation..., a.a.O., S. 204.

733. See Appendix No.15: Excerpt from the Statement of the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, 16 May, 1946.

734. See for that V.P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, a.a.O., S. 272. Besides Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O. Letter from Sir E Jenkins (Punjab) to Viceroy Wavell, 9 May, 1946, Document Number 232, in which Jenkins says "The attitude of the Congress is uncalculable but on the whole it seems to likely, that they will officially accept the solution".

735. D. Rothermund The Formation..., a.a.O., S. 204, 205.

736. J. Voigt, India..., a.a.O., S. 306, See also S.163 of this work.

737. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 232 = Letter from Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, 9 May, 1946.

738. See for that Appendix No. 15: Extract from Statement of the Cabinet Mission, 16 May, 1946. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 463 = Record of Interview of Cabinet Delegation

and Field Marshal Viscount Wavell with Master Tara Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh on 6 June, 1946 at 4 p.m.

739. Transfer of Power, VII, a.a.O., Document Number 482 = Resolution of the Sikh Panthic Conference dated 10 June, 1946.

740. From R/3/132 = 592 (63) GG 143 Coll. I: Correspondence with the leaders of the Sikhs in connection with the Statement of May 16, 1946, issued by the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency the Viceroy, May 1946-August 1946. From that Speeches made at the All Parties Sikh Conference held at Amritsar on 9 and 10 June, 1946, in IOL/London.

741. Records of Central Government R/3 Provincial Government in India, from that R/3/1/132 = 592 (63) 143 Coll. I, Corresp., a.a.O., from that Letter from E.M. Jenkins to Lord Wavell, Secret No. 603, 21 May, 1946. From that on 14.6.46, Report of Intelligence Bureau, Cabinet Mission's Proposals, Note on Sikh direct action in IOL/London.

742. For Indian National Army see S. 137-139 of this book. Information Department L/I/777 File No. 462/22 Political Situation, From that Confidential Appreciation..., 19 June, 1946, in IOL/London.

743. Born on 15 Jan. 1906, Member of Indian National Army, President, Pratinidhi Panthic Board 1946, from Oral History Interview with Naranjan Singh Gill, April 11, 1972 by S.L. Manchanda for the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, Delhi.

744. R/3/1/132 = 592 (63) GG 143 Colle. I = Corresp..., a.a.O., Intelligence Bureau, Report of 14.6.46.

745. R/3/1/132 = 592 (63) GG 143 Coll. I = Corresp..., a.a.O., Extract from Report No. 614, dated the 15.7.1946 from the Governor of the Punjab to the Viceroy, from that likewise extract from a source report dated 8 July, 1946.

746. R/3/1/132 = 592(63)GG, 143 Coll. I: Correspondence..., a.a.O., Intelligence Bureau, Extract from a source report dated 8 July, 1946, in IOL/London.

747. All India Congress Committee Papers, File G-56/1946 = Congress and the Sikhs in the Punjab, Letter from Naranjan Singh Gill to J. Nehru, 18 July, 1946, in NMM&L/Delhi.

748. R/3/1/132 = 592(63) GG, 143 Coll. I: Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Extract from Report No. 614, dated the 15.7.1946 from His Excellency the Governor of the Punjab to H.E. the Viceroy in IOL/London.

749. R/3/1/132= 592(63) GG, 143 Coll.I: Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Extract from the record of meeting the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy on 17 July 1946 at 9.30 a.m., see Information Department L/I/1/777 File No. 462/22 = Political Situation... a.a.O., from that Pol.9786/1946 Secret: Confidential Appreciation of the Political Situation in India, No.8, 1946, dated 19 August, 1946, prepared under the authority of the Governor, in IOL/London.
750. See for that Oral History Interview with Shri Naranjan Singh Gill New Delhi India, April 11, 1972, by Shri S.L. Manchanda for the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Delhi.
751. R/3/1/132= 592 (63) GG, 43 Coll.I, Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Extract from Report No.614, dated 15.7.1946.
752. R/3/1/132= 592(63) GG, 143 Coll.I, Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Extract from Report No.609, dated 15.6.1946.
753. R/3/132= 592(63) GG, 143 Coll.I, Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Intelligence Bureau 14.6.1946, Cabinet Mission's Proposals. Note on Sikh direct action, in India Office Library/London.
754. R/3/1/132= 592(63) GG, 143 Coll.I, Corresp..., a.a.O., from that Intelligence Bureau 14.6.1946, Cabinet Mission's Proposals. Note on Sikh direct action in India Office Library/London.
755. For Baldev Singh see S. 130-131 of this work.
756. Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*. Princeton, New Jersey 1966, S. 93.
757. Dietmar Rothermund, *The Formation...*, S. 206, Baldev Raj Nayar, *Minority Politics in the Punjab*, a.a.O., S. 93.
758. For that see in detail Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (ed.), *Muslim League Attack on Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab 1947*. Amritsar 1950, S. 52-209, as well as Supplement S.258-358. This report describes the individual massacres, however only from the point of view of Sikhs.
759. See for that S. 159, 160 of this book.
760. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, a.a.O., Vol.II, S. 268, J. Voigt, *India in...*, a.a.O., S. 306. C. Schrenck-Notzing, *Hundred Years of India*. Stuttgart 1961. S. 122. C. Mittelsten Scheid, *The Division of India*, a.a.O., S. 45, L. Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj*. London 1961. S. 11.
761. Kailash Chander Gulati, *The Akalis Past and Present*, New Delhi 1974, S. 130.
762. Khushwant Singh, *A History...*, a.a.O., Vol.II, S.271, Schrenck-

Notzing, Hundred..., a.a.O., S. 124-125. Wilhelm von Pochhammer
Indians Nation. Bermen 1973, S. 689.

763. J.H. Voigt, India in..., S.307.

764. D. Rothermund, The Formation..., a.a.O., S.210, 211.

765. See the details of the following work:

Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab. A study of its effects on the
Politics..., New Delhi, 1965.

Kirpal Singh, The Partition of the Punjab, Patiala, 1972.

766. For that Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, Vol.II,
a.a.O., S. 282. Details L. Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj,
London 1961.

767. B.R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab, Princeton, New
Jersey 1966, S. 98-118. K.C. Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present,
New Delhi 1974. S. 160-191.

Arjit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba, Delhi 1970.

768. For division of Punjab State on 9 May, 1966, see "The Division
of Punjab" in India Asia 9, 1967, pages 16-17.

Summary

The end of the 19th century was marked for the Sikh community by its re-founded "identity" and its loyalty was represented by the Singh Sabha to the British.

However, already at the beginning of the 20th century the loyalist attitude of the Sikh-community, which was brought about by the Singh Sabha, changed.

Outside India Sikhs took part in the Ghadr Movement as extremists. Inside India the Akalis, as moderates and radicals of the Gurdwara Reform Movement obtained the political leadership of the Sikh-masses, which was earlier in the hands of the loyal Chief Khalsa Dewan, the political organ of the Singh Sabha that time.

After the official handing-over of the Gurdwara-management (administration) into the hands of the Sikhs by the Gurdwara Act from 1925, the Sikhs increasingly devoted themselves to the policy of safeguarding and consolidating their rights.

In course of time different political Sikh-groups emerged, which have to be seen in connection with the constitutional development in British India.

Despite their protests the Sikhs had to resign themselves to the Communal Award of the British. This Communal Award imposed separate electorates on them.

The provincial elections which took place in 1937, compelled them to adapt to the so developed political situation. The Sikhs established parties, which were based on the Communal Award.

The Khalsa National Party was established due to the forthcoming provincial elections in the Punjab. This party replaced the loyal Chief Khalsa Dewan, which had become politically insignificant for the Sikhs.

The Sikh Congress Party, too, was finally established because of the provincial elections. Sikhs, who were closely connected with the Congress, should participate in the election campaign in accordance with the Congress programme.

The Akali Party was not created because of the provincial elections but developed before out of the Gurdwara Reform Movement.

Its separation into Shromani Akali Dal and Central Akali Dal was due to internal differences. These differences concerned the clarifi-

cation of the political action and the political objective. Due to this the Central Akali Dal-wing of Giani Sher Singh joined the Chief Khalsa Dewan in the formation of the Khalsa National Party.

The Kirti Kisan Sabha mainly absorbed terrorist Sikhs, who once were closely connected with the Ghadr Movement. Its foundation took place independent of the elections in 1933.

For the Akali Parties, Sikh Congress Party and Kirti Kisan Sabha, one of their tasks was to aspire to the independence of India. The expectations of the Khalsa National Party were in opposition to it. It demanded a united Indian nation without reference to independence.

Between 1935-1939 the Khalsa National Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal did not have good relations with each other. Again and again the loyalist Khalsa National Party, which gave support to the Unionist Party in the Punjab in the following years, had to defend itself against assaults on the part of the Shiromani Akali Dal.

The conflicts of the Khalsa National Party's attitude, connected with the Central Akali Dal-wing of Giani Sher Singh and the Shiromani Akali Dal extended from mere dissension to political rivalry. The reason for it can be found in the claim to power of the respective Sikh parties.

Each Sikh-party wished to be considered as only representation of the Sikh-community and to build up an own political powerful position. The result of the election in the Punjab in 1937 showed that this could not be realised without support by other political parties. The Khalsa National Party entered into an alliance with the Unionist Party and the Shiromani Akali Dal with the Congress Party. The important political representatives of the Sikh community, Shiromani Akali Dal wing of Giani Sher Singh, opposed each other in the election campaign. The election, taking place in the Punjab in 1937, also brought about a definite defeat for the Muslim League. The conclusion of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, dated 1937, provoked for the first time a common agreement between the political Sikh groups. Now loyalist and moderate Sikhs agreed on the opinion of the Shiromani Akali Dal that Sir Sikander Hayat Khan did not pursue a "non communal" policy.

Together with other political groups, the Congress representation in the Punjab formed the opposition after the election. The Shiromani Akali Dal more and more turned to the Congress Party after the election. The reason for this readiness of the Shiromani Akali Dal to co-operate with the Congress can certainly be found in the Khalsa

National Party's participation in governmental affairs to support the Unionist Party in the Punjab.

Another support of the Congress Party by Sikhs was performed by the Sikh Congress Party, which had been founded in 1936. However, the co-operation between the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal had not been successful for a long time. In 1939, the relationship between the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress Party was strained in an evident way, which can be traced back to the mutual dissatisfaction with the political attitude of the opposition. The Shiromani Akali Dal accused the Congress of having permanently ignored the Sikh interests.

It is to be suspected that the Shiromani Akali Dal made use out of the relationship to the Congress Party in order to be able to press through its demands concerning the Sikh community by means of the expected support by the Congress Party.

Therefore, the Shiromani Akali Dal-Congress relationship was quite problematic, since both parties had not been in a position to fulfill the expectations of the other party because of their own motivations.

At that time, the Kisan Sabha, too, co-operated with the Congress Party against the Unionist Government in the Punjab and with that indirectly against the British, too. In the Punjab the Congress Party established relations with the Shiromani Akali Dal, to the Kirti Kisan Party and to the Sikh Congress Party. This co-operation was, with exception to that of the Sikh Congress Party, problematic. The Congress Party could rely neither on the Shiromani Akali Dal nor on the Kirti Kisan Party, because the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Kirti Kisan Party made efforts to follow up their own political aims.

The co-operation of the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Kisan Sabha with the opposition party in the Punjab, the Congress, led in the result to disappointment and break with the Congress Party. The Congress did not see itself in a position to fulfil the expectations of both parties.

The political needs of the parties in India shifted due to the outbreak of World War II.

Great Britain's entry into the war in 1939 and the Muslims' demand for Pakistan led to a change of the political attitude of the Sikh parties. Besides the Khalsa National Party, connected with the Central Akali Dal Wing of Giani Sher Singh, the Sikh-untouchables like Ramdasis and Mazhibis promised their loyalty to give war-support to the British. The Congress Sikhs and the Sikh Congress Party followed the political decision of the Congress Party and granted no war-support.

The Congress-oriented Central Akali-wing of Baba Kharak Singh kept its distance, too, from a participation in the war in favour of the British and with that followed the political decision of the Congress Party.

In the first instance, the Communist Party of India and with that the Kirtis as its members, too, opposed a participation in the war. Hitler's invasion into Soviet Union in 1941 changed not only the opinion of India's Communist Party, but also the one of the Kirtis on the question concerning the participation in the war, too. Now unlimited war-support was promised.

Since 1942 the British could not only count on the war-support by the Sikhs of the Khalsa National Party, but also on the war-support by the Kirtis. In order to strengthen the position of the Sikhs in the army as well as to maintain a preference in minority questions by the British, the Shiromani Akali Dal, too, under the leadership of Master Tara Singh, promised war-support to the British. This seemed important to him because of the fact that the settlement of the Pakistan question was unsolved. The main problem of the Sikh-community was, despite the Pakistan danger, arising in India's new formation to reach a favourable position as separate community, in order to be able to represent their demands and rights in a successful way.

Sir Stafford Cripp's proposals made in 1942 to solve the question of India, which triggered the resistance of the political Sikh-representations, since according to the opinion of the Sikhs, the concession of Pakistan was included in these proposals, led to the Azad Punjab demand of the Sikhs. The Azad Punjab demand was not supported by all political Sikh-groups. The Central Akali Dal-wing of Baba Kharak Singh protested, as well as the Sikhs from the Rawalpindi district because they feared to be part of the Muslim province in case of a separation of the Punjab. They demanded Akhand Hindustan, a united India. The Central Akali Dal-wing of Baba Kharak Singh relied on an increased co-operation between Hindus and Sikhs instead of the Azad Punjab solution made by the Shiromani Akali Dal in order to refuse the suspected Muslim domination in the Punjab.

The Khalsa National Party agreed on the policy of Unionist-leader and Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, and was not only against Pakistan, but also against Azad Punjab.

The demand of the Shiromani Akali Dal for Azad Punjab was not given great importance by the British, since the political Sikh groups

did not show any unity. They presented themselves to the public in a quarrelsome way and tried to play off one against the other.


If the Shiromani Akali Dal had succeeded in achieving the support of the other political Sikh groups concerning the Azad Punjab demand and to approach the British in this demand as united political Sikh-group, there would have been the chance to be regarded by the British concerning this demand in a "more serious" way.

The demand for Pakistan made by the Muslim League among others finally became so important for the British, because of the fact that a Muslim-party with a leader represented the whole Muslim community in India and interpreted it as an independent community with its own politico-cultural value and self-consciousness.

Instead of finding a common political line, which was demonstrated to the public for the advantages of the Sikh-community, no agreements could be made because of the hostilities and rivalries of the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Central Akali Dal and the Khalsa National Party even if the same political opinion was held. In this connection the separation of the Shiromani Akali Dal into the groups Master Tara Singh/Giani Kartar Singh and Udham Singh Nagoke/Isher Singh Majhail, which, too, originally were connected with the rivalry about the leadership of the party, affected it in a very negative way.

It can be summed up that the political Sikh groups because of their inability to present themselves as a united political Sikh-representation, were not regarded, like the Muslim League, as a concerted political representation of a community by the British. Therefore, the demand for a separate province, respectively for a separate Sikh-state in case of the Pakistan-concession, did not influence further political decisions by the British on the independence of India.

Appendix No.1: The External Features of Sikhs



(From W.H. McLeod, *The Way of the Sikh*, London 1975, S.i0, 52.)

Appendix No. 1a: Gurus of Sikhs

The ten Gurus of Sikhs

- 1) Guru Nanak (1469-1538)
- 2) Guru Angad (1504-1552)
- 3) Guru Amar Das (1479-1574)
- 4) Guru Ram Das (1534-1581)
- 5) Guru Arjun (1563-1606)
- 6) Guru Hargovind (1595-1644)
- 7) Guru Hari Rai (1630-1661)
- 8) Guru Hari Krishan (1656-1664)
- 9) Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675)
- 10) Guru Govind Singh (1666-1708)

(From Gopal Singh, *The Sikhs*, Madras 1970)

**Appendix No. 2 : Nehru Report. Presidential Address of
Pandit Motilal Nehru, Forty-third In-
dian National Congress, Calcutta, 29
December 1928.**

.....What is our destination?

My answer straight and simple is FREEDOM in substance, and not merely in form, by whatever name you call it. The Madras Congress has declared the goal as "Complete Independence". The All-Parties Committee has recommended "Dominion Status". I have explained my position more than once, but with your permission I shall restate it here as clearly as I can. To put in a nutshell it comes to this: I am for Complete Independence--as full as any Dominion possesses it today--provided I get it before it loses all attraction. I am for severance of British connexion as it subsists with us today, but I am not against it as it exists with the Dominions.

Let me explain. National freedom unrestricted and unqualified is the natural craving of the human soul. I do not believe that there is a single Indian, be he or she a member of a party or group, or one completely detached from all parties and groups, who does not love freedom or will not have it. Differences arise only when the question is raised whether it is possible to have and to keep freedom; and it is then that we find opinion sharply divided. There are those who have the faith in them and in their countrymen to answer the question by an emphatic "yes"--and I may at once say that I am one of them. But there are also those who will shake their heads, some from conviction and others in doubt. Complete Independence is the goal of the former, Dominion Status that of the latter. I will not undertake a fruitless inquiry into the relation or want of relation between Independence and Dominion Status. It does not matter to me whether one is or is not the negation of the other. What matters to me is that Dominion Status involves a very considerable measure of freedom bordering on Complete Independence and is any day preferable to complete dependence. I am therefore not against an exchange of our object dependence with whatever measure of freedom there is in full Dominion Status if such exchange is offered. But I cannot make Dominion Status my goal as it has to come from another party over whom I have no control. The only way I can acquire such control is by

working in right earnest for Complete Independence. I say "in right earnest" because I know mere bluff will not take me far; it is only when Complete Independence is in sight that the party in power will be inclined to negotiate for something less. Empty bluff will not carry us to that stage. Solid work and ungrudging sacrifice alone will do it. When the work is done, and sacrifice made, the party having the whip hand will dictate. Whether it is to be Dominion Status or Complete Independence will depend upon whether the conditions then prevailing are similar to those of Ireland or to those of the United States of America at the time when each came into what she now has. Meanwhile, there is nothing before us but a protracted life-and-death struggle on the one side, and continued repression relieved by an occasional dose of undiluted oppression on the other. It follows therefore that whatever the ultimate goal, we must be prepared to traverse the same thorny path to reach it. If we are not so prepared, independence will ever be an idle dream and Dominion Status an ever receding will-o'-the-wisp.

I must here ease the minds of those who fear that the moment Dominion Status is granted to us, we shall use it to throw off British connection altogether. In the speech from which I have already quoted Lord Irwin said: "Those in Great Britain who sympathize most warmly with the ideal of India attaining at the earliest possible moment, the status of any of the other great Dominions of the Crown will find the ground cut from their feet if British opinion ever becomes convinced, that so-called Dominion Status was only valued by India as a stepping stone to a complete severance of her connexion with the British Commonwealth."

There is no foundation for this apprehension and there is no reason whatever, why we should seek complete severance of British connection if we are put on terms of perfect equality with the Dominions. If we are not put on such terms it will not be Dominion Status we will not take a colourable imitation. It must therefore be clearly understood that Dominion Status has to be offered and accepted with all its implications, its rights and obligations, which both parties will be in honour bound to respect and uphold. But as Mahatmaji has put it, we "would not hesitate to sever all connexion, if severance became necessary through Britain's own fault". It is conceivable that we may be driven to separation by the treatment accorded to us by Britain herself, and in that case we shall have precisely the same remedy as the

Dominions now have.

It will, I hope, now be clear why I say that I am for Complete Independence and at the same time not against Dominion Status, if the latter comes without avoidable delay. It is impossible to say which of the parties will have the whip hand at the psychological moment. Great Britain has the whip hand today, and the psychological moment for her to offer, and for India to accept, full Dominion Status, has arrived. If Great Britain will not avail herself of the opportunity India will have the whip hand tomorrow, and then will come the psychological moment for her to wrest Complete Independence from Great Britain. No offer of Dominion Status will then be acceptable.

They (the advocates of Complete Independence) say there are grave reasons for not accepting Dominion Status, even in our present circumstances. I shall now examine those reasons, as far as I have been able to ascertain them from their public speeches. It is said that Dominion Status will not destroy imperialism. My answer is, nor will Complete Independence do it. It has not done it in many other countries of the world. There is no doubt that full-blooded socialism will do it. But to seek to establish full-blooded socialism in a country lying prostrate and heavily chained at the feet of its exploiters is to cry for the moon. We have to shake off our chains before we can talk even of Dominion Status. On the same lines the altruistic argument is advanced that the British Commonwealth of Nations is an imperialist combine and we should not enter into an unholy alliance with it against the oppressed and exploited nations of the world. But it so happens that at the present moment we are not less oppressed and exploited than any other nation, and I do not see why, once we get rid of that oppression and exploitation, we should lend a willing hand in oppression and exploiting others. It is true that those who enjoy Dominion Status at present are carrying on their own little games of exploitation because it suits them to do so. But there can be no possible compulsion on India to resort to it provided only the legal status acquired is as full as that enjoyed by the Dominions. It is now settled beyond dispute that the Dominions are not bound to join England in her wars if they are not so inclined.

Perhaps the most important reason given is that the freedom involved in Dominion Status, being in its very nature restricted, the demand for it will divert attention from the goal of Complete Independence and retard the development of the capacity for

sacrifice. That may be so in the case of those who think that Dominion Status will come as a free gift from Britain, but cannot apply to those who believe that it can only be won by direct action after cultivating the fullest capacity for sacrifice. The other arguments against Dominion Status are arguments which prove that Britain will never grant it to India. I fully agree with those arguments and can suggest a few more leading to the same conclusion, but I do not wish to quarrel with those who have greater faith in Great Britain and am willing to give them a chance. I cannot expect them to go with me out of their own way if I refuse to accompany them on the way common to both. Of the same nature is the argument that Dominion Status is wholly unsuited to our genius and we can never pull on with the other members of the Commonwealth of Nations. This is true, not because there is any inherent incapacity in us, but because those other members are not likely to admit us on terms of perfect equality into their family. This is stating the same proposition in a different way, and really means that full Dominion Status will never be granted to us. The answer is: we shall not take anything less.

I have often asked some of our friends to whom Dominion Status is an anathema what they would do if it were to be offered today. The invariable answer has been that they would consider the offer when made by the British Government. To the further question, whether they would accept the offer if it followed the main features of the schemes adopted by the All-Parties Conference, I have never been able to get a clear answer. But objection is taken to the preparation of any scheme of government on Dominion lines by us on the ground that it is for Britain, and not India, to make the offer. It is pointed out that those who enjoy Dominion Status did not fight for it but achieved it in the course of their struggle for Complete Independence, the offer having come from Great Britain. I am quite clear in my own mind that substantially the same process will have to be repeated in India if we are ever to have Dominion Status, and as I have already pointed out, we cannot reasonably accept it unless Complete Independence is in sight. But I cannot understand why it is not open to us to offer terms to Great Britain, as much as it is open to her to offer terms to us. If the offer is honourable to those who make it as well as to those who accept it, it does not matter to me who is the proposer and who the acceptor.

(From *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47*. Selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai.

Oxford University Press, Bombay, London, New York, 1957. Vol. I. S. 221-224.

Also In Anil Chandra Banerjee (Ed.), *Indian Constitutional Documents 1757-1947*. Vol. III. Third Edition. Calcutta 1961. S. 213-216.)

Appendix No 3 : The Communal Award by His Majesty's Government, released on 16 August 1932.

1. In the statement made by the Prime Minister on 1st December last on behalf of His Majesty's Government at the close of the second session of the Round Table Conference, which was immediately afterwards endorsed by both Houses of Parliament, it was made plain that if the communities in India were unable to reach a settlement acceptable to all parties on the communal questions which the Conference had failed to solve, His Majesty's Government were determined that India's constitutional advance should not on that account be frustrated, and that they would remove this obstacle by devising and applying themselves a provisional scheme.

2. On the 19th March last His Majesty's Government, having been informed that the continued failure of the communities to reach agreement was blocking the progress of the plans for the framing of a new Constitution, stated that they were engaged upon a careful re-examination of the difficult and controversial questions which arise. They are now satisfied that without a decision of at least some aspects of the problems connected with the position of Minorities under the new Constitution, no further progress can be made with the framing of the Constituion.

3. His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that they will include provisions to give effect to the scheme set out below in the proposals relating to the Indian Constitution to be laid in due course before Parliament. The scope of this scheme is purposely confined to the arrangements to be made for the representation of the British Indian Communities in the Provincial Legislatures, consideration of representation in the legislature at the Centre deferred for the reason given in paragraph 20 below. The decision to limit the scope of the scheme implies no failure to realize that the framing of the Constitution will necessitate the decision of a number of the problems of great importance to Minorities, but has been taken in the hope that once a pronouncement has been made upon the basic questions of method and proportions of representation the communities themselves may find it possible to arrive at a modus vivendi on other communal problems, which have not as yet received the examination they require.

4. His Majesty's Government wish it to be most clearly understood that they themselves can be no parties to any negotiations which may be initiated with a view to the revision of their decision, and will not be prepared to give consideration to any representation aimed at securing the modification of it which is not supported by all the parties affected. But they are most desirous to close no door to an agreed settlement, should such happily be forthcoming. If, therefore, before a new Government of India Act has passed into law, they are satisfied that the communities who are concerned are mutually agreed upon a practicable alternative scheme, either in respect of the whole of British India, they will be prepared to recommend to Parliament that that alternative should be substituted for the provisions now outlined.

5. Seats in the Legislative Councils in the Governor's Provinces, or in the Lower House if there is an Upper Chamber, will be allocated as shown in the annexed table.

6. Election to the seats allotted in Muhammadan, European and Sikh constituencies will be by voters voting in separate communal electorates covering between them the whole area of the Provinces (apart from any portions which may in special cases be excluded from the electoral area as "backward").

Provision will be made in the Constitution itself to empower a revision of this electoral arrangement (and the other similar arrangements mentioned below) after 10 years with the assent of the communities affected, for the ascertainment of which suitable means will be devised.

7. All qualified electors, who are not voters either in a Muhammadan, Sikh, Indian Christian (see paragraph 10 below), Anglo-Indian (see paragraph 11 below) or European constituency, will be entitled to vote in a general constituency.

8. Seven seats will be reserved for Mahrattas in certain selected plural member general constituencies in Bombay.

9. Members of the "Depressed Classes" qualified to vote will vote in a general constituency. In view of the fact that for a considerable period these classes would be unlikely, by this means alone, to secure any adequate representation in the Legislature, a number of special seats will be assigned to them as shown in the table. These seats will be filled by election from special constituencies in which only members of the "Depressed Classes" electorally qualified will be entitled to vote. Any person voting in such a special constituency will,

as stated above, be also entitled to vote in a general constituency. It is intended that these constituencies should be formed in selected areas where the Depressed Classes are most numerous, and that, except in Madras, they should not cover the whole area of the Province. In Bengal it seems possible that in some general constituencies a majority of the voters will belong to the Depressed Classes. Accordingly, pending further investigation, no number has been fixed for the members to be returned from the special Depressed Class constituencies in that Province. It is intended to secure that the Depressed Classes should obtain not less than 10 seats in the Bengal Legislature.

The precise definition in each Province of those who (if electorally qualified) will be entitled to vote in the special Depressed Class constituencies has not yet been finally determined. It will be based as a rule on the general principles advocated in the Franchise Committee's Report. Modification may, however, be found necessary in some Provinces in Northern India where the application of the general criteria of Untouchability might result in a definition unsuitable in some respects to the special conditions of the Province.

His Majesty's Government do not consider that these special Depressed Classes constituencies will be required for more than a limited time. They intend that the Constitution shall provide that they shall come to an end after 20 years if they have not previously been abolished under the general powers of electoral revision referred to in paragraph 6.

10. Election to the seats allotted to Indian Christians will be by voters voting in separate communal electorates. It seems almost certain that practical difficulties will, except possibly in Madras, prevent the formation of Indian Christian constituencies covering the whole area of the Province, and that accordingly special Indian Christian constituencies will have to be formed only in one or two selected areas in the Province. Indian Christian voters in these areas will not vote in a general constituency. Indian Christian voters outside these areas will vote in a general constituency. Special arrangements may be needed in Bihar and Orissa, where a considerable proportion of the Indian Christian community belongs to the aboriginal tribes.

11. Election to the seats allotted to Anglo-Indians will be by voters voting in separate communal electorates. It is at present intended, subject to investigation of any practical difficulties that may arise, that the Anglo-Indian constituencies shall cover the whole area of each

Province, a postal ballot being employed; but no final decision has yet been reached.

12. The method of filling the seats assigned for representatives from backward areas is still under investigation, and the number of seats so assigned should be regarded as provisional pending a final decision as to the constitutional arrangements to be made in relation to such areas.

13. His Majesty's Government attach great importance to securing that the new Legislatures should contain at least a small number of women members. They feel that at the outset this object could not be achieved without creating a certain number of seats specially allotted to women. They also feel that it is essential that women members should not be drawn disproportionately from one community. They have been unable to find any system which would avoid this risk, and would be consistent with the rest of the scheme for representation which they have found it necessary to adopt, except that of limiting the electorate for each special women's seat to voters from one community. The special women's seats have accordingly been specifically divided, as shown in the table, between the various communities. The precise electoral machinery to be employed in these special constituencies is still under consideration.

14. The seats allotted to "Labour" will be filled from non-communal constituencies. The electoral arrangements have still to be determined, but it is likely that in most Provinces the Labour constituencies will be partly trade union and partly special constituencies as recommended by the Franchise Committee.

15. The special seats allotted to Commerce and Industry, Mining and Planting will be filled by election through Chambers of Commerce and various Associations. The details of the electoral arrangements for these seats must await further investigation.

16. The special seats allotted to landholders will be filled by election by special landholders' constituencies.

17. The method to be employed for election to the University seats is still under consideration.

18. His Majesty's Government have found it impossible in determining these questions of representation in the Provincial Legislatures to avoid entering into considerable detail. There remains, nevertheless, the determination of the constituencies. They intend that this task should be undertaken in India as early as possible.

It is possible that in some instances delimitation of constituencies might be materially improved by slight variations from the numbers of seats now given. His Majesty's Government reserve the right to make such slight variations, for such purpose, provided that they would not materially affect the essential balance between communities. No such variations will, however, be made in the case of Bengal and the Punjab.

19. The question of the composition of Second Chambers in the Provinces has so far received comparatively little attention in the constitutional discussions and requires further consideration before a decision is reached as to which Provinces shall have a Second Chamber or a scheme is drawn up for their composition. His Majesty's Government consider that the composition of the Upper House in a Province should be such as not disturb in any essential, the balance between the communities resulting from the composition of the Lower House.

20. His Majesty's Government do not propose at present to enter into the question of the size and composition of the Legislature at the Centre, since this involves among other questions that of representation of the Indian States which still needs further discussion. They will, of course, when considering the composition, pay full regard to the claims of all communities for adequate representation therein.

21. His Majesty's Government have already accepted the principle that Sind should be constituted a separate Province, if satisfactory means of financing it can be found. As the financial problems involved still have to be reviewed in connexion with other problems of federal finance, His Majesty's Government have thought preferable to include, at this stage, figures for a Legislature for the existing Province of Bombay, in addition to the schemes for separate Legislatures for Bombay Presidency proper and Sind.

22. The figures given for Bihar and Orissa relate to the existing Province. The question of constituting a separate Province of Orissa is still under investigation.

23. The inclusion in the table of figures relating to a Legislature for the Central Provinces including Berar does not imply that any decision has yet been reached regarding the future constitutional position of Berar.

London, 4th August, 1932.

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Appendix No. 4 : Sixth Schedule. Provisions as to Franchise.

Part VI : THE PUNJAB

From Government of India Act, 1935, Government of India. Legislative Department. Simla, the 9th September 1935. S. 360-365.

Part VI. THE PUNAJB

General requirements as to residence.

1. No person shall be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for a territorial constituency unless he is a resident in the constituency.

For the purposes of this Part of this Schedule, proof that a person owns a family dwelling-house or a share in a family dwelling house in a constituency and that that house has not during the twelve months preceding the prescribed date, been let on rent either in whole or in part shall be sufficient evidence that that person is resident in the constituency.

Qualifications dependent on taxation.

2. Subject to the provisions of Part I of this Schedule and to any overriding provisions of this Part of this Schedule, a person shall be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for a territorial constituency if during the previous financial year either--

- (a) he was assessed to income tax, or was in the Province assessed in respect of any direct municipal or direct cantonment tax to an amount of not less than fifty rupees; or
- (b) he was in the Province assessed to haisiyat or profession tax to an amount of not less than two rupees, or, in districts in which no such tax exists, to any other direct tax imposed under the Punjab District Boards Act to an amount of not less than two rupees.

Qualifications dependent on Property, etc.

3. Subject as aforesaid, a person shall also be qualified to be

included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency if he either--

- (a) is the owner of land in the Province assessed to land revenue of not less than five rupees per annum; or
- (b) is a tenant with a right of occupancy as defined in Chapter II of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, in respect of land in the Province assessed to land revenue of not less than five rupees per annum; or
- (c) is an assignee of land revenue in the Province amounting to not less than ten rupees per annum; or
- (d) is a tenant of not less than six acres of irrigated land in the constituency, or of not less than twelve acres of un-irrigated land in the constituency; or
- (e) has throughout the twelve months immediately preceding the prescribed date owned immovable property in the Province of the value of not less than two thousand rupees or of an annual rental value of not less than sixty rupees, not being land assessed to land revenue; or
- (f) has throughout the twelve months preceding the prescribed date occupied as tenant in the constituency immovable property of an annual rental value of not less than sixty rupees, not being land assessed to land revenue; or
- (g) is a zaildar, inamdar, sufedposh or lambardar in the constituency;

Provided that the provisions of sub-paragraph (d) of this paragraph shall be deemed to be complied with in the case of a person who is the tenant of both irrigated land in the constituency if the sum of the area of that irrigated land and half the area of that unirrigated land is not less than six acres.

Educational Qualification.

4. Subject as aforesaid, a person shall also be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency if he is proved in the prescribed manner to have attained the primary or an equivalent or higher educational standard.

Qualifications by reason of service in His Majesty's Forces.

5. Subject as aforesaid, a person shall also be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency if he

is a retired, pensioned or discharged officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier in His Majesty's regular military forces.

Additional Qualification for Women.

6. Subject as aforesaid a person who is a woman shall also be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency if she is the pensioned widow or the pensioned mother of a person who was an officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier of His Majesty's regular military forces, or if she is shown in the prescribed manner, to be literate or if her husband possesses the qualifications requisite for the purposes of this paragraph

7. A husband shall be deemed to possess the qualifications requisite for the purposes of the last preceding paragraph if he either--

- (a) during the previous financial year was assessed to income tax, or was assessed in the Province in respect of any direct municipal or cantonment tax to an amount of not less than fifty rupees; or
- (b) is a retired, pensioned or discharged officer, non-commissioned officer or soldier of His Majesty's regular military forces; or
- (c) has throughout the twelve months preceding the prescribed date owned immovable property in the province of the value of not less than four thousand rupees or an annual rental value of not less than ninety-six rupees, not being land assessed to land revenue; or
- (d) has throughout the twelve months preceding the prescribed date occupied as a tenant immovable property in the constituency of an annual rental value of not less than ninety-six rupees, not being land assessed to land revenue; or
- (e) is the owner of land in the Province assessed to land revenue of not less than twenty-five rupees per annum; or
- (f) is the assignee of land revenue in the Province amounting to not less than fifty rupees per annum; or
- (g) is a tenant or lessee under the terms of a lease for a period of not less than three years of Crown land in the constituency for which an annual rent of not less than twenty-five rupees is payable; or
- (h) is a tenant with a right of occupancy as defined in Chapter II of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, in respect of land assessed to land revenue of not less than twenty-five rupees per annum;

Provided that for the purposes of sub-paragraph (g) of this paragraph, where the amount payable by any tenant or lessee is assessed

from harvest to harvest, the annual rent payable by him shall be deemed to be the annual average of the amounts payable by him in the three years preceding that in which the prescribed date falls.

Special Qualification for Scheduled Castes.

8. Subject as aforesaid a person who is a member of the scheduled castes shall also be qualified to be included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency if he either--

- (a) is shown in the prescribed manner to be literate; or
- (b) has throughout the twelve months preceding the prescribed date owned immovable property in the Province of a value of not less than fifty rupees, not being land assessed to land revenue, or has throughout that period owned malba of a house in the Province of not less than that value; or
- (c) has, throughout the twelve months preceding the prescribed date, occupied as tenant immovable property in the constituency of an annual rental value of not less than thirty-six rupees.

Application necessary for Enrolment in certain cases.

9. No person shall, by virtue of paragraph four, paragraph six or subparagraph (a) of paragraph eight of this Part of this Schedule, be included in the electoral roll for any territorial constituency unless application is made by him in the prescribed manner that he should be so included.

Interpretation, etc

- 10.--(1) In this Schedule, in relation to the Punjab --
- “annual rental value” in relation to immovable property means the amount for which the property together with its appurtenances and furniture, if any, is actually let, or may reasonably be expected to let, from year to year;
 - “land revenue” means land revenue as defined in sub-section (6) of section three of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, and, in the case of fluctuating land revenue of land revenue assessed on land subject to river action, the annual amount thereof shall be taken to be the average amount of land revenue paid during the three

agricultural years preceding that in which the prescribed date falls;
 “land records” means attested records of rights or attested annual records of rights maintained under Chapter IV of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, and included an order finally sanctioning a mutation duly passed under that Chapter;

“agricultural year” means a year ending on the thirtieth day of September;

“owner” does not include a mortgagee;

“tenant” in relation to agricultural land means a tenant as defined in the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, and in relation to other property means a person who holds that property by lease and is, or, but for a special contract, would be, liable to pay rent therefor, and in relation to a house not situated in military or police lines includes any person occupying the house rent free by virtue of any office, service or employment,

“zaildar”, “inamdar”, “sufedposh” and “lambardar” mean respectively persons appointed as such in accordance with rules for the time being in force under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, and do not include a substitute appointed temporarily for any such person.

(2) In computing for the purposes of this Part of this Schedule the period during which a person has owned any immovable property, any period during which it was owned by a person from whom he derives title by inheritance shall be taken into account.

(3) Any reference to immovable property, not being land assessed to land revenue, includes a reference to any building situated on land assessed to land revenue.

(4) Where property is held or payments are made by, or assessments are made on, the members of a Hindu Joint Family, and the respective shares of the members of the family are not specified in the land records or in any municipal or cantonment record or in a decree of a civil court, as the case may be, the family shall be adopted as the unit for deciding whether the requisite qualification exists, and, if it does exist, the person qualified shall be the manager of the family.

(5) Subject to the provisions of the last preceding sub-paragraph, any reference in this Schedule to land assessed to land revenue, to other immovable property, to a tenancy or lease of land assessed to land revenue or to assigned land revenue shall, in relation to any persons who are co-sharers in such land, property tenancy or lease, or land

Appendix No. 6 : Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders published on 30 March 1942.

The conclusions of the British War Cabinet as set out below are those which Sir Stafford Cripps has taken with him for discussion with the Indian leaders and the question as to whether they will be implemented will depend upon the outcome of these discussions which are now taking place.

His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed in this country and in India as to the fulfilment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India. The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way sub-ordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

His Majesty's Government therefore make the following declaration:

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India, in the manner described hereafter, an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for the participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) the right of any Province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. With such non-accessing Provinces, should they so desire. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution, giving them the same full status as Indian Union, and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.

(ii) the signing of a treaty which shall be negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the

complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian Hands; it will make provision, in accordance with the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, for the protection of racial and religious minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in the future its relationship to the other member States of the British Commonwealth.

(iii) whether or not an Indian State elects to adhere to the constitution, it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements, so far as this may be required in the new situation.

(d) The constitution-making body shall be composed as follows, unless the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of hostilities.

Immediately upon the result being known of the Provincial elections which will be necessary at the end of hostilities, the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of the Constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one-tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole, and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) During the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defence of India as part of their world war effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. Thus they will be enabled to give their active and constructive help in the discharge of a task which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Appendix No. 7 : Sikhs Reject Proposals.

The Sikh All-Parties Committee in a representation to Sir Stafford Cripps declared the proposals unacceptable to them for the following reasons:

(i) Instead of maintaining and strengthening the integrity of India a specific provision has been made for separation of provinces and constitution of Pakistan, and

(ii) The cause of Sikh community has been lamentably betrayed. Ever since the British advent our community has fought for England in every battlefield of the Empire, and this is our reward, that our position in the Punjab, which England promised to hold in trust and in which we occupied a predominant position, has been finally liquidated.

Why should a province that fails to secure 3/5 majority in its legislature, in which a religious community enjoys statutory majority, be allowed to hold a plebiscite and given the benefit of a bare majority? In fairness this right should have been conceded to the communities who are in permanent minority in the legislature.

Further, why should not the population of any area opposed to separation be given the right to record its verdict and to form an autonomous unit?

We are sure you know that Punjab proper extended up to the banks of Jhelum excluding Jhang and Multan districts, and the trans-Jhelum area was added by the conquest of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and retained by the British for administrative convenience. It would be altogether unjust to allow the extraneous trans-Jhelum population which only accidentally came into the province to dominate the future of the Punjab proper.

We give below the figures which abundantly prove our contention: From the boundary of Delhi to the banks of Ravi river the population is divided as follows:

Muslims 4,505,000; Sikhs and other non-Muslims 7,646,000.

From the Delhi boundary to the banks of the Jhelum river excluding Multan and Jhang districts:

Muslims 8,288,000; Sikhs and other non-Muslims 9,348,000.

To this may be added the population of Sikh States of Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Kapurthala and Faridkot, which is about 26 lakhs. Of this the Muslims constitute barely 20 percent and this reduces the ratio of Muslim population still further.

We do not wish to labour the point any more. We have lost all hope of receiving any consideration. We at all times however, by all possible means operation of the Punjab from All India Union. We shall never permit our motherland to be at the mercy of those who devour it.

(From M. Satharaman, *Why Crippa Failed*, New Delhi 1942, p. 92.)

Appendix No. 8 : Resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, 2 April 1942.

.....The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognized by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India, regret that the proposals of His Majesty's Government embodying the fundamentals are not open to any modification and therefore no alternative proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the proposals in their present form are unacceptable to them for the following reasons:

(1) The Mussulmans, after 25 years of genuine efforts for the reconciliation of the two major communities and the bitter experience of the failure of such efforts, are convinced that it is neither just nor possible, in the interests of peace and happiness of the two peoples, to compel them to constitute one Indian Union composed of the two principal nations--Hindus and Moslems; but this appears to be the main object of His Majesty's Government as adumbrated in the preamble of the Draft Declaration, the creation of more than one Union being relegated only to the realm of remote possibility, and is purely illusory.

(2) In the Draft Declaration a constitution-making body has been proposed with the primary object of creating one Indian Union. So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it has finally decided that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones: and it will therefore be unfair to the Moslems to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union. With conditions as they are it will be not only futile but on the contrary may exacerbate bitterness and animosity amongst the various elements in the country.....

(From Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, Vol. II, selected by M. Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Bombay 1957. S. 526 f.)

Appendix No. 9 : Excerpt from “The Hindu-Muslim Problem”

From Lala Lajpat Rai, in Lala Lajpat Rai, Writings and Speeches, Vol. II, 1920-1928. Edited by Vijaya Chandra Joshi, Delhi 1966. S. 212, 213.

(b) The demand for proportionate representation in the Legislatures is perfectly reasonable provided the principle is accepted through and through. The plea for “effective” minority representation is, however, untenable. Mr. Jinnah has placed a special interpretation of his own on this term. Let us examine it in the light of facts. In Bengal and the Punjab, the Mussalmans are in a majority, and if this principle is accepted, they will rule over these Provinces. The Hindus in these Provinces according to the interpretation of Mr. Jinnah are an effective minority already: so they are not entitled to any special representation. But what about the Sikhs? Are they or are not entitled to special representation? And from whose share are they to get it? From the share of the Hindus or that of the Muslims? Under no principle can they get it from the share of the Hindus? They must get it, if they must, from the Muslims’ share on the same principle on which the Muslims themselves claim it in the U.P., or the other Provinces where they are in a minority. This will interfere with the absolute majority which Muslims demand over the Hindus and Sikhs combined. Some Mussalmans realize this and contend that they will be content with a bare majority of one or two. But it is obvious that they cannot have everything in their own way. Assuming, however, that they are allowed their own way, do they imagine that they will be able to make their rule effective in the Punjab? The Punjab occupies a unique position among the Provinces of India. It is the home of a community who were the rulers of the Province when the British took possession of it. That community is virile, strong and united. Will this community readily consent to occupy the entirely subservient position which this arrangement involves? If nothing else helps them they may oppose Swaraj as they did, not long ago. Under the circumstances I would suggest that a remedy should be sought by which the Muslims might get a decisive majority without trampling on the sensitiveness of the

Hindus and the Sikhs. My suggestion is that the Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority, to be a Muslim-governed Province; and the Eastern Punjab, with a large Hindu-Sikh majority, to be a non-Muslim governed Province. I do not discuss Bengal. To me it is unimaginable that the rich and highly progressive and alive Hindus of Bengal will ever work out the Pact agreed to by Mr. Das. I will make the same suggestion in their case, but if Bengal is prepared to accept Mr. Das's Pact, I have nothing to say. It is its own look-out.

Maula Hasrat Mohani has recently said that the Muslims will never agree to India's having Dominion Status under the British. What they aim at are separate Muslim States in India, united with Hindu States under a National Federal Government. He is also in favour of smaller States containing compact Hindu and Muslim populations. If communal representation with separate electorates is to be the rule, then Maulana Hasrat's scheme as to smaller provinces seems to be the only workable proposition. Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim states: (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West Frontier, (2) Western Punjab, (3) Sindh, and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a Province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.

Appendix No. 10 : The “Quit India” Demand.

Resolutions of the All-India Congress Committee, Bombay, 8 August 1942

The All-India Congress Committee has given the most careful consideration to the reference made to it by the Working Committee in their resolution dated 14 July 1942 and to subsequent events, including the development of the war situation, the utterances of responsible spokesmen of the British Government, and the comments and criticisms made in India and abroad. The Committee approves of and endorses that resolution and is of opinion that events subsequent to it have given it further justification, and have made it clear that the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.

The Committee has viewed with dismay the deterioration of the situation on the Russian and Chinese fronts and conveys to the Russian and Chinese people its high appreciation of their heroism in defence of their freedom. This increasing peril makes it incumbent on all those who strive for freedom and who sympathize with the victims of aggression to examine the foundations of the policy so far pursued by the Allied Nations, which have led to repeated and disastrous failure. It is not by adhering to such aims and policies and methods that failure can be converted into success, for past experience has shown that failure is inherent in them. These policies have been based not on freedom so much as on the domination of subject and colonial countries, and the continuation of the imperialist tradition and method. The possession of empire, instead of adding to the strength of the ruling power, has become a burden and a curse. India, the classic land of modern imperialism, has become the crux of the question, for by the freedom of India will Britain and the United Nations be judged, and the peoples of Asia and Africa be filled with hope and enthusiasm.

The ending of British rule in this country is thus a vital and immediate issue on which depend the future of the war and the success by throwing all her great resources in the struggle for freedom and

against the aggression of Nazism, Fascism and Imperialism. This will not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations, and give these nations, whose ally India would be, the moral and spiritual leadership of the world. India in bondage will continue to be the symbol of British Imperialism and the taint of that imperialism will affect the fortunes of all the United Nations. The peril of today, therefore, necessitates the independence of India and the ending of British domination. No future promises of guarantees can affect the present situation or meet that peril. They cannot produce the needed psychological effect on the mind of the masses. Only the glow of freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions of people which will immediately transform the nature of the War.

The All-India Congress Committee, therefore, repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British Power from India. On the declaration of India's Independence, a provisional Government will be formed and free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. The provisional Government can only be formed by the co-operation of the principal parties and groups in the country. It will thus be a composite Government, representative of all important sections of the people of India. Its primary functions must be to defend India and resist aggression with all the armed as well as the non-violent forces at its command, together with its Allied Powers, and to promote the well-being and progress of the workers in the fields and factories and elsewhere, to whom essentially all power and authority must belong. The provisional Government will evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly which will prepare a Constitution for the Government of India acceptable to all sections of the people. This Constitution, according to the Congress view, should be a federal one, with the largest measure of autonomy for the federating units, and with the residuary powers vesting in these units. The future relations between India and the Allied Nations will be adjusted by representatives of all these free countries conferring together for their mutual advantage and for their co-operation in the common task of resisting aggression. Freedom will enable India to resist aggression effectively with the people's united will and strengthen it.

The freedom of India must be the symbol of and prelude to the

freedom of all other Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, the Dutch Indies, Iran and Iraq must also attain their complete freedom. It must be clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any colonial power.

While the All-India Congress Committee must primarily be concerned with the independence and defence of India in this hour of danger, the Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national Minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world's resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a World Federal Defence Force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.

An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operate on an equal basis with other nations in the solution of international problems.

Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations. Such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come.

The Committee regretfully realizes, however, that despite the tragic and overwhelming lessons of the war and the perils that overhang the world, the Governments of few countries are yet prepared to take this inevitable step towards world federation. The reaction of the British Government and the misguided criticism of the foreign Press also make it clear that even the obvious demand for India's independence is resisted, though this has been made essentially to meet the present peril and to enable India to defend herself and help China and Russia in their hour of need. The Committee is anxious not to embarrass in any way the defence of China or Russia, whose freedom is precious and must be preserved, or to jeopardize the defence capacity of the United Nations. But the peril grows both to India and these

nations, and inaction and submission to a foreign administration at this stage is not only degrading India and reducing her capacity to defend herself and resist aggression, but is no answer to the growing peril and is no service to the peoples of the United Nations. The earnest appeal of the Working Committee to Great Britain and the United Nations has so far met with no response, and the criticisms made in many foreign quarters have shown an ignorance of India's and the world's need, and sometimes even hostility to India's freedom, which is significant of a mentality of domination and radical superiority which cannot be tolerated by a proud people conscious of their strength and of the justice of their cause.

The All-India Congress Committee would yet again, at this last moment, in the interest of world freedom, renew this appeal to Britain and the United Nations. But the Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavoring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian Government which dominates over it and prevents it from functioning in its own interest and in the interest of humanity. The Committee resolves, therefore, to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence the starting of a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale, so that the country might utilise all the non-violent strength it has gathered during the last twenty-two years of peaceful struggle. Such a struggle must inevitably be under the leadership of Gandhiji and the Committee requests him to take the lead and guide the nation in the steps to be taken.

The Committee appeals to the people of India to face the dangers and hardships that will fall to their lot with courage and endurance, and to hold together under the leadership of Gandhiji, and carry out his instructions as disciplined soldiers of Indian freedom. They must remember that non-violence is the basis of this movement. A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committees can function. When this happens, every man and woman who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide, urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India.

Lastly, whilst the All-India Congress Committee has stated its own

view of the future governance under free India, the All-India Congress Committee wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on mass struggle it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India.

(From Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47. Vol. II. Selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai. London 1957. S. 541-544.)

**Appendix No.11: Mr. C. Rajagopalachari's formula,
10 July 1944.**

Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League to which Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve:

- (1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.
- (2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.
- (3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.
- (4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.
- (5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.
- (6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.

(From Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947. Vol. II. Selected by Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai. London 1957. S. 548-549.)

Appendix No.12: Excerpt from Broadcast Speech of the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, 14 June 1945.

I have been authorised by His Majesty's Government to place before Indian political leaders proposals designed to ease the present political situation and to advance India towards her goal of full self-government. These proposals are at the present moment being explained to Parliament by the Secretary of State for India. My intention in this broadcast is to explain to you the proposals, the ideas underlying them, and the method by which I hope to put them into effect.

This is not an attempt to obtain or impose a constitutional settlement. His Majesty's Government had hoped that the leaders of the Indian parties would agree amongst themselves on a settlement of the communal issue, which is the main stumbling-block; but this hope has not been fulfilled. In the meantime, India has great opportunities to be taken and great problems to be solved, which require a common effort by the leading men of all parties. I therefore propose, with the full support of His Majesty's Government, to invite Indian leaders both of central and provincial politics to take counsel with me with a view to the formation of a new Executive Council more representative of organised political opinion. The proposed new Council would represent the main communities and would include equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Moslems. It would work, if formed, under the existing constitution. But it would be an entirely Indian Council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, who would retain his position as War Member. It is also proposed that the portfolio of External Affairs, which has hitherto been held by the Viceroy, should be placed in charge of an Indian Member of Council, so far as the interests of British India are concerned.

A further step proposed by His Majesty's Government is the appointment of a British High Commissioner in India, as in the Dominions, to represent Great Britain's commercial and other such interests in India.

Such a new Executive Council will, you realise, represent a definite advance on the road to self-government. It will be almost entirely Indian, and the Finance and Home Members will for the first time be Indians, while an Indian will also be charged with the management of India's Foreign Affairs. Moreover Members will now be selected by the

Appendix No. 13 : Sikh Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission.

The following is the text of the Memorandum submitted by Master Tara Singh to the Cabinet Mission:-

The position of the Minorities has changed since the Cripps Mission. As conceded by Major Attlee, Indians cannot be made responsible for governing themselves and at the same time power retained in the hands of an authority outside India for intervention on behalf of such minorities for ensuring their proper treatment by the majority. This makes it all the more necessary for the Sikhs to safeguard in the Constitution itself their political status in the future policy of the country.

The draft declaration provides for the right of non-accession of provinces. The Sikhs make it plain that they are opposed to any possible partition of India as envisaged in the draft declaration. As stated above, the Sikhs are from a compact cultural nationality of about six millions. They further maintain that, judged by any definition or test, the Punjab is not only their homeland, but their holy land. They were the last rulers of the Punjab and before the advent of the British they enjoyed in the Punjab independent economic and political status which has gradually deteriorated under British rule.

They wish, however, to point out that, with the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy on the basis of the Communal Award, they have been reduced to a state of complete helplessness. If the existing provincial political set-up is continued, the transference of power to the people would perpetuate the coercion of the Sikhs under what in practise has come to the Muslim rule. That set-up is unjust almost exasperated the Sikhs to the point of revolutionary protest. The intervention of war conditions alone has been responsible for the Sikhs acquiescing temporarily in this communal tyranny. They cannot be expected to continue to submit to it as a permanent arrangement in any new scheme of Indian polity.

Akali Demands

The statutory Muslim majority in the Legislature of the Province must go and the position of the Sikhs must be strengthened by increased

representation therein so as to ensure to the Sikhs an effective voice in the administration of the country.

In the alternative, out of the existing province of the Punjab a new province may be carved out as an additional provincial Unit in the United India of the future in such a way that all the important Sikh Gurdwaras and shrines may be included in it as also a substantial majority of the Sikh population in the existing province of the Punjab.

The Sikhs cannot, however, blind themselves to the fact that the Muslims have declared that they are a separate nation as distinct from the Sikhs, the Hindus and others, and that on that basis they are entitled to Pakistan. We have already expressed unequivocally our opposition to the establishment of such a State. In view of the rumours that are current we are obliged to take note of such a State. In view of the rumours that are current we are obliged to take note of the possibility of the Cabinet Mission giving serious consideration to the Muslim League claim.

Before the Mission arrives at a decision on this question, we would emphasise that the Sikhs have as good a claim for the establishment of a separate sovereign Sikh State as the Muslims for Pakistan without conceding at the same time the claim for a separate State made on behalf of the Sikhs. The Sikhs are in favour of a single constitution-making body in which they should be represented as already indicated above.

In case the Mission should think of taking into serious consideration the proposal that has been made for two constitution-making bodies, one for Pakistan and the other for the rest of India, we wish, in the light of what has been said by us above, to make our position clear that there should be a separate constitution-making body also for the Sikh State.

(From: N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1946, S. 200-201.)

Appendix No. 14 : Memorandum of the Central Akali Dal presented to the British Cabinet Mission.

“...the Central Akali Dal wishes to place the following demands on behalf of the Sikh Community before the British Cabinet Mission:--

- (i) India should be made completely independent and Self-governing.
- (ii) India should not be partitioned on any religious or communal basis. On the other hand, her unity should be maintained. Without unity, India's freedom has little meaning left in it. By her vivisection into small states, India will become very weak and independence of her various parts shall be rendered unsafe. The Centre should be sufficiently strong to protect the coastal line of India and defend her voters on the North West and East and maintain an army, a Navy and an Air Force of the size and competent of the Defence Forces of big world powers. For this purpose a strong National Government should be established at the centre.
- (iii) All the Provinces should be under the Centre and no Province should have a right of Secession.
- (iv) All residuary powers should vest in the centre.
- (v) There should be a Special Tribunal for the protection of the rights of the minorities, both at the Centre as well as in the Provinces and for the grant of relief to the minorities against any injustice that may be done to them. The Central Government should have special powers to enforce the decision of that Tribunal.
- (vi) There should be a single Constituent Assembly for the whole of India. The proposal for two constituent assemblies is mischievous. To set up a second constituent assembly against the will of 44% (in fact 50%) Hindu and Sikh population in the Punjab and 46% Hindu population of Bengal and to invest 56% and 54% Muslim population respectively with the rights to frame constitution for those areas is not in keeping with any canons of law, equity or justice. In the Punjab and Bengal there do not live Musalmans only, but also Hindus and Sikhs and their rights and interests in those areas are by no means less important, but are rather more important than those of Mohammadans.
- (vii) The Sikhs should be given effective representation in the constitu-

- ent assembly which should in no case be less than that recommended by Sapru Committee namely 8%.
- (viii) In the Central Legislature Sikhs should have, guaranteed to them by constitution, 5% representation and one seat in the Cabinet, which should not be changeable without their consent.
- (ix) In the Interim Government at the Centre there should be at least one Sikh Councillor.
- (x) Punjab is the Home-land of the Sikhs. Every particle of its soil is sacred to them. Before the advent of the British the whole of the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and Kashmir were under their rule. Under the treaty of 1846, the British came here as regents for the Minor Sikh Maharaja and taking the advantage of that position they established their rule here. Even now, as has been discussed above, the Sikhs occupy the most important position in the Punjab. Their Gurdwaras, religious documents, educational institutions and proprietary rights and interests here are second to none, but are comparatively superior. They pay 40% of the Revenue. Therefore in the Punjab the position of the Sikhs should be that of equality and perfect respectability and not that of a subject community. If the Punjab can be called the homeland of any one community, it is certainly that of the Sikhs alone. But we want that none of the three major communities living here should be subject to any other's domination, rather every community should be perfectly free. The Hindus, Sikhs and Musalmans have been determined in the Hindu Majority Provinces. The reservation of seats for the majority community in the Punjab is opposed to all rules of constitutional law and practice and is most unjust. If this province is handed over to a purely Islamic State, the Sikhs will resist it by all possible means and it will give rise to a Civil War in the Punjab.
- (xi) The Sikhs should be guaranteed one third share in the Executive of the Punjab and it should be made rule for the constitution that no Government in the Punjab shall be deemed to be complete unless it includes one third Sikh members in it.
- (xii) There should be joint electorates subject only to the reservation of seats for the minorities alone.
- (xiii) The reservation of one seat for about a dozen Tumandars in the Punjab Assembly is most unjust and undemocratic and must be at once put an end to.
- (xiv) The Sikh representation in the Frontier Legislature is much too

(iii) It should be increased and the title should be given due representation in the Legislature as a Union Minister, Chief Minister, Deputy and Secretary

(iv) The title should be given proper safeguards for the protection of their religious, cultural, educational and economic - political interests

(v) In view of the military importance of the title and their long standing relations with the army the title should be the standing traditional honor of title should be fixed at 10% or less which was their proportion in the army prior to the last World War

From All India Congress Committee Report, Feb 12, 1948 - Congress and title in the Punjab, in Indian Memorial Mission & (New York Daily, 6 11)

Appendix No. 15: Excerpt from Statement of the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy, 16 May 1946.

(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: foreign affairs, defence, and communications; and which should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects.

(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted from British-Indian and States representatives. Any question raising a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major communities as well as a majority of all the members present and voting.

(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers should vest in the Provinces.

(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union.

(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legislatures, and each Group could determine the provincial subjects to be taken in common.

(6) The constitutions of the union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals thereafter.

... ..
(18) In forming any Assembly to decide a new constitutional structure the first problem is to obtain as broad-based and accurate a representation of the whole population as it possible. The most satisfactory method obviously would be by election based on adult franchise; but any attempt to introduce such a step now would lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new constitution. The only practicable alternative is to utilize the recently elected provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies. There are, however, two factors in their composition which make this difficult. First, the numerical strength of the provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same proportion to the total population in each province. Thus, Assam with a population of 10 millions has a Legislative

Assembly of only 250. Secondly, owing to the weightage given to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths of the several communities in each provincial Legislative Assembly are not in proportion to their numbers in the province. Thus the number of seats reserved for Muslims in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48% of the total, although they form 55% of the provincial population. After a most careful consideration of the various methods by which these inequalities might be corrected, we have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable plan would be:

- (a) to allot to each province a total number of seats proportional to its population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest substitute for representation by adult suffrage.
- (b) to divide this provincial allocation of seats between the main communities in each province in proportion to their population.
- (c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a province shall be selected by the members of that community in its Legislative Assembly.

We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognise only three main communities in India: General, Muslim, and Sikh, the "General" community including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs. As the smaller minorities would, upon the population basis, have little or no representation since they would lose the weightage which assures them seats in the provincial Legislatures, we have made the arrangements set out in paragraph 20 below (which has been omitted in this book) to give them a full representation upon all matters of special to the minorities.

(19)(i) We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each provincial Legislative Assembly the following numbers of representatives, each part of the Legislature (General, Muslim or Sikh) electing its own representatives by the method of proportional representation with the single transferable vote:-

Table of Representation

Section A

Province	General	Muslim	Total
Madras	45	4	49
Bombay	19	2	21

United Provinces	47	8	55
Bihar	31	5	36
Central Provinces	16	1	17
Orissa	9	0	9
Total	<u>167</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>187</u>

Section B

Province	General	Muslim	Sikh	Total
Punjab	8	16	4	28
North-West Frontier Province	0	3	0	3
Sind	1	3	0	4
Total	<u>9</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>35</u>

Section C

Province	General	Muslim	Total
Bengal	27	33	60
Assam	7	3	10
Total	<u>34</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>70</u>

Total for British India 292

Maximum for India States 93

Total 385

(24) To the leaders and people of India who now have the opportunity of complete independence we would finally say this. We and our Government and countrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian people themselves to agree upon the method of framing the new constitution under which they will live. Despite the labours which we have shared with the Indian Parties, and the exercise of much patience and goodwill by all, this has not been possible. We therefore

now lay before you proposals which, after listening to all sides and after much earnest thought, we trust will enable you to attain your independence in the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturbance and conflict. These proposals may not, of course, completely satisfy all parties, but you will recognise with us that at this supreme moment in Indian history statesmanship demands mutual accommodation.

We ask you to consider the alternative to acceptance of these proposals.....

(From V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India*. Calcutta 1957. Appendix IV, S. 470-475.)

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